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PREFACE
Innumerable scholars have examined virtually every 
phase of this country's Civil War. One facet of that momentous 
struggle which has received relatively little attention, 
however, is the way in which this conflict affected and 
altered the Federal government's relations with the Five 
Civilized Tribes of the Indian Territory. As the tide of war 
swept across the country and the United States abdicated all 
authority in the Indian Territory, the people of the Cherokee, 
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek and Seminole tribes had little 
choice except to break their ties with the Federal government 
and join forces with the South. Gradually this realignment was 
accomplished, and by the end of 1861 the Five Civilized Tribes, 
along with a number of smaller tribes, had established treaty 
relations with the new Confederate government. In the case of 
the Civilized Tribes, in no instance was total unity beneath 
the Confederate banner achieved, and by early 1862 the Federal 
government was faced with the task of sustaining an ever 
growing number of loyal tribesmen driven from their homes into 
Kansas by their rebel brethren and white secessionists.
In the long months and years following this exodus, all 
too often the interests of the loyal Indians were ignored as
iii
politicians and military men connived and fought to advance 
their own interests and those of their supporters. When 
hostilities ceased in 1865 the tribesmen of the Indian Territory 
had sustained losses probably as great as those inflicted on 
any people during the war. Nonetheless, all--both the loyal 
and the disloyal alike--were forced to do penance for their 
"traitorous" behavior by yielding to stringent Federal demands.
The history of this chain of events is as complex as it 
is unfortunate. If this study sheds some new light on those 
confusing years, years of great import for the Five Civilized 
Tribes, it will have fulfilled its purpose.
Any historical work reflects the combined efforts and 
talents of many people. To my ever patient directing professor. 
Dr. Donald J. Berthrong, I wish to express appreciation for 
the invaluable contribution he has made in guiding this study 
to its completion. I am also indebted to the other members 
of my committee. Dr. Arrell M. Gibson, Dr. Norman L. Crockett, 
Dr. Robert E. Shalhope and Dr. Joseph C. Pray, for their 
services in reading the text and making suggestions designed to 
make the finished product more worthy.
A special word of thanks must be extended to Mr. Jack 
Haley, assistant curator of the Western History Collections, 
University of Oklahoma, for the indispensable assistance which 
he has provided on numerous occasions. In addition, I owe a 
great debt of gratitude to the staffs of the following 
institutions: the Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City,
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the Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, the Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, 
and the National Archives, Washington, D. C.
To the following ladies, Mrs. Portia Stokes, Mrs.
Ruth F. Shoap, Mrs. Barbara Kirkland and Mrs. Cora Byers, all 
staff members of the Prescott Library, Louisiana Polytechnic 
Institute, I express my appreciation for assistance rendered 
in ferreting out much-needed research materials.
Finally, a few personal words. To my mother-in-law, 
Mrs. Helen Hill, I wish to extend my deepest gratitude for 
moral and financial support without which this project could 
not have been sustained. To two young gentlemen, David and 
Brooks, I express thanks for their long-suffering patience in 
putting up with only half a father for over a year. And to 
my devoted helpmate and wife, Evelyn, I owe a debt for which 
mere words are a totally inadequate recompense. Her always 
strong and courageous arm of support guided me through 
numerous tribulations which alone I never could have overcome.
S.D.B.
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THE CIVIL WAR AND THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES - 
A STUDY IN FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: WHITE MAN AND INDIAN
The problems facing the white man when he reached North
America were legion. Foremost among these was the necessity 
of resolving conflicting European claims to the continent. 
Arriving first the Spanish claimed all of North America, an 
assertion based upon Alexander Vi's bull of May, 1493. But 
as Sir Walter Raleigh later observed, papal bulls could not 
gore nearly so well as they could bellow. Refusing to respect
the sanctity of the Pope's decree, other European powers
eventually staked out footholds in the Spanish domain. Spain’s 
inability to repulse the intruders necessitated the formulation 
of some principle whereby conflicting claims could be resolved 
and perpetual war avoided.^
In terms of strict legal niceties, this problem was
^Wilcomb E. Washburn, "The Moral and Legal Justifi­
cations for Dispossessing the Indians," Seventeenth Century 
America, ed. James Morton Smith (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 17-18.
never resolved. A principle gradually emerged which held 
that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects 
or by whose authority it was made. To this principle the 
British added a corollary, known as the doctrine of effective 
occupation which argued that areas not actually colonized 
were open to anyone for the taking. Still, the question of 
conflicting claims remained unresolved, and the maritime 
powers thus resorted to Machiavellian tactics, settling
their rivalries as often as not through force of arms rather
2 - —
than jurisprudence.
A problem of equal perplexity and magnitude was that 
of living with the Indian Inhabitants of North America, and 
none of the powers dealt with this problem In exactly the same 
manner. While It Is extremely difficult to make accurate 
generalizations on early European-Indian relations. It appears 
that the English colonists soon concluded that the Indian 
had a title to his lands based on actual use, a claim that 
could not be summarily dismissed if constant warfare was 
to be avoided. While English colonists were by no means 
always scrupulous in observing this right, the colonial 
period is not without examples of English attempts to deal
^Opinion of John Marshall in Johnson and Graham* s 
Lessee vs. McIntosh, 8 Wheaton, p. 5 73; Max Savelle, The 
Origins of American Diplomacy; The International History of 
Anglo-America, 1492-T~763 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), 
pp. 27-28.
fairly with the Indians. Contrary to popular myth, the 
settlers of New England made attempts to treat the area's 
native inhabitants justly, and the crown on its part did not 
as a rule interfere with the internal affairs of the tribes. 
Actions such as these, however, produced no era of permanent 
peace between Englishmen and Indian. The greed of white 
colonists, the clash of alien cultures and, on occasion, 
Indian militancy combined to produce decades of intermittent 
conflict throughout the English colonies.^
After the outbreak of revolution in 1775, the 
Continental Congress quickly attempted to assume control 
over the Indians living east of the Mississippi River. 
Recognizing the military necessity of maintaining the friend­
ship of these tribes, the Continental Congress on June 16, 
1775 established a five member committee of Indian affairs. 
The following month Congress established three Indian 
departments--the northern, middle and southern departments-- 
and provided that commissioners were to be appointed to 
superintend the affairs of each.^ These initial efforts were 
followed by the negotiation of a treaty with the Delawares
^Alden T. Vaughn, New England Frontier Puritans and 
Indians 1620-16 75 (Boston: Littla, Brown, 1965), pp. 93-154, 
passim; William T. Hagan, American Indians (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 8; opinion ofJohn Marshall in 
WorChester v s . the State of Georgia, 6 Peters, p. 547.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1904), II, pp. 93, 174-75.
in 1778 and the signing of similar agreements with the 
Wyandots, Chippewas, Cherokees, Choctaws and Creeks, to name 
a few, in the immediate post-war period. In these pacts the 
Indians generally acknowledged themselves to be under the 
protection of the United States, tribal domains were delineated 
in great detail, and United States citizens were prohibited 
from settling on those lands reserved for the tribes. The 
Indians on their part relinquished all claims to those lands 
not within the boundaries spelled out in their respective 
treaties
Unfortunately, pledges of protection and friendship 
and the circumscription of tribal domains did not bring 
lasting peace between the white man and the red. The 
Americans, like their British predecessors, were plagued by 
numerous disputes, quarrels and conflicts, and in the face 
of these troubles some individuals began searching for a way 
in which the Indian and his white neighbors might peacefully 
occupy the same continent.
In 1803 a possible solution to the Indian question 
presented itself when the United States acquired the Territory 
of Louisiana from France. Perhaps part of this vast trackless
^Charles J. Kappler (ed.), Indian Affairs, Laws and 
Treaties. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), 
II, pp. 1-12, 19-25 (hereafter cited as Kappler, Laws and 
Treaties, II).
wilderness might be set aside for the resettlement of the 
Indian, leaving the area east of the Mississippi for the 
white man. In trying to reconcile the purchase of Louisiana 
with his strict constructionist views. President Thomas 
Jefferson sketched a proposed amendment to the Constitution 
defining the newly acquired territory's status. The 
provisions of this amendment clearly reveal that Jefferson 
envisioned using at least some of this new domain as an 
Indian reserve, for it granted Congress the authority "to 
exchange the right of occupancy in portions where the U. S. 
have full right for lands possessed by the Indians . . .  on 
the East side of the Mississippi. . . .
This amendment never became part of the Constitution. 
Jefferson's ideas on the Indian question must have carried 
weight, however, for the Louisiana Territorial Act of 1804 
contained a provision empowering the President to begin 
removal negotiations. Subsequent treaty talks were held on 
the question of resettlement, and as early as 1808, tribes 
from both north and south of the Ohio River had begun 
emigrating to the West. There they settled in a rather 
vaguely defined area known as the "Indian Country" encompassing
^Quoted in Everett S. Brown, The Constitutional 
History of the Louisiana Purchase 1803-1812 (Berkeley; 
University of California Press, 1920), pp. 38-39.
much of present day Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas and 
Oklahoma.^
At best this early removal program was a haphazard, 
poorly coordinated affair. Still, to national leaders it 
seemed that the best solution to the Indian question would 
be the resettlement of the Eastern tribes in areas west of 
the Mississippi uninhabited by the white man. President 
James Monroe in a message to Congress in January, 1825, 
voiced unqualified support of the proposal, an opinion 
concurred in by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun. But it was 
not until the administration of Andrew Jackson that the 
program of Indian removal and resettlement began in 
earnest.^
In his inaugural address of March 4, 1829 Jackson 
promised to deal fairly and liberally with the Indians. 
Jackson's position, however, as a strong supporter of the 
states that desired removal was already well known, and in 
his first annual message in December, 1829 he asked Congress
Walter Lowrie and Walter S. Franklin (eds.), 
American State Papers. Class II: Indian Affairs, II, pp. 
124-25 [hereafter cited as American State Papers, II);
A. M. Gibson, Oklahoma A History of Five Centuries (Norman: 
Harlow Publishing Corp., 1965) , p. 71 (hereafter cited as 
Gibson, Oklahoma); Luther B. Hill, A History of the State 
of Oklahoma (Chicago and New York: The Lewis Publishing 
Co., 1908), I, pp. 23-36 (hereafter cited as Hill, State of 
Oklahoma, I).
^Grant Foreman, Indian Removal The Emigration of the 
Five Civilized Tribes of Indians (Norman; University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1953), p. 7 (hereafter cited as Foreman, 
Indian Removal); American State Papers, II, pp. 541-44.
to consider the propriety of setting aside an ample district 
west of the Mississippi for the occupancy of the Eastern 
tribes. In keeping with Jackson's views Congress, after a 
bitter debate, in May, 1830 enacted the Indian Removal Act, 
placing in the President's hands the authority to proceed 
with the removal of the Eastern Indians from their ancestral 
domains. Agents of the administration quickly fanned out 
through the country from the Gulf to the Great Lakes calling 
Indian leaders into special councils where they were gorged 
with pork and beef, plied with whiskey and promises and urged 
to move west. The weaker and more primitive tribes of the 
North yielded with relatively little resistance to the 
blandishments of the whites, but the Jackson administration 
encountered more difficulty in dealing with the Cherokee, 
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek and Seminole tribes of the South.^ 
In part, the trouble which the Federal government had 
in negotiating with these tribes was of its own making.
Since Jefferson's administration the government had tried 
periodically to persuade these people to emigrate across the 
Mississippi. At the same time, however, it had paid agents 
and subsidized missionaries who encouraged the Indian to 
adopt the white man's ways. With the exception of the fierce 
and relatively isolated Seminoles, the major Southern tribes
^Foreman, Indian Removal, pp. 21-22; James D. 
Richardson (ed.) A Compilation of the Message and Papers of 
the Presidents (Washington: Bureau of National Literature 
and Art, 1909), II, pp. 438, 458.
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proved receptive to these Inducements. From the missionaries 
of various Protestant denominations, hundreds of Indian 
children in the decade following the end of the War of 1812 
received training in the agricultural, mechanical and house­
hold arts. Schools and Christian churches were established, 
constitutions and legal codes drafted, some Indian farmers 
began fencing off their lands, and a number of the more 
affluent acquired that ultimate accouterment of Southern 
civilization, Negro slaves.
This advancement in the arts of civilization proved 
embarrassing to the Jackson administration in more than one 
way. Jackson and his contemporaries usually attempted to 
justify Indian removal by trumpeting the alleged superiority 
of a farming to a hunting culture. This rationalization 
might have some ring of authenticity as long as those Indians 
being displaced were wandering nomads, but its authority was 
substantially reduced when applied to the tribes of the South. 
By 1830 these people were agriculturists as well as hunters 
and could not be classified as nomadic savages. In addition, 
their growing sophistication and familarity with the white 
man's institutions made it possible for the leaders of these
l^Mary E. Young, "Indian Removal and Land Allotment: 
The Civilized Tribes and Jacksonian Justice," American 
Historical Review, LXIV (October, 1958), pp. 32-33 (hereafter 
cited as Y oung, ''Remove1 and Allotment, AHR, LXIV); Angie 
Debo, And Still the Waters Run (New York: Gordian Press, 
1966), pp. 3-4 (hereafter cited as Debo, And Still); Edwin 
C. McReynolds, The Seminoles (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 195 7), p. ix.
tribes to parry effectively with Federal negotiators.^^
The process whereby the Jackson administration
ultimately secured the removal of the five Southern tribes
is a topic of enormous complexity beyond the scope of this
study. Suffice it to say that through a combination of
cajolery and threats these Indians gradually signed removal
treaties, beginning with the Choctaws in September, 1830
1 9and concluding with the Cherokees in December, 1835.
The subsequent trek to the West was not without its 
costs, the most obvious of which were the miseries and 
deprivations which the migrants endured. In the removal of 
the Southern Indians, the magnitude of the undertaking was 
never fully comprehended by either Congress or the Jackson 
administration. Thus, the careful planning and genuine 
compassion which the adoption of such a novel enterprise 
should have elicited were rarely, if ever, in evidence. 
Inadequate preparation by the government combined with the 
appointment of a horde of political incompetents to posts of
llyoung, "Removal and Allotment," AHR, LXIV, pp. 30- 
34; Debo, And Still, pp. 4-5.
l^Kappler, Laws and Treaties, II, pp. 221, 247, 249,
259, 264, 290, 324. The best general study of the removal of 
the Southern tribes is Grant Foreman's Indian Removal. For 
a more specialized account of certain facets of the removal 
question, especially the role played by white land speculators, 
see Young's Removal and Allotment," AHR, LXIV, pp. 31-45 and 
the same author's article "The Creek Frauds: A Study in 
Conscience and Corruption," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XLII (December, 1955), pp. 411-437.
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authority resulted in woeful mismanagement and cruel and 
unnecessary suffering by the emigrants. As one historian of 
the five Southern tribes has observed, much suffering was 
perhaps inevitable, but much could have been avoided by 
considerate and skillful preparation.
The Southern migrants who survived the horrors of 
removal settled within the confines of present day Oklahoma.
In this new land of great beauty and vast potential wealth 
the former tribes of the South re-couped their fortunes and 
made such remarkable social and political progress that in 
the years preceding the Civil War they became known as the 
Five Civilized Tribes. After the organization of the Kansas 
and Nebraska territories, in the turbulent 1850's, the area 
which they occupied acquired the title of the Indian 
Territory. The area inhabited by the Civilized Tribes was 
a territory only in an informal sense, however, for while 
numerous bills were introduced in Congress in the ante helium 
period providing for the establishment of a formal territorial 
government for these people, none passed.
The existence of the Civilized Tribes in the West 
was not completely devoid of hazards and difficulties.
Amicable relations had to be established with the indigenous 
tribes of the area such as the Osages, Kiowas and Comanches,
l^Foreman, Indian Remova1 , p. 8.
l^Debo, And Still, p. 5; Hill, State of Oklahoma, I, 
p. 21; Ira G. Clark, "Attempts to Form an Indian Confederation 
in Oklahoma" (Unpublished M.A. thesis. University of Oklahoma, 
1937), pp. 1-14.
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some of whom had threatened to exterminate the newcomers. 
Boundary lines separating the lands of the former Southern 
tribes had to be agreed upon and lands set aside for some of 
the smaller non-indigenous tribes settled in the area.^^
Perhaps the greatest of the problems to be faced was 
intra-tribal friction growing out of the dichotomy of 
interests and outlook of the full-blood and half-blood 
Indians. Long before the Civilized Tribes were forced from 
their ancestral homes in the East, with the exception of 
the Seminoles, intermarriage with the whites had become 
quite common. The children of these mixed marriages as a 
rule more willingly accepted the white man's ways while the 
conservative full-bloods generally wanted to preserve their 
ancient tribal customs.
The removal controversy exacerbated these opposing 
viewpoints. The mixed-bloods, with some exceptions 
were generally more willing to abandon their traditional 
homes than were the full-bloods. The mixed-blood, full- 
blood controversy was evident to some extent in all the 
tribes, but it was especially acute in the Creek and Cherokee 
tribes. Before the Creeks at last agreed to removal full- 
scale civil war very nearly developed between the conservative, 
full-blood Upper Creeks led by Opothleyahola and the
l^Gibson, Oklahoma, pp. 92-101. 
l^Ibid., pp. 167-69.
^^Young, "Removal and Allotment," AHR, LXIV, pp. 32-33
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progressive, mixed-blood Lower Creeks led by William 
18McIntosh.
The removal crisis among the Cherokees closely paralleled
that of the Creeks. After the full-blood majority, led by
John Ross, refused to accede to Federal demands, a treaty was
signed in 1835 with the Cherokee mixed-blood faction led
by Major Ridge. When at last the embittered full-bloods were
induced to migrate at bayonet point in 1838, they quickly
extracted revenge by assassinating Major Ridge and two of his
closest followers, his son John Ridge and Elias Boudinot in
June, 1839. Following these murders, Boudinot's younger
brother Stand Watie became the acknowledged leader of the
19Ridge or Treaty Party.
The elimination of some of the most prominent mixed- 
blood leaders doubtless helped John Ross maintain his 
leadership of the Cherokees. Quite obviously, however, the 
events of 1839 did nothing to promote a spirit of tribal 
unity. As the Cherokee Nation grew and prospered under the 
benevolent despotism of Ross, the partisans of each faction 
conducted a private civil war until 1846 when a treaty of 
peace was signed by the leaders of both parties. Thereafter 
a surface unity of sorts prevailed among the Cherokees with 
John Ross the perennial candidate for the office of principal
IBcibson, Oklahoma, pp. 86-90.
l^Ibid., p. 116: Mabel W. Anderson, "General Stand 
Watie," Chronicles of Oklahoma, X (1932), p. 543.
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9 nchief winning every election until his death in 1666.'—
Still, the seeds of discord, distrust and hostility 
were present not only among the Cherokees but among the 
other Civilized Tribes as well. And like elements in a 
delicate chemical formula, they needed only the stimulation 
of the proper catalyst to again come alive. That catalyst-- 
in the form of war between North and South--was provided in 
1861.
Gibson, Oklahoma, p. 140. For a thorough study of 
ante-bellum Cherokee factionalism see Gerard A. Reed, "The 
Ross-Watie Conflict: Factionalism in the Cherokee Nation, 
1839-1865," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Oklahoma, 196 7).
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CHAPTER II 
THE PIKE TREATIES
The Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes probably never 
understood the origins and significance of the American Civil 
War. Nonetheless the location of their country made it 
virtually impossible for these people to avoid involvement in 
the conflict. While possession of the Indian Territory could 
not in itself determine the outcome of the war, its control 
carried with it certain advantages. Situated adjacent to the 
states of Arkansas and Texas, the Territory in the hands of 
Union forces would pose a grave threat to the security of 
both these secessionist centers. Confederate domination of 
the area, on the other hand, would open southern Kansas to 
rebel attack. The Indian Territory in addition formed a 
natural bridge over which communications might be maintained 
with the far western territories. The side which controlled 
the Territory might also draw upon the area's natural resources 
and agricultural products to support its armies.^
A. M. Gibson, Oklahoma A History of Five Centuries 
(Norman: Harlow Publishing Corporation, 1965), pp. 194-95 
(hereafter cited as Gibson, Oklahoma).
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Long before the outbreak of hostilities in 1861, some 
perceived the potential value of the Indian Territory.
Indeed, much more attention was paid to the area before and 
immediately after the outbreak of hostilities than at any other 
time. Once the momentous conflict was fully underway, both 
sides seem to have given the Indian Territory only secondary 
consideration, concentrating their attention and their 
resources in what appeared to be more strategic theaters.
While residents of the newly established Kansas 
Territory frequently looked upon the Territory as some sort 
of dumping ground to which their own tribes might be removed, 
the slaveholders of Arkansas and Texas held a slightly more 
humane though no less selfish position. Rather than 
desiring to deprive the Indians of their lands, the main 
goal of these people was to suppress abolitionist propaganda 
and keep the area loyal to the South. In achieving these 
closely related goals Arkansas and Texas slaveholders could 
generally count on the support of the mixed-blood Indians,
Omany of whom were slaveholders themselves. They likewise 
could count on the support of Federal employees in the Indian 
Territory. From the 1830's onward almost all of the Indian
^Annie Abel, The Slaveholding Indians, Vol. I: The 
American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist (Cleveland:
The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1915), pp. 36-37, 6 7 (hereafter 
cited as Abel, Slaveholding Indians, I); Lois E. Forde, "Elias 
Cornelius Boudinot'* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1951), p. 77 (hereafter cited as Forde, "Boudinot")
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superintendents and agents in the area were Southern pro­
slavery men, and in the years leading up to the Civil War 
these superintendents and agents considered the appointment 
of civil servants, the granting of licenses to traders and 
even the hiring of agency employees, such as blacksmiths, in 
the light of whether the applicants were pro or anti- 
slavery.^
When the sectional crisis reached its climax in the 
dark days following Abraham Lincoln's election. Western 
secessionists went all out to convince the tribes of the 
Indian Territory that they must join forces with the South.^ 
One of the most active of these individuals was Arkansas' 
new governor, Henry M. Rector. Elected and inaugurated in 
the fall of 1860, Rector worked in favor of secession from 
the outset of his administration.^ In one of his first 
actions in office Rector appointed an aide. Lieutenant 
Colonel J. J. Gaines, to visit the tribes west of Arkansas 
in an effort to win their support.^ Realizing that winning 
the allegiance of the powerful and influential Cherokees 
would be a masterful stroke Rector on January 29, 1861
^Forde, "Boudinot," pp. 77, 80.
4lbid., p. 80.
^Abel, Slaveholding Indians, I, p. 103.
^Article in the Van Buren Press, January 4, 1861 
(typescript copy in the Grant Foreman Papers, Indian Records 
Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City).
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addressed a letter to Principal Chief John Ross. The 
incoming administration, claimed Rector, looked upon the 
Indian country as a fruitful field for the harvest of 
abolitionists, freesoilers and Northern charlatans. By 
contrast the Indian Territory and the slave states were 
linked in a "common brotherhood" based on their attitudes 
and institutions as well as the contiguity of their 
territories. Now that the secession of the slaveholding 
states was almost certain Rector expressed the hope that 
the tribes of the Territory would cooperate with the South 
in defending her "institutions, honor and firesides. . . ."^ 
Texas was not to be outdone in the effort to win 
Indian support. Despite the opposition of Governor Sam 
Houston a secession convention convened on January 28,
1861. Before adjourning on February 5, the delegates at 
this convention appointed a three member commission to proceed 
to the Indian Territory and urge the tribes of the area to
g
join forces with the emerging Confederacy.
At first glance it would appear that emissaries from 
the Southern states would stand little chance of winning 
Indian support. States such as Georgia, Alabama and
^Henry M. Rector to John Ross, January 29, 1861, 
John Ross Papers, Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American 
History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
^Rupert N. Richardson, Texas The Lone Star State 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J .: Prentice Hall, 1958), pp. 184-85; 
Abel, Slaveholding Indians, I, p. 82.
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Mississippi had been responsible for the brutal expulsion 
of the Five Civilized Tribes from their native homes, and 
while time had probably dimmed some memories of past wrongs, 
they had not been entirely forgotten. Despite this legacy 
of heartache, the South in 1861 had a number of factors 
working in its favor.
One of the most obvious of these was the fact that
every agent in the Indian Territory in early 1861 was a 
9Southerner. So was Elias Rector, superintendent of the 
Southern Superintendency. Men such as these were of great 
assistance to the South in fanning the flames of secessionist 
sentiment in the Indian Territory. The efforts of Federal 
employees were on occasion backed by the activities of 
Christian missionaries in the Territory. One of the most 
ardent supporters of secession among the Indians, for 
example, was Dr. Cyrus Kingsbury, the oldest missionary in 
the Choctaw Nation.
Another factor of great importance was tribal 
dissatisfaction over the Federal government's reluctance to 
meet its treaty obligations. At the very time that 
secessionists were striving to obtain Indian allegiance to
^Abel, Slaveholding Indians, I, p. 82.
^^Orlando Lee to William P. Dole, March 15, 1862, 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern 
Superintendency, National Archives, Microcopy 234, Roll 834.
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the Confederacy several of the tribes were striving to 
secure the settlement of long pending issues.
One of the most complex of these matters was the 
Choctaw Net Proceeds Claim. By the terms of the Treaty of 
Dancing Rabbit Creek of 1830, the Choctaws were forced to 
exchange their remaining lands in Mississippi for a new 
domain west of Arkansas. After selling the old Choctaw 
lands in Mississippi, amounting to about ten mission acres, 
and after the deduction of administrative expenses, the 
Federal government had reaped a huge profit. The Choctaws 
subsequently claimed that these proceeds should be turned 
over to the tribe, for prior to the signing of the treaty 
of 1830 the United States commissioners had assured them 
that the Federal government had no desire to profit from 
the sale of Choctaw lands. Accordingly, on November 9,
1853 the Choctaw National Council appointed a four member 
commission composed of Peter P. Pitchlynn, Israel Folsom,
Dixon W. Lewis and Samuel Garland to settle all claims which 
the Choctaw people had against the Federal government.
After their arrival in Washington the Choctaw delegates 
employed attorney Albert Pike, a New Englander who had lived 
for many years in Arkansas and was well known among the 
Indians. Pike's task was to assist the delegation in
l^David Baird, "Peter Pitchlynn: Choctaw Delegate" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 
1968), pp. 123-62 passim (hereafter cited as Baird, 
"Pitchlynn").
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securing the hoped for indemnification. After a lengthy 
series of negotiations with Federal officials a new treaty 
was signed by the Choctaw delegates on June 22, 1855. Among 
its provisions this agreement provided that the United 
States Senate would determine whether the Choctaws were 
entitled to the Net Proceeds of their land or a gross sum 
in satisfaction of their claims against the United States.
The decision of the Senate was to be final.
A complicated series of legal maneuvers and 
Congressional hearings followed. After strenuous exertions 
on the part of Pitchlynn a measure of success was achieved 
in 1861. On March 2, 1861 Congress appropriated $500,000 
to meet the Net Proceeds Claim, one-half to be paid in cash 
and the other half in bonds. Quite possibly, however, this 
victory simply reinforced old images of Federal indifference 
to Indian interests, for while the $250,000 in cash was paid 
to the Choctaws on April 18, 1861 the $250,000 in bonds was 
not delivered. Furthermore, this $500,000 settlement was far 
short of the almost $3,000,000 which Secretary of the 
Interior Jacob Thompson had said the Choctaws were entitled
to.
l^Ibid.; Charles J. Kappler (ed.), Indian Affairs. 
Laws and Treaties (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1903), II, pp. 533-34 (hereafter cited as Kappler, Laws and 
Treaties, II).
l^Baird, "Pitchlynn," pp. 123-62 passim.
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The Chickasaws, like the Choctaws, had long-standing 
grievances against the United States. One of these was their 
desire to secure a reduction in the size of United States 
military reservations in the Chickasaw c o u n t r y . O f  more 
importance was their claim growing out of the treaty of 
1852. Since removal days the Chickasaws had maintained that 
their tribal funds accruing from their treaties of 1832 
and 1834 had been mismanaged by Federal officials.
Accordingly a new treaty was negotiated in 1852. Under the 
fourth article of this agreement the Interior Department was 
to compile an account "exhibiting in detail all the moneys 
which . . . have been placed in the Treasury to the credit
of the Chickasaw Nation, resulting from the treaties of 
1832 and 1834, and all the disbursements made therefrom,
As of 1861 the Interior Department had not fulfilled 
its treaty commitment. Not surprisingly, in a letter to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in March, 1861 Chickasaw 
delegates Edmund Pickens, James Gamble and Sampson Folsom 
expressed bewilderment at the Federal government's tardiness 
in this matter. They confessed that they were about ready
l^cyrus Harris to James Buchanan, October 20, 1860, 
Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, 
Indian Division, Record Group 48, National Archives, Letters 
Received.
the Chickasaws took exception to any portion of 
this account, their objections would be referred to the 
secretary of the interior for adjudication. Kappler, Laws 
and Treaties, II, p. 443.
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to conclude that the delay arose from an "indisposition"
on the part of the Federal government to treat them justly.
The Cherokees likewise had cause to complain. Among
these people dissatisfaction grew out of uncertainty
concerning the final disposition of the Cherokee Neutral
Lands, an 800,000 acre tract added to the Cherokee domain in
the West in the tribe's final removal treaty of December 29,
1835.^^ Despite treaty provisions specifically prohibiting
such actions, this area had been incorporated into the Kansas
Territory, and by 1860 at least 700 white families were
living on these lands. Cherokee officials recognized the
futility of trying to maintain control of the area, and
attempts were made prior to the outbreak of the Civil War
to retrocede these lands to the United States. Disagreements
concerning the financial arrangments, however, prevented a
settlement of the matter, a fact duly noted by officials of
18the Confederate states.
l^Edmund Pickens et £l to William P. Dole, March 16, 
1861, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 
Chickasaw Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 142.
As late as April 3, 1861 the Chickasaw delegates 
submitted to the Indian Office a proposal to place the entire 
national fund under the control of the Chickasaw legislature. 
No action seems to have been taken on the proposal, however.
l^Kappler, Laws and Treaties, II, pp. 325-26.
1 8^°John Ross e^ £l to A. B. Greenwood, nd, John Ross 
Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Bizzell Library, University 
of Oklahoma, Norman; Grace Steele Woodward, The Cherokees 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 260 (here- 
after cited as Woodward, Cherokees).
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Among the Seminoles, Federal failure to make annuity 
payments had created discontent by 1860. The United States 
government's lack of promptness In paying annuities seems 
to have been a perpetual Indian complaint, but the failure 
to make these payments became an especially crucial matter 
Immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War. Faced by 
the worst drought In thirty years, a drought which caused 
widespread crop failures In the Indian Territory, the tribes 
desperately needed their money In order to buy food for their 
needy citizens. In the crucial months Immediately before and 
after the outbreak of war, more than one agent In the Indian 
Territory urged the Immediate payment of annuity funds to 
relieve the Immense suffering brought on by the drought.
Even the forces of nature It appears were conspiring to 
create a sense of malaise among the tribes of the Indian
1QTerritory.
Perhaps even more crucial than any sense of wrong 
growing out of unfulfilled treaty stipulations was the 
Indians' desire to maintain their territorial Integrity.
With regard to this crucial matter the South, from the
Ellas Rector to A. B. Greenwood, August 9, 1860, 
Letters Received, O.I.A., Seminole Agency, N.A., Microcopy 
234, Roll 803; John Crawford to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, May 20, 1861, Letters Received, O.I.A., Cherokee 
Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 99; A. B. Greenwood to 
Moses Kelly, January 20, 1861, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters 
Received; Abel, Slaveholding Indians, I, pp. 5 7-58.
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Indians' point of view, clearly had the upper hand as of
1861. To the tribes of the Territory it doubtless appeared
that the policy of the Federal government had by this time
become almost completely identified with the interests of
land-hungry Westerners. No less a person than Robert J.
Walker, governor of the Kansas Territory, had stated in
185 7 that the Indian Territory should soon become a state
in the Union, adding pointedly that the Indian treaties
would pose no obstacle to the accomplishment of this goal.
At the Republican national convention of 1860 in what was
surely one of the most impolitic statements of his career,
William H. Seward had said that the Indian Territory south
20of Kansas must be vacated by the Indians. When to the
anxieties which statements such as these must have created
among the Indians are added considerations such as the fear
of financial loss resulting from the possible emancipation
of the slaves, the investment of tribal funds in Southern
state bonds, blood ties between mixed-blood Indians and
Southern white families as well as commerical ties due to
the southward flow of the territory's rivers and streams, it
is easy to understand why the Indians were receptive to
21Southern advances.
The Confederate government wasted little time in
^®Abel, Slaveholding Indians, 1, pp. 58-59; Forde, 
"Boudinot," pp. 72-73.
Zlcibson, Oklahoma, p. 194; Abel, Slaveholding 
Indians, 1, p. 61.
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exploiting its advantages. As early as February, 1861, the 
provisional Confederate Congress adopted a resolution to 
look into the expediency of opening negotiations with the 
western Indian tribes. On March 4, 1861, the Congress passed 
a resolution authorizing President Jefferson Davis to send 
a special agent to the Indian tribes west of Arkansas, and 
on the fifteenth of that same month a law was enacted 
establishing a Bureau of Indian Affairs under the supervision 
of the Confederate War Department. The following day. 
President Davis appointed David Hubbard, an Alabamian totally 
unfamiliar with Indian affairs, commissioner of the new 
bureau. Here, probably because of the pressing nature of 
other questions, matters stood for a while.
In May, 1861, the executive branch of the Confederate 
government finally invoked the authority granted in the 
resolution of March 4. Sometime in early May, Secretary of 
State Robert Toombs forwarded a somewhat ambiguous commission 
to Albert Pike, the same individual who had aided the 
Choctaws in the Net Proceeds litigation. Under the terms of 
this commission Pike was instructed to visit the Indian tribes 
west of Arkansas, assure them of the friendship of the 
Confederate states and induce them to join forces with the 
Confederacy. Much to Pike's disappointment, however, Toombs
Abel, Slaveholding Indians, I, pp. 127-29; Walter 
Lee Brown, "Albert Pike 1809-1891" (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Texas, 1955), pp. 539-40 
(hereafter cited as Brown, "Pike").
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had not specifically authorized the negotiation of formal
23treaties with the Indians.
Pike was convinced that Indian allegiance could never 
be achieved without the negotiation of treaties guaranteeing 
the tribes the same rights that they enjoyed in their 
treaties with the United States. In a letter of reply 
written to Toombs on May 20, he freely expressed his own 
views. In this communique Pike expressed regrets that he 
had received neither arms, money, supplies nor authority to 
guarantee Indian treaty rights. At least 1,000 rifles and 
$60,000 should be sent immediately, to be followed by 
another 1,000 rifles and perhaps an additional $40,000 
as soon as possible. Finally, Pike informed the secretary 
of state that since he had been directed to act at his 
discretion and since he had not been forbidden to give the 
Indians ample guarantees that their previous treaty rights 
would be maintained, he would give such guarantees, if 
possible, through the negotiation of treaties.
While Pike and Toombs were ironing out these difficulties. 
Secretary of War Leroy P. Walker adopted a separate line of 
action. On May 13, the secretary assigned Brigadier General 
Benjamin McCulloch to the command of the military district 
embracing the Indian Territory. Without waiting for the
^^Brown, "Pike," pp. 540-41; Gibson, Oklahoma, p. 196 
^^Brown, "Pike," pp. 541-42.
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establishment of formal alliances, on that same day Walker
dispatched a letter to Douglas H. Cooper who technically was
still serving as United States agent to the Choctaw and
Chickasaw tribes. Cooper was empowered to raise a mounted
regiment among these two tribes. Once organized and enlisted,
if possible for a twelve month period, the regiment was to
be received into the Confederate service and supplied with
arms. Finally on May 14, the secretary ordered Commissioner
of Indian Affairs Hubbard to proceed immediately to the
Indian Territory where he was to strive to bring the tribes
of the area under the protection of the Confederate
government. Walker, like Toombs, made no mention of negotiating
actual treaties, and he specifically instructed Hubbard not
to commit the Confederacy to any financial obligations to 
25the Indians.
The provisional Congress of the Confederacy simultane­
ously pursued still another course. In an act passed on 
May 17 and approved by President Davis four days later.
Congress annexed the Indian Territory to the Confederate 
states and placed all its tribes under the protection of the 
Confederacy. This enactment conceded that Confederate control 
over the Territory would be subject to the rights and 
privileges guaranteed to the Indians under United States 
treaties and statutes. But the enactment stipulated that
Z^lbid., pp. 542-43; Leroy P. Walker to D. H. Cooper, 
May 13, 1861, Cherokee Nation Papers— Civil War Letters, 
1861-1874, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma.
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this concession would not commit the Confederacy to the
expenditure of money for financial obligations contracted
by the Federal government. Under the terms of this statute,
however, the Confederate government assumed full power of
trustee over all Indian funds invested by the United States
9 Ain bonds of the Confederate states.
Of the various individuals commissioned to treat with 
the Indians, Albert Pike by far played the most important 
role. Poor health sharply curtailed Commissioner Hubbard's 
activities in the West, and the emissaries sent out by Texas 
and Arkansas probably did about as much harm as good for the 
Confederate cause through their indiscriminate use of
^^Brown, "Pike," p. 544.
The eighth section of this act required the commissioner 
of Indian affairs to publish at an early date a summary 
statement of the bonds of the states of the Confederacy held 
in trust by the United States government for the tribes of 
the Indian Territory. Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
S. S. Scott presented the required abstract on January 17,
1862. This summation revealed that tribal funds were 
invested in bonds of the secessionist states of Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Virginia and Arkansas, as well as in bonds of Missouri and 
Kentucky, states which technically never seceded. In 
addition portions of the Chickasaw national fund were invested 
in bonds of the Richmond and Danville Rail Road and the 
Nashville and Chattanooga Rail Road, guaranteed by the states 
of Virginia and Tennessee, respectively.
In a supplementary act of January 10, 1862, the 
Confederate Congress instructed its constituent states to 
deposit in the Confederate treasury "all sums of money, bonds 
or securities of any kind belonging to the Indian tribes" with 
whom the Confederacy had relations. See Letter of the 
Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs . . . iji Regard to 
Certain Indian Trust Funds, January 17, 1862, (RichmonHT Ritchie
and Dunnavant, 1862). Copy in the John Ross MSS, Gilcrease...
Institute, Tulsa.
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11scare tactics. Through the use of diplomacy, with a 
slight sprinkling of coercion. Pike, aided by General 
McCulloch, negotiated the treaties making the Indians formal 
allies of the Confederacy.
Before entering the Indian Territory, Pike made 
rather extensive preparations. He consulted with General 
McCulloch, after the letter's arrival in Little Rock, and 
explained the general terms which he was going to offer the 
Indians. After receiving a $500 appropriation from the 
Arkansas secession convention. Pike traveled by steamer to 
Fort Smith, arriving there Saturday, May 25, 1861.
At Fort Smith additional preparations were made. 
Meetings were held with Southern Superintendent Elias Rector 
and Seminole Agent Samuel M. Rutherford, and both agreed to 
continue their duties under the Confederacy. A similar 
agreement was reached with Choctaw and Chickasaw Agent Douglas 
H. Cooper. Perhaps most importantly, at Fort Smith Pike met 
with a delegation representing the anti-Ross Cherokees. Pike 
assured these individuals that the Confederacy would protect 
them if they took up arms for the South, and, preparing for 
all contingencies, he dispatched letters to the leaders of 
the anti-Ross group asking them to meet him at the Creek 
Agency two days after his talk with the Cherokee chief. After
27The Arkansas ordinance of secession passed on May 6, 
1861, followed four days later by the passage of a resolution 
authorizing the president of the secession convention to 
appoint a three member delegation to visit the Ipdian 
Territory. Abel, Slaveholding Indians, I, p. 119.
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sending off another letter to Secretary of War Toombs 
complaining about the absence of definite treaty-making 
authority. Pike departed Fort Smith for the Indian country 
on May 29.
While the Confederacy pushed ahead persistently with 
its plans, the Federal government was thrashing in a sea of 
confusion. Adherence to the traditions of the spoils system 
would undoubtedly have prompted the incoming Lincoln 
administration to make changes in the Indian service, even 
if normal conditions had prevailed. The fact that the 
appointees of the Buchanan administration were openly working 
for the Confederacy now made such changes imperative if the 
new administration hoped to maintain ties with the Indians.
Lincoln, the political pragmatist, at first attempted 
to fill vacated positions with Southern Unionists. Undoubtedly 
he hoped that such appointments would boost the spirits of 
Union sympathizers--both Indian and white--in the area and 
help the Federal government maintain some semblance of 
influence in the Indian country. His efforts were less than 
successful. On April 5, 1861, Secretary of the Interior 
Caleb Smith telegraphed Arkansan Samuel L. Griffith notifying
Brown, "Pike," pp. 547-52; Albert Pike to Robert 
Toombs, May 29, 1861, The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation 
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 
"(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902 ) Series IV, i, 
pp. 580-81 (hereafter cited as OR, with series number given 
in upper-case numerals and the volume number given in lower­
case numerals).
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him of his appointment as Southern Superintendent- Griffith 
at first accepted the position, saying that his appointment 
greatly pleased his fellow Unionists in Arkansas and the 
Indian Territory, but quickly lost his courage and declined 
the offer. The position was accepted the following month by 
William G. Coffin of Indiana. Meanwhile, William Quesenbury 
of Arkansas declined Lincoln's offer to serve as Creek agent, 
preferring instead to serve the Confederacy in the same 
capacity. Quesenbury's fellow Arkansan John Crawford 
accepted an appointment from the administration as Cherokee 
agent and then used his position to promote the Confederate 
cause. Not until late 1862, long after the Civilized Tribes 
had aligned with the Confederacy, did the vexed administration 
succeed in filling all the vacated agency positions.^9 This 
difficulty, combined with the withdrawal of United States 
troops left the tribes of the Indian Territory bereft of 
practically all Federal protection.
At the outbreak of hostilities in 1861, there were four 
active military posts in and near the Indian Territory.
Poised at its eastern edge on the Arkansas River was Fort 
Smith, the "mother post of the Southwest," one of the most
29sarauel L. Griffith to Caleb Smith, April 10 and 
April 20, 1861, and Smith to William P. Dole, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 
234, Roll 834; John Crawford to Dole, April 23 and June 13, 
1861, Letters Received, O.I.A., Cherokee Agency, N.A. , 
Microcopy 234, Roll 99; Brown, "Pike," p. 547.
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important supply depots west of the Mississippi. In the
Territory itself there was Fort Washita located near present
day Tishimingo, Oklahoma, Fort Arbuckle located sixty miles
northwest of Fort Washita, and Fort Cobb. This particular
post was situated 160 miles northwest of Fort Washita in the
Leased District, an area leased by the United States in 1855
from the Choctaws and Chickasaws for the settlement of
remnants of certain Texas tribes such as the Wichitas and
Caddoes and certain Comanche bands. Altogether in 1861,
30these posts contained only about 700 men.
As the omnious cloud of secession grew darker.
Federal commanders in these outlying areas turned to Washington 
for instructions. In December, 1860, Major General David 
E. Twiggs., a native of Georgia who commanded Federal forces 
in Texas, sent off two anxious inquiries to the commanding 
general of the army, Winfield Scott. What should be done 
with Federal property in the state if Texas seceded?
Correctly perceiving the serious political implications of 
the situation. General Scott concluded that policy decisions 
of such great importance should be made by the President.
In a note of reply written by one of his aides. General Scott, 
therefore, declined to issue any special instructions to
H. Emory to E. D. Townsend, May 19, 1861, and 
Townsend to the Secretary of War, March 27, 1861, OT, I, i, 
pp. 648-49, 659-60; Abel, Slaveholding Indians, pp. 51-52; 
Edwin C. Bearss and A. M. Gibson, Fort Smith; Little 
Gibraltar on the Arkansas (Norman: University o£ Oklahoma 
Press, 1969y, p. 2l4.
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Twiggs. Instead he attempted to console Twiggs by predicting 
that the Buchanan administration would reach some decision
O Ion this question before any crisis developed in Texas.
Predictions such as this were a poor substitute for 
definite instructions. As President Buchanan frittered away 
precious time, secessionist sentiment swept across the South. 
In desperation General Twiggs, who had not yet been advised 
upon a plan of action if Texas seceded, on January 15,
1861 asked to be relieved of his command. His request was 
approved, and orders were issued on January 28 placing 
Colonel Carlos A. Waite in charge of the Federal forces in 
Texas. Orders were subsequently issued by General Winfield 
Scott on February 15, 1861 instructing Waite to march all the 
troops in his command northward to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
o 2without unnecessary delay if Texas left the Union.
^^David E. Twiggs to Winfield Scott, December 13,
1860, OR, 1, i, p. 5 79; David E . Twiggs to Lorenzo Thomas, 
December 27, 1860, ibid.; George W. Lay to David E. Twiggs, 
December 28, 1860, ibid., pp. 579-80.
S^David E. Twiggs to Winfield Scott, January 15, 1861, 
ibid., p. 581; Special Orders No. 22, January 28, 1861, ibid., 
p. 584; Lorenzo Thomas to C. A. Waite, February 15, 1861, 
ibid., pp. 589-90.
The role played by President Buchanan in the decision 
to abandon the Texas outposts appears to have been minimal.
One of Scott's biographers indicates that Federal military 
policy during the early months of 1861 was formulated by Scott 
and Joseph Holt, a Kentucky Unionist recently appointed 
secretary of war. During this crucial period Scott was fully 
converted to the policy advocated by William H. Seward, 
Lincoln's secretary of state designate. Seward favored 
conciliation of the South if possible and an avoidance of 
armed coercion so long as there remained the faintest hope of 
peaceful adjustment. Charles W. Homer, Winfield Scott The 
Soldier and the Man (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), 
pp. 684-96.
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Before these instructions reached Texas, indeed,
before Waite could assume his new command, events in the
state reached the crisis point. On February 16, 1861
representatives of the Texas secession convention demanded
that Twiggs surrender all Federal installations in the state.
On February 18, 1861 Twiggs agreed to capitulate and the
Texans promised to grant the Federal troops safe passage out
of the state by way of the Gulf Coast. When Waite assumed
command on February 19 he quickly approved this arrangement,
33seeing that his forces were badly outnumbered.
The situation of the Federal facilities in Arkansas 
was as precarious as those in Texas. As secessionist 
sentiment increased, Arkansans became more restive with the 
maintenance of Federal military outposts in their state. On 
January 29, 1861 Captain James Totten, commander of the Little 
Rock Arsenal, warning the Buchanan administration that trouble 
lay ahead for his command, pleaded for instructions as to what 
course of action to f o l l o w . T h e r e  was no immediate response
^^Thomas J. Devine et al to David E. Twiggs, February 
16, 1861, OR, I, i, p. 513; Twiggs to Devine, February 18,
1861, ibid., pp. 515-16; C. A. Waite to Lorenzo Thomas,
February 26, 1861, ibid., pp. 521-22.
Twiggs received the orders relieving him on February 
15, 1861 but Waite's absence from Federal headquarters at San 
Antonio prevented the general from turning over the command 
to Waite until February 19. In the meantime, the pressure of 
circumstances had forced the surrender of the Federal positions 
David E. Twiggs to Lorenzo Thomas, February 18, 1861, ibid., 
p. 590; General Orders No. 7, February 19, 1861, ibid., p. 591.
^^James Totten to Samuel Cooper, ibid., p. 638.
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from Washington. Suddenly on February 6, as bands of armed
citizens poured into Little Rock from all over the state,
Governor Rector demanded the surrender of the arsenal. This
demand was followed by a series of exchanges between the
Governor and Totten. Substantially outnumbered, and by his
own admission absolutely uninformed regarding the wishes of
the Buchanan administration, Totten surrendered the arsenal
on February 8, 1861 after receiving assurances that his men
would be given safe passage out of the state. A few days
later, Totten's command departed for St. Louis by steamer.
Arkansas secessionists next began operations against
Fort Smith by seizing at Napoleon, Arkansas, a consignment
of supplies bound for that outpost. The exact date of the
seizure is not known, but officials at the headquarters of
the Department of the West in St. Louis learned of it on
February 12. The information was apparently relayed by
telegraph to Washington, for on February 13, 1861, General
Scott ordered the abandonment of Fort Smith. At the insistence
of Arkansas Unionists, however, this order was retracted on 
36February 22. Here matters stood for the remainder of
James Totten to Samuel Cooper, February 6, 1861, 
ibid., pp. 639-40; Henry M. Rector to Totten, February 6,
1861, ibid., p. 643; Henry M. Rector to James Totten, February 
7, 1861, ibid., p. 644; Surrender Agreement, February 8, 1861, 
ibid., ppl R4-45; Orders No. 6, February 12, 1861, ibid. , 
p. 646.
36Justus McKinstry to Seth Williams, February 12, 1861, 
ibid., p. 646; Lorenzo Thomas to Brigadier General William S. 
Harney, February 13, 1861, ibid., p. 654; Francis H. Wolfe 
and James M. Ward to the Secretary of War, February 22, 1861, 
ibid., p. 655; Winfield Scott to William S. Harney, February 
22, 1861, ibid., p. 656.
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the Buchanan administration.
One of the first problems faced by the Lincoln 
administration was the disposition of the Federal outposts 
located on the periphery of the Confederate States. In the 
prolonged, agonizing debate over Fort Sumter, the focal point 
and symbol of Southern defiance of Federal authority, the 
fate of the Western outposts received only secondary conside­
ration. But on March 18, 1861, the War Department issued 
somewhat imprecise orders dealing with the Indian Territory. 
Forts Washita, Arbuckle and Cobb were placed under the 
command of Lieutenant Colonel William H. Emory, a native of 
Maryland who at the time was in the nation's capital.
Emory was instructed to station himself at Fort Washita, and 
concentrate the troops at Fort Arbuckle and Fort Cobb in 
the Fort Washita area unless, in his judgment the safety of
the troops and the interests of the United States demanded
37a different disposition.
Emory felt uncomfortable with the discretionary powers 
he had been given and asked for more specific instructions.
In particular he wanted to know what should be done about 
defending Fort Smith, the supply depot for the Indian 
Territory forts. Answering through one of his aides. 
Assistant Adjutant-General E. D. Townsend, General Scott
^^E. D. Townsend to William H. Emory, March 18, 1861, 
OR, I, i, p. 656.
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declined to give more precise instructions with regard to
the Indian Territory. He did say, however, that Emory
should provide assistance in guarding Fort Smith if the post
commander asked for it. And if Arkansas seceded, the
Federal troops were to withdraw from the state immediately.^®
Following the receipt of this communique, Emory left
Washington for his assignment. While enroute Emory sent word
to the post commander at Fort Arbuckle, telling him to begin
moving his troops to Fort Washita. Arriving at Fort Smith
in early April, he sent word on April 6 to Fort Cobb ordering
about half its troops likewise to repair to Fort Washita.
Under the original orders of April 6, the Leased District
Indians living in the Fort Cobb area were to be permitted to
accompany the troops if they desired, but when Emory learned
that the Choctaws and Chickasaws might object to these
Indians entering their own domains, this portion of the order 
39was suspended. After the issuance of this suspension,
Emory seems to have given Indian affairs no further conside­
ration. Never, apparently, did he consider trying to use his 
force to stiffen Indian resistance to Confederate entreaties. 
Never, apparently, did he consider trying to join forces with
®®E. D. Townsend to William H. Emory, March 21, 1861, 
ibid., p. 659.
^^William H. Emory to E. D. Townsend, April 2, 1861,
and William H. Emory to the Commanding Officer at Fort Cobb,
April 6 and 10, 1861, ibid., pp. 660-64.
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any of the pro-Union Indians. His own consideration was 
the safety of his troops, and if their welfare meant the 
abandonment of the Indian Territory, the tribes therein 
must simply shift for themselves.
Before leaving Fort Smith for Fort Washita, Emory had 
already become impressed with the precariousness of the 
Federal positions he commanded. On April 13, 1861 he asked 
Washington to consider the position of the Federal troops 
in the Indian Territory if Arkansas seceded, thus closing 
off the best and most direct lines of communication and 
supply. While on the road to Fort Washita on April 18 he 
dispatched a similar message to departmental headquarters 
in St. Louis.
Following Emory's departure from Fort Smith, important 
events occurred in rapid succession. On April 18 or 19-- 
the exact date is not clear--a large consignment of supplies 
bound for Fort Smith and the Indian Territory forts was 
seized at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. By the time these goods were 
captured. Governor Rector was planning to use state troops 
to attack Fort Smith itself. Learning that a force equipped 
with artillery had been dispatched by the governor for that 
purpose. Captain Samuel Sturgis abandoned the post on the 
evening of April 23. Retreating southwestward, Sturgis
^^illiam H. Emory to E. D. Townsend, April 13, 1861,
and William H. Emory to Seth Williams, April 18, 1861, ibid.,
pp. 665-66, 668.
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reached Fort Washita on April 30. Emory, realizing that his 
command was now almost completely isolated and rapidly running 
out of supplies, began an immediate retreat toward Kansas.
With the loss of only two deserters he reached Fort Leavenworth 
on May 31, 1861.^^
Unwittingly, in undertaking this movement, Emory had 
obeyed to the letter orders issued by General Scott. On 
April 17, five days after South Carolina's attack on Fort 
Sumter, Scott instructed Emory to retreat with his men to 
Fort Leavenworth. Emory, however, did not receive these 
orders until he had started his retreat on his own initiative 
In the light of the Federal withdrawal, Albert Pike, 
in theory, should have had an easy time in his negotiations.
But he did not. While some of the Indians willingly embraced 
the Confederate cause others refused to do so with a tenacity 
that imperiled both life and limb.
The spectre of secession and disunion prompted the 
Chickasaws to act as early as January, 1861. On January 5, 
the Chickasaw legislature passed an act calling on the Cherokee, 
Creek, Seminole and Choctaw tribes to join with them in
41william Burns to Joseph P. Taylor, April 21, 1861, 
ibid., p. 647; William H. Emory to E. D. Townsend, May 10 and 
May 31, 1861, ibid., pp. 648-49; R. C. Gatlin to Lorenzo 
Thomas, April 24, 1861, ibid., p. 650; Samuel D. Sturgis to 
Seth Williams, May 21, l86l, ibid., pp. 650-51; Alexander 
Montgomery to Seth Williams, April 24, 1861, ibid., p. 651.
^^E. D. Townsend to William H. Emory, April 17, 1861,
and William H. Emory to E. D. Townsend, May 19, 1861, ibid.,
pp. 648-49, 667.
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holding an intertribal council. The stated purpose of this 
council was to persuade the tribes to adopt some common policy 
designed to protect both tribal and Individual rights In the 
event that the union of states was dissolved.43
Possibly because of Its fairly convenient location at 
the junction of the North Fork and the Canadian, the Creek 
Agency was chosen as the site of the proposed council. 
Centrality of location, however, did not promote large 
attendance. Prior to the convening of the council, the 
Choctaws staked out their own Independent course of action.
On February 7, the Choctaw General Council passed a set of 
resolutions decrying the present crisis In national affairs 
while voicing the determination of the tribe to join Its 
destiny with that of the Southern states If disunion 
o c c u r r e d . 44 After taking this rather emphatic stand the 
Choctaws apparently felt no need to attend any policy formu­
lating council. Strangely enough, the Chickasaws likewise 
did not attend the conclave which they themselves had proposed.
Of the three remaining Civilized Tribes that sent 
delegates, the Cherokees appear to have had the dominant voice. 
And under Cherokee Influence, the Intertribal council decided 
upon a policy which a later generation would call watchful
^^Typescrlpt copy of the law found In John Ross MSS, 
Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma.
44Abel, Slaveholding Indians, I, pp. 71-72. For a 
copy of the Choctaw resolutions see OR, I, 1, p. 682.
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waiting., a policy favored by Chief John Ross. In addressing 
the Cherokee National Council in October, 1860, Ross had 
urged his people not to take sides in the bitterly contested 
political campaign being waged in the United States. The 
duty of the Cherokees, he said, was to stand by their rights, 
allow no interference in their internal affairs and comply 
with all their obligations. In a similar vein, in issuing 
instructions to the Cherokee delegates to the intertribal 
council, Ross again urged firm adherence to already existing 
treaties, sagely pointing out that no measures which the 
council had the power to adopt could add anything to the 
Indians' security. When the Cherokee delegates met with 
their Seminole and Creek counterparts on February 17, they 
had a free and friendly exchange of views after which the 
delegates agreed that their best policy was to do nothing, 
keep quiet and comply with their t r e a t i e s . ^5
Not everyone in the Indian Territory, however, was 
willing to keep quiet. Worming through the area, Texas and 
Arkansas secessionists, aided by intermarried whites and 
mixed-blood slaveholders, spread the wildest of tales among
Address of John Ross to Cherokee National Council, 
October 4, 1861, John Ross MSS, Division of Manuscripts, 
University of Oklahoma; Jacob Derrysaw to John Ross, February 
4, 1861, John ross to William P. Ross, Thomas Pegg, John 
Spears and Lewis Downing, February 12, 1862, and William P. 
Ross et £l to John Ross, March 15, 1861, John Ross MSS, 
Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa; Abel, Slaveholding Indians, I, 
pp. 70-71.
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the Indians. The Union was permanently dissolved! All the 
free states except New England would soon join with the South! 
European aid for the Confederate cause was expected 
momentarily! Land-hungry abolitionists were about to seize 
all Indian lands! Twenty thousand Southerners were poised 
and ready to attack if the tribes did not join arms with the 
Confederacy! So said the apostles of secession.
As a result of this agitation, the Cherokee nation 
fragmented internally. Led by the Baptist missionary Evan 
Jones, the conservative full-bloods joined ranks under the 
banner of the Keetoowah Society, an ancient Cherokee organi­
zation whose origins are shrouded in the misty past when the 
Cherokees were still a wild and warlike tribe. Known as 
the "Pin Indians" because of the crossed pins worn on their 
hunting shirts, the members of the society voiced abolitionist 
slogans, but their real goal was the preservation of ancient 
tribal traditions and culture. In response, and in imitation 
of their Southern kinsmen, the pro-slavery mixed-bloods formed 
an organization known as the Knights of the Golden Circle, 
dedicated to the propagation of secessionist sentiments. The 
clashes between these two groups produced a period of turmoil 
almost as chaotic as that following the murders of the Ridges
4 Charles B. Keith to H. B. Branch, August 24, 1861, 
William G. Coffin to William P. Dole, June 3, 1861 and 
Orlando Lee to Dole, March 15, 1862, Letters Received,
0.1.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234,
Roll 834.
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and Elias Boudinot in 1835. In the other Civilized Tribes 
similar conditions prevailed, though in none of the others 
do they appear to have been as acute.
Upon entering the Indian Territory, Albert Pike called 
first upon the Cherokees. His reasons for doing so are 
obvious. The tribe was the most powerful and influential in 
the Territory, and its lands lay immediately adjacent to 
Arkansas. Doubtless the desire to end civil strife and gain 
the support of a unified tribe before continued conflict made 
such support impossible was another factor prompting Pike's 
decision to see the Cherokees first.
Long before Pike’s arrival. Chief John Ross had been 
bombarded with letters from the high and the lowly demanding 
to know his position and sentiments. Dispatches arrived from 
such notables as Governor Rector and his cousin Elias, from 
Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Kannady, the new Confederate 
commander of Fort Smith, and from a group of concerned 
secessionists in Boonsboro, A r k a n s a s . P a t i e n t l y  Ross
Evan Jones to William P. Dole, January 21, 1862, 
ibid.; "The Keetoowah Society," The Reporter (Chelsea, 
Cherokee Nation) March 12, 1903 (typescript copy in the John 
Ross MSS, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma; 
Forde, "Boudinot," p. 71; Gerard Reed, "The Ross-Watie 
Conflict^ Factionalism in the Cherokee Nation, 1839-1865," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 
1967), p. 274 (hereafter cited as Reed, "Ross-Watie 
Conflict").
^®Brown, "Pike," p. 550.
49nenry M. Rector to Ross, January 21, 1861, Elias 
Rector to Ross, February 14, 1861, J. R. Kannady to Ross,
May 15, 1861, John Ross MSS, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa.
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answered these people, stating basically the same thing in each 
reply. The Cherokees, he said, were bound to the people of 
Arkansas by their locality, similar institutions and natural 
sympathies and certainly harbored no desire to wage war on 
their white neighbors. Yet the Cherokees had no wish to become 
involved in the current sectional feud. They would, therefore, 
adhere to already existing treaties and follow a course of 
neutrality even if full-scale civil war between the sections 
o c c u r r e d . 50 These statements agreed with a proclamation issued 
by Ross to the Cherokee people on May 17, 1861 which advised 
tribal members to abide faithfully by all treaty obligations 
and avoid any acts of partisanship. Such a course, he 
concluded, could give no just cause for aggression or invasion 
from any quarter and would place the Cherokees in a position to 
claim and retain all their rights whatever the outcome of the 
sectional c r i s i s . N o t  all Cherokees abided by this advice, 
as is shown by the factional strife within the tribe, but at 
least the principal chief's position had been stated clearly 
by the time Pike arrived.
Pike, accompanied by General McCulloch, entered the 
Cherokee Nation early in June, and on the sixth of the month
John Ross to Henry M. Rector, February 22, 1861, 
John Ross to citizens of Boonsboro, Arkansas, May 18, 1861, 
and John Ross to J. R. Kannady, May 17, 1861, ibid.
^^Proclamation of John Ross to the Cherokee People, 
May 17, 1861, John Ross MSS, Division of Manuscripts, 
University of Oklahoma.
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submitted a written set of treaty proposals to Ross. Among 
other things the defense of the Cherokee country "at all 
hazards" was promised as well as Confederate assumption of all 
annuities and other moneys due the Cherokees under existing 
treaties with the United States. A Cherokee delegate was to 
be given a seat in the Confederacy's House of Representatives, 
a Confederate court established in the Cherokee Nation and if 
for any reason the Neutral Lands were lost, the tribe would 
receive $500,000 with interest from the date of purchase 
in 1835. Pike concluded by requesting that Ross grant him the 
privilege of appearing before the Cherokee Executive Council 
later in the month to explain his proposals. Cooly, Ross 
replied that his intention was to maintain Cherokee neutrality. 
Later in the month he called the executive council into 
session, but did not request Pike's presence. The council 
gave its endorsement of the Principal Chief's neutrality 
policy
Following the Cherokee rebuff. Pike and McCulloch 
separated. McCulloch returned to Fort Smith, and Pike made his 
way to the Creek Agency. Arriving on June 12, Pike immediately 
sent out messages to the chiefs, headmen and leaders of the
5 2Albert Pike to John Ross, June 6, 1861, Cherokee 
Nation Papers--Civil War Letters 1861-1874, Division of 
Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma; Minutes of the Executive 
Council of the Cherokee Nation, June 27-July 2, 1861, John 
Ross MSS, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa; Brown, "Pike," pp. 552-53
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Creek, Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes to meet him at North
Fork Town, a village situated twenty-five miles southeast of
53the Creek Agency.
The situation that awaited Pike upon his arrival was 
probably more complicated than anticipated. As in the 
Cherokee Nation, the secession crisis had revived tribal 
enmities dating back to the embittered removal days. The 
Upper Creeks, with some exceptions, were anti-slavery and 
favored the maintenance of ties with the United States while 
the mixed-blood Lower Creeks espoused the Southern cause.
At the time of Pike's arrival, some of the Upper Creeks, led 
by Opothleyaholo, were on their way to a meeting to be held 
in the Antelope Hills at the western edge of the Leased 
District. This conclave began on June 22 and was attended 
by anti-slavery dissidents from the Creek, Cherokee and 
Seminole tribes, as well as delegates from several of the 
tribes of the Leased District. Before adjournment on June 
24 a general declaration of neutrality was drafted by those
in attendance.54
Shortly after his arrival at the Creek Agency, Pike 
received a communication from Secretary of War Walker. The 
secretary forwarded a copy of the Act of May 21, 1861 forbidding 
the expenditure of money for financial obligations contracted 
by the Federal government in its Indian treaties. The statute
5^Brown, "Pike," pp. 553, 556-5 7. 
54ibid., p. 555.
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was accompanied by a letter from Walker which still did not 
give Pike any specific authority to negotiate treaties. 
According to Walker's letter Pike was to inform the Indians 
that the Confederacy's intention was to advance the tribes 
toward a system of landholding in severalty through the 
establishment of a territorial government
Pike quickly perceived the disastrous consequences 
which would follow obedience to such instructions. The 
Indians, he knew, feared and opposed territorial organization 
and the division of lands in severalty. He was also cognizant 
of the fact that any failure to extend adequate financial 
guarantees and any failure to incorporate these guarantees 
into treaties would foredoom his efforts to failure. Pike 
therefore must either ask Richmond for new and more realistic 
instructions or deliberately disobey those he had already 
received. Knowing the value of immediate action, he chose the 
latter course. After learning that the anti-Ross Cherokees 
were afraid to keep their pre-arranged rendezvous with him 
for fear of being murdered by their full-blood opponents. Pike 
moved on to North Fork Town.^^
Here Pike carried all before him. With Opothleyaholo's
55lbid., pp. 55 7-58.
^^Message of the President, and Report of Albert Pike, 
Commissioner of the Confederate States to the Indian Nations 
West of Arkansas, of the Results of his Mission (Richmond; 
Enquirer Book and Job Press, 186177 PP* 13-17. A microfilm 
copy of this document can be found in the Division of Manu­
scripts, University of Oklahoma.
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followers away at the Antelope Hills conference, and with all 
Northern-leaning white teachers and missionaries expelled, 
there was virtually no one to stop the Southern sympathizers 
from carrying out their plans. Some time after Pike’s arrival, 
a group of wealthy mixed-blood Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks 
and Semindles met and drew up a constitution creating an 
Indian confederacy. The confederacy was to be known as the 
United Nations of the Indian Territory, and a constitution was 
drawn up providing for annual meetings of a Grand Council 
composed of six delegates from each member tribe. The Council, 
under the terms of the constitution, had the authority to call 
on the member tribes for troops to aid the Southern cause. 
Following-the drafting of this plan of union. Grand Council 
sessions were held sporadically throughout the duration of 
the war.^^
The drafting of this constitution was followed by the 
signing of a treaty between Pike and Creek delegates on July 
10. Signed by such individuals as Principal Chief Motey Canard 
and Echo Harjo, principal chief of the Upper Creeks, this treaty 
was more favorable than any which the tribe had ever negotiated 
with the United States. Its meticulous detail indicates that
W. S. Robertson to "Sir” [Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs?], September 30, 1861, Letters Received, O.I.A., 
Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 834; 
Brown, "Pike," p. 560; Angie Debo, The Road to Disappearance 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941), pp. 144-45 
(hereafter cited as Debo, Road) .
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those signing were well informed on past treaties and Indian 
grievances. Slavery received legal recognition, the Creek 
tribe was to hold its lands perpetually in fee single, and these 
lands were never to be incorporated into any territory, nor 
would any attempt be made to establish a territorial government 
over them, except "upon the free, voluntary, and unsolicited 
application" of the Creek Nation. Most importantly the 
Confederate government bound itself to meet all annuity payments 
due the Creeks under former treaties with the United States and 
guaranteed the tribe "the final settlement and full payment" 
of all moneys owed by the United States, including the capital 
and interest on any bonds of the Northern states purchased 
with Creek funds. The Creeks and Seminoles were to be jointly 
entitled to a delegate in the Confederate House of Representa­
tives. The Creek Nation, either by itself or in conjunction 
with the Seminoles, would furnish a mounted regiment for the 
Confederate service as well as any additional troops 
requisitioned by the Confederate president for the defense of 
the Indian Country. The Richmond government was granted 
authority to build and maintain military posts in the Creek 
domain, each post occupying a tract one mile square. Finally 
the Confederate government, or any company chartered by it, 
received the right of way for the construction of railroads 
or telegraph lines through the Creek country.
Two days later a similar pact was signed jointly with
^^OR, IV, i, pp. 426-39; Debo, Road, p. 145
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the Choctaws and Chickasaws. Before leaving Fort Smith, Pike 
had predicted that no difficulties would be encountered in 
negotiating with these two tribes, and he was correct. After 
the abandonment of the Indian Territory by United States 
forces and the defection to the Confederacy of their trusted 
agent, D. H. Cooper, secessionist sentiment rapidly crystallized 
among these two tribes. A few exceptionally brave individuals, 
such as Peter Pitchlynn, continued to advocate neutrality but 
these people were soon coerced into silence, and Southern 
sympathizers pushed ahead with their plan. The treaty which 
they eventually signed with Pike was identical in most respects 
to the Creek treaty, with two exceptions. First the treaty 
outlined the process whereby the two tribes might gain joint 
Confederate statehood, and second it provided for the 
establishment of a Confederate States court at Boggy Depot, a 
small community in the southwestern portion of the Choctaw 
domain. As in the case of the Creek treaty, all annuities, 
trust funds,, debts and claims that the two nations had against 
the United States and the states of the Confederacy were
egguaranteed.
Pike next attempted negotiations with the Seminoles. 
Accompanied by individuals such as Elias Rector and former
^ OR, IV, i, pp. 445-66; see also Albert Pike to 
Robert Toombs, May 29, 1861, ibid., pp. 359-61; Orlando Lee 
to William P. Dole, March 15, 1862, Letters Received, O.I.A., 
Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 834; 
Brown, "Pike," pp. 562-66.
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United States Indian Agent Samuel Rutherford, Pike moved 
southwestv/ard from North Fork Town to the Seminole Agency. 
Immediately he attempted to induce Principal Chief John Jumper 
into signing a pact with the Confederacy. Jumper, somewhat 
disingenuously, professed astonishment upon learning of the 
reason for Pike's visit, a maneuver probably designed to give 
the chief time to seek advice and sample the opinions of his 
people. Told by his councilors to adhere to already existing 
treaties and seeing that sentiment in the nation was running 
strongly in favor of neutrality. Jumper at first refused to 
negotiate. Thereupon, Pike resorted to mild intimidation, 
telling the chief that the "cold" people from the North.would 
soon take the Seminole's lands unless the tribe fought. Such 
threats, supported by similar ones from Sector and Rutherford, 
at last brought success. On August 1, 1861, Jumper and a 
dozen town chiefs, representing about half the tribe signed 
a treaty of alliance, which the non-signers ignored. With 
the exception of the omission of any references to statehood 
and the establishment of a Confederate court, the Seminole 
agreement in all essential details was identical to those 
already signed.
Before leaving Fort Smith in May, Pike corresponded 
with Matthew Leeper, agent of the Leased District tribes, and
OR, IV, i, pp. 513-25; Pas Ko ja to the President of 
the United States, nd. Letters Received, O.I.A., Seminole 
Agency, N.A. , Microcopy 234, Roll 803; Brown, "Pike," pp. 568- 
71.
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had enlisted his support. Under his original plans, Pike hoped 
to meet with representatives of these tribes at the Seminole 
Agency. By early August no delegates had appeared, so, with 
some misgivings Pike and his party, accompanied by a body of 
armed Seminoles and Creeks, began the potentially perilous 
trip to the distant Leased District. Word was sent informing 
Leeper of their coming, and upon arrival at the Wichita Agency 
Pike and his party found representatives of the Caddo and 
Wichita tribes waiting for them, along with delegates from 
several Comanche bands. After the exchange of greetings and 
views treaties were signed on August 12. Under the terms of 
these agreements the tribes and bands of the Leased District 
placed themselves under Confederate protection and pledged 
to refrain from attacking their Indian neighbors or any of the 
states of the Confederacy. These tribes, however, were not to 
contribute troops to the Confederate cause. Friendship was all 
that was asked of them.^^
While still at the Seminole Agency, Pike, on August 1, 
had fired off a rather tartly worded dispatch to John Ross.
Pike knew that since his departure from the Cherokee Nation 
other Confederate notables, such as General McCulloch and 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs David Hubbard, had corresponded 
with Ross in an effort to elicit his support for the Confederate 
cause. All efforts had failed. Ross still persisted in his
G^OR, IV, i, pp. 542-54; Albert Pike to Robert Toombs, 
May 29, 1^1, ibid. , pp. 359-61; Brown, "Pike,” pp. 572-77; 
Gibson, Oklahoma, p. 198.
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course of neutrality. In an effort to tighten the screws on 
Ross, Pike, in his letter, warned the Cherokee chief that 
the Confederate government was under no obligation to renew 
the generous terms offered in June. In particular. Pike wanted 
it clearly understood that the states of the Confederacy would 
never again feel themselves obligated to pay the Cherokees 
anything for the Neutral Lands. In choosing to follow a course 
of neutrality. Pike concluded, the Cherokees were in reality 
allying themselves with Northerners who had already defrauded 
them of their lands, and to the North they should look for 
payment. If the Confederate states ever paid out any portion 
of the monetary value of these lands, that money would be paid 
only to those Cherokees who had declared themselves the
f i  9friends of the South. Clearly Pike was not only threatening 
the withdrawal of the proposed terms. He was also threatening 
in only a slightly veiled manner to deal with the anti-Ross 
Cherokees, a consideration never long out of Ross's mind.
As Pike penned his letter, the force of circumstances 
was rapidly drawing the Cherokees into the Confederate fold.
One such circumstance was the negotiation of the Pike treaties. 
While the Cherokees had not been induced to sign a treaty, the 
negotiation of treaties with neighboring tribes had forestalled 
the establishment of anv effective neutral Indian Confederation
Albert Pike to John Ross, August 1, 1861, David 
Hubbard to John Ross, June 12, 1861, and Ben McCulloch to 
John Ross, June 12, 1861, John Ross MSS, Gilcrease Institute, 
Tulsa.
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as had been hoped for by individuals such as Ross and 
Opothleyahola. The negotiation of these treaties, combined 
with the secession of Texas and Arkansas made it possible for 
General McCulloch to surround the Cherokee Nation with both 
white and Indian troops, a maneuver deliberately designed to 
convince the Cherokees that they had no choice except to join 
the Confederacy. And always there was the spectre of a 
secession movement within the Cherokee Nation itself. The 
Watie-Boudinot faction was as bitterly resentful as ever of 
the Ross Party's control over Cherokee affairs, a fact which the 
astute Ross could not help but perceive. If Ross did not 
cater to their desires, they might usurp his authority and 
establish relations of their own with the Confederacy.^3 The 
meeting which representatives of this faction had with Pike 
at Fort Smith would indicate that they were not above resorting 
to such tactics when the opportune time arrived.
Such circumstances as these caused the Ross faction to 
waver in its determination to remain neutral. On August 1, 
the same day that Pike sent his missive, the Cherokee Executive 
Council met again. Taking cognizance of the restiveness and 
turmoil in the Nation, the Council voted to call the Cherokee 
people into a general meeting at Tahlequah on August 20. The 
stated purpose of this assembly was to harmonize the views of
^Benjamin McCulloch to Leroy P. Walker, June 22 and 
June 29, 1861, OR, I, iii, pp. 595-96, 600; Brown, "Pike," 
pp. 581-82; Forïïë, "Boudinot," p. 70.
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the Cherokees for the common good of all members of the 
tribe.
The meeting of the Executive Council was followed by 
the Confederate victory at Wilson's Creek, Missouri, on 
August 10. Whether any of the Watie-Boudinot Cherokees 
fought with the Confederate forces in this battle is not clear, 
but certainly they benefitted from its outcome. Combined with 
the Confederate victory at Bull Run in the East, Wilson's 
Creek created an illusion of Confederate invincibility, an 
invincibility that would put Ross in prison and Watie at the
head of the Cherokee Nation unless the principal chief mended
. . 65his ways.
By the time the Cherokees convened in general meeting 
Ross had made his decision. In addressing the assemblage 
Ross briefly outlined his previous policy of neutrality and 
discussed the altered circumstances that made a change of 
course advisable. Pointing to such considerations as the 
probable permanent disruption of the Union and the Cherokee 
Nation's increasingly isolated position, he reminded his fellow 
tribesmen that the preservation of their rights and their 
tribal existence stood above every other consideration. Thus, 
he concluded, the time had come when the Cherokees should
^^Minutes of the Executive Council of the Cherokee 
Nation, August 1, 1866, John Ross MSS, Gilcrease Institute, 
Tulsa.
G^Reed, "Ross-Watie Conflict," pp. 281-82; Woodward, 
Cherokees. p. 265.
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signify their consent for their national authorities to enter 
into an alliance with the Confederacy.^^
Consent was quickly granted. Resolutions granting the 
requested authority were passed, and word was sent to Pike at 
Fort Arbuckle telling him of the Cherokee's new position. 
Delighted with the news. Pike immediately sent a dispatch to 
Ross agreeing to open treaty talks and retracting his statements 
of August 1. Pike in addition requested that Ross invite the 
Osages, Quapaws, Shawnees, and Senecas, small tribes located 
north of the Cherokees, to send representatives to the talks 
to be held in the Cherokee N a t i o n . ^7
Pike's arrival at Park Hill in late September or early 
October was followed quickly by the negotiation of several new 
treaties. On October 2 a pact was signed with the Great Osage, 
followed on October 4 by the signing of similar agreements with 
the Quapaws, Senecas and Shawnees. Under the terms of the 
treaties these tribes occupied a position in the Confederate 
hierachy higher than that of the Leased District tribes but 
lower than that of the Five Nations, for while they agreed, 
if requested, to furnish troops to the Confederacy, they were 
not given the privilege of sending a delegate to the Confederate
G^Address of John Ross to the Cherokee People, August 
21, 1861, OR, I, iii, pp. 673-75.
67john Ross to James Brown, September 10, 1861, John 
Ross MSS, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa; Brown, "Pike," pp. 581- 
85.
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Congress nor was any prospect held out that they would become 
part of any Indian state.
Three days later the last link in the Indian treaty 
chain was completed. After several days of preliminary talks 
Pike and Ross signed a treaty on October 7, 1861 formally 
allying the Cherokees with the Confederate states. The 
provisions of this pact were in harmony with the terms first 
offered by Pike in June. Furthermore, in an effort to ease 
the anxieties of the principal chief, the Confederacy promised 
to deal in the future with no one but the constitutional 
authorities of the Cherokee Nation. The treaty signing 
ceremony was followed by a brief meeting between Watie and 
Ross in which the two shook hands in a show of tribal unity 
much more symbolic than real.^^
By late November, 1861 Pike was in Richmond to secure 
the ratification of his treaties. Once in the Confederate 
capital Pike generally succeeded in convincing his superiors 
of the wisdom of departing from his official instructions. 
President Jefferson Davis, however, objected to those portions 
of the treaties providing for tribal representation in Congress 
and Indian statehood. Davis believed such stipulations were 
not only impolitic but unconstitutional. The admission of new
68q r , IV, i, pp. 636-46, 647-58; Brown, "Pike," p.
587.
^^Brown, "Pike," pp. 590-91; OR, IV, i, pp. 669-87.
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states and the seating of representatives in the House, he 
maintained, could not be controlled through the negotiation of 
treaties. In agreement with the President's views changes 
were made in these areas in the Pike treaties, and by early 
January, 1862 all were ratified.70
Formally the tribes of the Indian Territory were now 
all aligned with the Confederacy. Indian unity beneath the 
Confederate banner, however, was the flimsiest of mirages, 
for even before the ratification process was completed the 
forces of disintegration had shattered and scattered these 
bewildered people.
70Allan Nevins and James D. Richardson (eds.). The 
Messages and Papers of Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy 
Including Diplomatic Correspondence (New York: Chelsea House- 
Robert Hector, 1966), pp. 149-51; Brown, "Pike," pp. 596- 
604.
CHAPTER III 
THE GREAT SOUTHERN EXPEDITION
Not the least of the problems facing President-elect 
Abraham Lincoln was the task of choosing his official family. 
Few, if any, American presidents have had a completely free 
hand in choosing those individuals who would serve with them 
during their administrations. Certainly Lincoln did not. In 
keeping with emerging American political traditions, those 
individuals who had cooperated with the Republican party in 
1860 expected to reap their share of the spoils of public 
office, and political considerations undoubtedly weighed 
heavily on Lincoln's mind as he attempted to organize his 
administration.
One of the groups which had played a vital role in 
Lincoln's nomination at Chicago's Wigwam in 1860 was the 
Republican delegation from Indiana. In gratitude for past 
assistance, Caleb B. Smith of the Hoosier state was named 
Lincoln's secretary of the interior. Upon the recommendation 
of John P. Usher, an Indianian who would later succeed Smith 
as secretary of the interior, William P. Dole of Paris,
60
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Illinois, was appointed commissioner of Indian affairs.^
Upon assuming his duties as head of the Indian Office, 
Dole, not surprisingly, devoted much of his time to the task 
of maintaining the loyalty of the tribes of the Indian 
Territory. His efforts in this direction were hampered by 
the defection to the Confederate cause of the former Indian 
agents, and the difficulties encountered by the Lincoln 
administration in securing replacements. When the administration 
induced William G. Coffin to become Superintendent of the 
Southern Superintendency, Dole quickly dispatched a letter 
via Coffin to the chiefs of the Five Civilized Tribes. Dated 
May 11, 1861, this letter informed the recipients that the 
intentions of President Lincoln had been misrepresented by 
his opponents. While the policy of the administration was to 
maintain the Union, Dole assured the tribal leaders that under 
no circumstances would any effort be made to interfere with 
the Indians' domestic institutions and affairs. The commissioner 
concluded his dispatch with a statement to the effect that the 
War Department had been requested to furnish troops and munitions
Ofor the Indian Territory.
^Clarence E. Macartney, Lincoln and His Cabinet (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), pp. 49-56; John P. Usher 
to Abraham Lincoln, December 19, 1860, Abraham Lincoln Papers, 
Library of Congress (microfilm copy). Series I, Roll 12.
^Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the 
Year 1861, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1862 
TSeriaTTll?) , pp. 650-51.
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Unfortunately all requests of this sort fell on 
deaf ears. On April 30, 1861, Dole, in communicating to the 
secretary of the interior, asked if the Federal government 
had any intention of keeping a force in the Indian Territory 
sufficient to defend the tribes against enemy incursions.
At the very least, Dole believed that an arms depot should 
be established in the Southern Superintendency which would
Opermit the tribes of the area to defend themselves. Caleb 
Smith, in turn, addressed an inquiry to the War Department 
on May 4, to which Secretary of War Simon Cameron sent a 
tartly worded reply six days later. Cameron informed Smith 
that orders for the evacuation of the garrisons of the Indian 
Territory were issued on April 17, and present necessities 
made any change in these orders impossible.^ Undaunted, Dole 
renewed his requests on May 30 after receiving definite 
information that Confederate emissaries were operating among 
the Indians. A military force of two to three thousand men, 
he believed, would suffice to secure the neutrality of the 
tribes of the Indian Territory. If the Federal government 
failed to provide this force, he warned, it would soon find 
it impossible to maintain its agencies among the tribes
^William P. Dole to Caleb Smith, April 30, 1861, Records 
of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Indian Division, 
Record Group 48, National Archives, Letters Received.
^Simon Cameron to Caleb Smith, May 10, 1861, ibid., 
Letters Received--War Department.
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along the Southern border.^ Dole's entreaties and warnings 
were ignored. With rumors circulating that efforts were to be 
made to capture Washington itself, the hard-pressed War 
Department made no effort to provide either arms or troops for 
the Territory.
By early June, 1861 Southern Superintendent Coffin was 
in Kansas. Commissioner Dole had suggested to the superin­
tendent that if it could be done with safety he should establish 
his office at some point in the Indian Territory. After 
meeting at Fort Leavenworth with some of the troops who had 
recently abandoned the Territory, Coffin decided to proceed to 
the Neosho Agency and from there feel his way gingerly into the 
Cherokee country. By the middle of June, Coffin had reached a 
place called Crawford Seminary at which point he made an effort 
to meet with Cherokee Chief John Ross. This effort ended in 
failure due largely. Coffin believed, to the dangers by which 
Ross was surrounded. By the middle of July, 1861 the superin­
tendent had returned to Leavenworth. In a letter to the 
commissioner. Coffin informed Dole that he would maintain his 
headquarters at Leavenworth until the latter part of the month.
By that time he felt confident that the actions of Federal forces 
would have made it safe for him to establish his headquarters 
as far south as Humboldt, Kansas.^
^William P. Dole to Caleb Smith, May 30, 1861, ibid.. 
Letters Received.
^Coffin to Dole, June 3, 1861, Letters Received by the 
Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency, National 
Archives, Microcopy 234, Roll 834.
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In the light of the difficulties that Federal forces 
would have in subduing and controlling any large portion of 
the southwestern border area. Coffin's confidence appears 
extremely optimistic. His faith, however, was not without 
some foundation, for at least one person. Senator James Henry 
Lane of Kansas, was busily engaged in organizing an expedition 
to invade the Indian Territory.
Tall, cadaverous, vulgar, tempestuous, of fluctuating 
courage and utterly unscrupulous, Lane was without doubt one 
of the most controversial figures whose path ever crossed 
that of the Five Civilized Tribes. B o m  in Lawrencebury, 
Indiana, in 1814, Lane, despite his mother's desire that he 
become a minister, decided to follow in the footsteps of his 
politician father. During the Mexican War, Lane served as a 
colonel in an Indiana volunteer regiment and participated 
creditably in several battles. Using his military record as 
a springboard into politics. Lane was elected lieutenant 
governor of Indiana and later served as a congressman from his 
native state. His vote in favor of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, 
however, wrecked his career in Indiana, and in 1855 he came to 
Kansas to repair it.?
At the time of his arrival in Kansas, Lane was a 
Democrat. But sensing the winds of change, and piqued by the
?Albert Castel, A Frontier State at War; Kansas, 1861- 
1865 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, T958), pp. 19-20 
(hereafter cited as Castel, Frontier State).
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refusal of the pro-slavery legislature to grant him a divorce. 
Lane switched his allegiance to the Free State Party and 
became a major general of the Free State militia. During 
Kansas' time of deepest turmoil in 1856 and 185 7, he 
participated in a number of largely sham battles and campaigns 
against the pro-slavery forces. These endeavors were largely 
devoid of practical results, but the flamboyant publicity which 
accompanied these actions made Lane a hero to thousands of 
Kansans. In addition to his military activities Lane established 
a law practice and engaged in petty land speculation. Through 
all of this. Lane never lost sight of his primary goal, 
election to the United States Senate. According to one 
authority. Lane was a senatorial candidate from the day he set 
foot on Kansas soil. Decked out in his customary costume of 
overalls, calfskin vest and bearskin overcoat and armed with a 
magnetic and persuasive speaking voice. Lane constantly stumped 
the territory seeking endorsements for his senatorial candidacy. 
Despite, or perhaps, because of his grotesque appearance, he 
built up a substantial following, and became a local folk hero. 
Even individuals who were fully aware of his faults sometimes
Qgave him their support.
Not all Kansans, however, rallied beneath the Lane 
banner. Foremost among those who refused to be taken in by 
Lane's demagogic antics was Charles Robinson. Born in
Gibid., pp. 19-23.
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Massachusetts in 1818, Robinson as a young man practiced 
medicine in New England and later emigrated to California 
where he had the dubious distinction at various times of being 
shot, imprisoned and elected to the California legislature.
In 1854 he became an agent of the New England Emigrant Aid 
Company and conducted the initial settlement of Lawrence,
Kansas. Tall, quiet and dignified, Robinson was in many 
respects the very antithesis of Lane and was called the George 
Washington of Kansas by his f o l l o w e r s . ^
From the beginning. Lane and Robinson clashed. Robinson 
regarded crude, vulgar Jim Lane with suspicion and contempt. 
Lane, in turn, loathed Robinson as the main obstacle blocking 
his ambitions to control Kansas politics. Although their 
rivalry was essentially a struggle for personal power, it 
involved also a conflict between the radical and conservative 
factions of the Free State Party. The radicals, led by Lane, 
advocated a program of terrorism against so-called pro-slavery 
settlers while Robinson's conservatives favored the exercise of 
patience and the use of moderate tactics in wresting the control 
of local government out of the hands of the pro-slavery party.
The Lane-Robinson feud reached a fever pitch in the 
tense weeks preceding the election of the first Kansas senators 
in April, 1861. After winning election to the governorship.
^Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
lOlbid.. pp. 21-22.
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Robinson used every power at his command to block Lane's 
election to the United States Senate, but to no avail. Amidst 
a scene of uproarious confusion the Kansas legislature on 
April 2, 1861 elected Lane to the Senate. Chosen along with 
Lane was Samuel Pomeroy of Atchison, a short, pudgy man of 
forty-five with a bland smile and sanctimonious air that led 
Kansans to call him "Pom the Pious.
When Lane reached Washington to assume his senatorial 
duties, the capital seethed with frantic rumors. Rebels were 
preparing to seize the Federal arsenal at Harpers' Ferry; 
the White House was to be burned and the President assassinated'. 
Quickly perceiving the opportunities such an atmosphere 
presented. Lane seized the initiative. Forming his fellow 
Kansans in Washington into an outfit known as the Frontier 
Guards, Lane offered the President the unit's aid in defending 
the capital city. The proposal was accepted, and for several 
days the Guards bivouacked in the White House itself. After 
serving a total of about two weeks Lane's unit was mustered out 
of the service at a White House ceremony attended by President 
Lincoln.
The most significant aspect of the Frontier Guards 
episode was the effect which it had on Lane's relationship with
l^Ibid., pp. 24-32.
l^ibid., p. 34; Jay Monaghan, Civil War on the Western 
Border 1854-1865 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1955), p. 128 
(hereafter cited as Monaghan, Western Border) .
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the President. For years Lane had been cultivating Lincoln's 
friendship and had campaigned in his behalf in Indiana and 
Illinois in 1860. By raising and commanding the Frontier 
Guards, Lane increased his esteem in the eyes of Lincoln 
and henceforth commanded remarkable influence with the 
President. By the end of April, 1861 Lane was handing 
applications for appointments to Federal positions to Lincoln, 
who in turn endorsed them without even reading them. Pomeroy 
and Martin Conway, the sole Kansan in the House of Represen­
tatives, in contrast, obtained only a minor share of the 
13patronage.
Not yet content. Lane tried to gain still greater 
influence. Through allies in the Kansas legislature, an 
attempt was made to deprive Governor Robinson of the right to 
select general officers of the state militia. When the move 
failed, the irrepressible senator on June 20, 1861 secured 
from the War Department a brigadier general's commission and 
permission to recruit two regiments in Kansas. When Robinson 
learned of this action, the governor declared Lane's Senate 
seat vacant and appointed one of his own close associates, 
Frederick P. Stanton, to fill the vacated position. Stanton 
left immediately for Washington and following his arrival the 
Judiciary Committee of the Senate considered the merits of his 
case and recommended the passage of a resolution awarding Lane's 
seat to Stanton. Lane's friends in the upper house, however.
^^Castel, Frontier State, pp. 34-35
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prevented the resolution from coming to a vote, and Stanton 
had to content himself with receiving nothing more than 
traveling expenses.
Robinson's attack, however, was not a total failure.
By attempting to drive Lane out of the Senate, on the grounds 
that under the Constitution no man could serve as United States 
senator and general simultaneously, Robinson had forced his 
adversary to drop all claims to being a regularly commissioned 
general. Undaunted, Lane, vÆio by this time apparently harbored 
presidential ambitions, secured a brigadier's commission from 
Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana and returned to Kansas 
in August.
Once back in his adopted state. Lane harangued fellow 
Kansans to join his brigade. On the surface, the goal of 
Lane's Brigade, as the unit became known, was to launch forays 
against rebel forces in Missouri. In reality, however, it 
appears that Lane had already hatched in his own mind a 
grandiose scheme to drive with his men all the way to the Gulf 
of Mexico, stirring up slave insurrections along the way. 
Anti-slavery zealots in the North could not help but be impressed 
by such a foray, if it ever materialized, and it was not 
inconceivable that an expedition of this sort might go a long 
way toward placing Jim Lane in the White House.
l^ibid., pp. 46-48; Senate Report No. 1, 37 Cong., 1 
Sess., 1861 (Serial 1112), pp. 1-6.
^^Castel, Frontier State, pp. 48-49.
IGlbid., pp. 49-50.
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After enlisting the support of both ruffians and men 
of esteem. Lane proceeded southward from Leavenworth to Fort 
Scott. At this outpost, located only a few miles from the 
western border of Missouri, he took charge of the 1,200 troops 
there who were members of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Kansas 
regiments. After assuming command of these forces, he 
decided that Fort Scott would be difficult to hold because of 
the surrounding hills. Thus, the bulk of the troops were moved 
to a new hastily constructed outpost known as Fort Lincoln.
By the latter part of August Lane had concluded that
the Southern Indians could be of some assistance in his
planned drive to the Gulf, On August 30, 1861 E. H. Carruth,
a former national clerk of the Seminole Nation, was commissioned
to arrange a meeting between Lane and the leaders of the tribes
of the Indian Territory. After receiving his commission,
Carruth on September 11 dispatched messages to the Five
Civilized Tribes. These letters invited tribal leaders to
attend a proposed conference to be held in the vicinity of
Fort Lincoln, promised them the protection of both their
pensions and property and gave them assurances that the Federal
commissioners would inform them when and where their tribal
18moneys would be paid.
l^Ibid., pp. 50-51; Monaghan, Western Border, p. 182.
H. Carruth to William C. Coffin, July 11, 1861, 
Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 834; also Carruth to John Ross, to the 
Loyal Choctaws and Chickasaws, to the Chiefs and Headmen of the 
Seminoles and to Opothleyaholo, September 11, 1861, ibid.
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Certainly there were individuals in the Indian Territory 
who were anxious to meet Federal representatives. By the time 
that Carruth wrote his letters to the tribes of the Territory, 
Albert Pike had nearly completed the negotiation of his 
treaties. Nevertheless within each of the Civilized Tribes 
there were individuals dissatisfied for one reason or another 
with the Confederate alliance. Dissention and dissatisfaction 
were particularly widespread among the Creeks.
From the very first a significant number of Creeks, led 
by Opothleyaholo, favored the preservation of treaty relations 
with the United States and the steering of a course of 
neutrality. Unswayed by either the arguments of Pike or the 
actions of some of their leaders in treating with the Confederacy, 
these people held a council on August 5, 1861 and declared the 
Confederate treaty illegal. Apparently before the dispatch of 
Carruth*s letters, the Creek dissidents decided to send dele­
gates northward to Kansas. Chosen to make the trip were White 
Chief and Bob Deer, accompanied by interpreter Joseph Ellis.
Their desire was to meet with Federal representatives in an
attempt to get some promise of support from the United States 
19government.
Traveling northeastward, the delegates reached the 
Shawnee reservation on the Kansas-Missouri border around the 
middle of September. Here it appears they met with Carruth and
l^Angie Debo, The Road to Disappearance (Norman; 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1941), p . 148 (hereafter cited 
as Debo, Road).
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made tentative plans to hold a general intertribal conference 
at Humboldt, Kansas, in November, but this meeting never 
materialized. Eventually the Creek emissaries made contact 
with their newly appointed agent, George Cutler, and together 
they traveled to Washington where a meeting was held with 
Lincoln in December, 1861. Agent Cutler favored the formation 
of a brigade of loyal Indians in order to restore tribal confi­
dence in Federal intentions. Lincoln's exact response to this 
proposal is not known, but at the December meeting he apparently 
promised nothing more specific than to send help as soon as 
possible. By late December Agent Cutler and his charges were 
back in Kansas where they met with Superintendent Coffin at 
Leavenworth on the twenty-eighth of the month. The Creeks 
had hoped that the superintendent would have some funds which 
they might carry back to their people. Coffin, however, could 
give them nothing except a few pipes, along with some tobacco 
and sugar. After receiving these meager presents the Indians 
started back toward their homes in the Indian Territory.^0
Events transpiring within the Territory prevented the 
Creek delegates from reaching their destination. As malcontents 
from other tribes began joining Opothleyaholo's band of
20ceorge Cutler to William P. Dole, October 21, 1861, 
Abraham Lincoln MSS, L.C., Series 1, Roll 28; White Chief et al 
to Abraham Lincoln, September 18, 1861 and May 16, 1863,
Letters Received, O.I.A., Creek Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, 
Roll 230; William G. Coffin to Dole, March 29, 1862, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 
234, Roll 834; Debo, Road, p. 149.
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dissident Creeks, Principal Chief Motey Canard grew increasingly
uneasy. Learning that the dissidents had been told that the
majority of the Cherokees opposed alignment with the Confederacy,
Canard dashed off a letter to John Ross on October 1. The
Creek chief asked Ross to send some sort of delegation to
Opothleyaholo's camp to inform those there of the true
conditions within the Cherokee nation. Otherwise, Canard
warned, civil war would soon break out within the Creek Nation.
Two days later Canard sent off a more frantic message to Ross
informing the Cherokee chief that Opothleyaholo's followers
were planning an attack within five days on the regiment
21organized under the Pike Treaty.
Ross responded to these near frantic appeals by sending 
a delegation headed by Joseph Vann to Opothleyaholo's camp, 
with them the Cherokees carried an invitation to attend their 
National Council, which was in session at Tahlequah, and 
letters from Pike granting Opothleyaholo and his friends safe 
passage to the Cherokee capital. Ross, meanwhile, sent a 
letter to Canard inviting him also to come to Tahlequah. By
getting the feuding Creeks to meet together, Ross hoped to
22harmonize relations between the contending factions.
His efforts to mediate the Creek difficulties failed.
Zlcanard to Ross, October 1 and 3, 1861, John Ross 
Papers, Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and 
Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Debo, Road, p. 150.
22r o s s to Canard, October 8, 1861, John Ross MSS, 
Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa.
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In a letter of October 18, Canard thanked Ross for his efforts
but expressed the opinion that there was now no hope for a
friendly adjustment to the current difficulties within the
tribe. Aware that the dissident Creeks had sent a delegation
northward in search of assistance and obviously alarmed by the
number of people, including runaway slaves, attracted to
Opothleyaholo, Canard had decided to resort to force. And
force was applied, despite the strenuous objections of John 
23Ross.
Gathering a force of about 1,400 troops, Douglas H. 
Cooper, now a full-fledged Confederate colonel, moved in mid- 
November against Opothleyaholo’s main encampment near present 
day Eufaula, Oklahoma. For a while the dissident tribesmen 
held their own against the Confederate attackers, but on 
December 26, 1861, Cooper's force, with the aid of Arkansas 
reinforcements, inflicted a crushing defeat on Opothleyaholo 
at the Battle of Chustenahlah in the Osage Hills. Following 
this disaster all discipline broke down in the ranks of the 
Union sympathizers, and Opothleyaholo's followers began a pell- 
mell retreat toward Kansas. Food, livestock and sometimes 
even children were lost as the survivors of Chustenahlah 
dashed as best they could northward across snow covered 
prairies in the dead of winter. How many died before reaching
23canard to Ross, October 18, 1861, and Ross and 
Joseph Vann to Canard, and Echo Harjo, October 20, 1861, ibid.
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Kansas will probably never be known, but doubtless hundreds,
perhaps even thousands, failed to survive the ordeal of their 
24forced march.
The arrival of these refugees in Kansas threw an 
entirely new element into the already complex situation in 
that state. Officials of the Indian Bureau were unprepared 
for the arrival of these Indians, and their relief efforts 
were at best grossly inadequate. Suffering from scanty and 
sometimes putrid provisions and smarting from the defeat 
suffered at the hands of their enemies, the refugees them­
selves were anxious to return home. Late in January, 1862, for 
example, Opothleyaholo wrote Lincoln begging the President to 
permit "the great war chief" James Lane to lead an expedition 
into the Indian c o u n t r y . ^ 5
Lane had long since made clear to Washington officials 
his desire to lead a military expedition southward out of
Edwin C. McReynolds, The Seminoles (Norman; University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1957), pp. 293-301; Debo, Road, pp. 149-51; 
Dean Banks, "Civil War Refugees from Indian Territory in the 
North, 1861-1864," Chronicles of Oklahoma XLI (1963), pp. 288- 
89 (hereafter cited as Banks, Refugees," CO, XLI).
25 Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the 
Year 1862, S. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 37 Cong., 2 Sess. , 1862 (Serial 
1117), p. 181; Ho-po-EITH-LE-YO-HO-LA [Opothleyaholo] and 
A-LUK-TUS-TE-NU-KE to Lincoln, January 28, 1862, War of the 
Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies (Washington; Government Printing 
Office, 1883), Series I, viii, p. 534 (hereafter cited as OR, 
with series number in upper-case numerals and volume number 
in lower-case numerals).
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Kansas toward the Gulf. Returning to the nation's capital 
from Kansas in November, 1861 the senator immediately resorted 
to what one historian has called his "infectious enthusiasm" 
in attempting to persuade the administration to launch a 
southern expedition. The targets of Lane's palaver were 
Lincoln, Lincoln's new secretary of war, Edwin M. Stanton, 
and General George B. McClellan, who had recently superceded 
Winfield Scott as commanding general of the Union armies.
There were others in addition to Senator Lane who for 
various reasons wanted to see an attack launched against the 
Confederate held areas south of Kansas. One of these was 
Postmaster General Montgomery Blair who thought that a 
Federal movement against Texas would forestall what he believed 
was one of the Confederacy's great aims, the conquest of 
Mexico. Another was Edward Atkinson, a New Englander prominent 
in abolitionist circles. In a pamphlet published in 1861 
entitled "Cheap Cotton by Free Labor" Atkinson argued 
convincingly that the reconquest of Texas and the colonization 
of the area by Northern free labor would be an important first 
step in the reconstruction of Southern agriculture and society. 
Late in 1861 he began trying to promote a military expedition 
into Texas, corresponding with individuals such as Dwight 
Foster, the attorney general of Massachusetts, and Senator
Annie Abel, The Slaveholding Indians, Vol. II: The 
American Indian as £  Participant in the Civil War (Cleveland: 
The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1919), p. 3 7 (hereafter cited as 
Abel, Slaveholding Indians, II); Castel, Frontier State, p. 78.
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Charles Sumner. To those voices urging a Federal offensive 
in the West was added that of Massachusetts' politician and 
general Benjamin F. Butler, no less an egomaniac than Lane.
In correspondence and in personal meetings with Stanton and 
McClellan, Major General Butler, who at that time commanded 
the Department of New England, asked permission to land on the 
Texas coast with a force of 15,000 men. Yielding to these 
assorted pressures, the administration began drawing up plans 
for a two-pronged attack designed, among other things, to 
detach Texas from the Confederacy. The intention was to permit
Butler to land on the Texas coast near Indianola while a
27second Federal column advanced southward from Kansas.
The precise role which Lane would play in this operation 
was the source of great confusion. In his conversations with 
administration leaders, the senator insisted that all of his 
own plans had been approved by Major General David Hunter, 
commander of the Department of Kansas. These statements were 
patently false. Hunter, in fact, had no knowledge of any 
plans to launch an expedition out of Kansas until late 
November, 1861. On the twenty-sixth of the month Adjutant 
General Lorenzo Thomas addressed a letter to Hunter informing 
him that General McClellan thought that a successful movement 
might be launched from his department against northeastern
2 dwell H. Johnson, Red River Campaign; Politics and 
Cotton in the Civil War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1456), IT:--------
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Texas. Hunter was asked to report to Washington the "troops
and means" which he had at his disposal which might be used
28in the venture.
Hunter responded by branding the proposed expedition 
"altogether impracticable." To give validity to this assertion 
he pointed out that to the south Federal forces faced an 
estimated ten thousand hostile Indians while to the east 
Confederate General Sterling Price was believed to have about 
twenty thousand men in Missouri. To counter these forces he 
had only about three thousand troops in his department, and 
under these circumstances he would be doing good, he said, to
hold on to the territory within his lines. Fort Leavenworth,
29Hunter maintained, could be taken by the enemy at will.
Irritated by the department commander's skepticism. 
General McClellan sent an immediate reply. In this dispatch 
Hunter learned for the first time that the proposed expedition 
launched from his department against northern Texas would work 
in conjunction with a second expedition to strike at the western 
part of the state from the Gulf of Mexico. McClellan urged 
Hunter to give further consideration to the planned attack and 
assured him that a sufficient force would be placed at his 
disposal as soon as Hunter's wants were known and circumstances 
p e r m i t t e d . I n  response. Hunter informed the commanding
29.
^^Thomas To Hunter, November 26, 1861, OR, I, viii, p. 379, 
^^Hunter to Thomas, December 11, 1861, ibid., p. 428. 
30McClellan to Hunter, December 11, 1861, ibid., pp. 428-
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general that as he now had an idea of what specifically was
expected and planned he would lose no time in preparing and
forwarding exact estimates of the forces required for the
expedition. As though to again remind McClellan of the
difficulties of the proposed campaign, he estimated offhand
that at least twenty thousand additional men would be needed,
along with a transportation train large enough to transport
31supplies from Fort Leavenworth to Texas.
Hunter soon received another message from Washington, 
this one from Lane. On January 3, 1862, the senator informed 
the department commander that he had been instructed to 
report to Hunter for "an active winter's campaign." The 
government, added Lane, had ordered eight regiments of cavalry, 
three regiments of infantry and three batteries to report to 
Hunter. Lane concluded by informing Hunter that as department 
commander he would be expected to organize four thousand 
Indians to aid in the forthcoming e x p e d i t i o n . L a n e ' s  letter 
was followed by a somewhat contradictory one from Adjutant 
General Lorenzo Thomas on January 24, 1862. Thomas' letter 
informed Hunter that the outlines of the plan which Lane had 
urged upon the president and the secretary of war were in 
accordance with Hunter's own views. Thomas also informed him 
that Lane had been given authority to raise eight to ten thousand
^^Hunter to McClellan, December 19, 1861, ibid., pp
450-51.
32Lane to Hunter, January 3, 1862, ibid., p. 482.
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Kansas troops and organize four thousand Indians. Finally,
the adjutant general emphasized the fact that General McClellan
had not given Lane a command Independent of Hunter. Lane was
to operate under Hunter's supervision and If Hunter deemed It
33proper, he might command the expedition himself.
By the time that Thomas dispatched his communique, the 
plans for the proposed southern expedition had become hope­
lessly confused. In southern Kansas the refugee Indians were 
clamoring to be returned to their homes, and In response 
plans had been laid to organize the warriors Into military 
units to aid In the reconquest of their territory, but It was 
not clear whether Hunter or Lane was to handle this task. In 
Kansas, officers reported dally to Hunter requesting formal 
permission to be assigned to the staff of General Lane, and 
perhaps most galling of all from Hunter's point of view was the 
fact that Lorenzo Thomas' letter of January 24 revealed that 
Lane was still telling Washington authorities that his proposed 
expedition was a joint design drawn up by Hunter and himself 
working together. In reality. Lane had never consulted with 
Hunter on any southern expedition, and as of late January,
1862 Hunter was still In the dark as to the exact details of
'0-
Lane's plans. Washington authorities had done nothing to 
enlighten the department commander on the subject as they labored
33Thomas to Hunter, January 24, 1862, Ibid., pp. 525-
26.
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under the impression that the plans presented by the senator 
were a Lane-Hunter concoction.
In exasperation and anger Hunter issued General Order
No. 11 on January 27, 1862. From his headquarters at Fort
Leavenworth, Hunter informed all interested parties that the
departmental commander intended to personally command the
operation which the newspapers were now calling General Lane's
expedition. He said that since transportation had not been
provided, the expedition must go forward without it. Therefore,
all tents, chests, camp tables and stools must be abandoned or
stored. The general commanding the expedition would take in
his valise one shirt, one pair of drawers, one pair of socks and
one handkerchief, and no officer or soldier was to carry any
more. Through the issuance of this order. Hunter was trying to
make a burlesque out of the southern expedition, and he succeeded,
The idea of Union forces driving through the Indian Territory
and Texas to the Gulf with only one change of underwear was,
35after all, ludicrous.
By the time Hunter issued this order. Lane was back in 
Kansas. Infuriated over Hunter's assuming command of his 
project. Lane immediately fired off a letter to one of his 
allies in the House of Representatives, John Covode of
^^David Hunter to Henry W. Halleek, February 8, 1862, 
ibid., pp. 829-31.
35James H. Lane to John Covode, January 27, 1862, 
ibid., pp. 529-30; Castel, Frontier State, p. 80.
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Pennsylvania. Lane instructed Covode to see the President, 
the Secretary of War and General McClellan and then let him 
know what he should do. By telegram Covode soon replied that 
he had followed Lane's instructions and that Hunter would not 
get the money or men he needed. "̂ His command," Covode stated 
confidently, "cannot go forward.
In an effort to render some order out of the growing 
confusion, Lincoln finally intervened. On January 31, 1862 
the President addressed a letter to Secretary of War Stanton 
informing the secretary that he had never intended the so-
called Lane Expedition to be "a great, exhausting affair,"
3 7merely a snug, sober column of 10-15,000 men. Lincoln 
next wrote a joint letter to Hunter and Lane dated February 
10. The President stated that his intention was to avail 
the government of the services of both men and, if possible, 
to satisfy both. If General Hunter could, consistent with 
the public interest, oblige General Lane he would also 
oblige the President. If an amicable accord could not be 
worked out, however. Lane must report to Hunter for duty 
according to accepted rules or decline to serve. After the 
reception of Lincoln's letter. Lane gave up his attempt to 
personally lead an expedition, and he returned to Washington.
^^Lane to Covode, January 27, 1862, OR, I, viii, pp. 
529-30; David Hunter to Henry W. Halleck, February 8, 1862, 
ibid., pp. 829-31.
^^Lincoln to the Secretary of War, January 31, 1862, 
ibid., p. 538. The underlining is Lincoln's.
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But during the course of his return trip to the nation's 
capital, he reportedly denounced the President in bitter 
terms, calling him, among other things, a demagogue and 
scoundrel who broke his promises.^®
The ensuing weeks witnessed the continuation of plans 
to launch a military expedition out of Kansas. The impetus, 
however, was different. Now the major stimulus for a canqjaign 
came from officials of the Indian office. Faced with a growing 
number of refugees from the Indian Territory and unable to 
provide adequate shelter and provisions in Kansas, Commissioner 
Dole and his associates concluded that a return of the Union 
Indians to their homes would be the best solution to the 
refugee problem. On March 13, 1862 the commissioner corresponded 
with Secretary of the Interior Smith and voiced the opinion 
that the refugee Indians now in southern Kansas might best 
be cared for by returning them under adequate protection to 
their home territory. If this action were taken the Indians 
could raise the food needed for their subsistence. If the 
refugees remained in Kansas, on the other hand. Dole estimated 
that it would cost the Federal government $500,000 to support 
them during the coming year.^^
By the time Dole wrote to Smith about the refugee 
problem, 8,000 Indians had made the trek northward to
38Lincoln to Hunter and Lane, February 10, 1862, ibid., 
p. 551; Castel, Frontier State, pp. 80-81.
S^Dole to Smith, March 13, 1862, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters 
Received.
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Kansas. Gradually Union agents had channeled the flood 
of refugees and had settled most of them on largely unin­
habited Indian lands on the Verdigris River west of Humboldt. 
Despite the efforts of Superintendent Coffin and his agents 
to aid these people,, the plight of the refugees once they 
reached Kansas was not much better than it had been on the 
trails leading from the Indian Territory. Little money was 
available with which to procure needed supplies and shelter, 
and the harsh winter weather, combined with diseases such as 
measles and diptheria, took a fearsome toll of those who had 
fled their homes. With the ground frozen and few tools 
available, burial of the deal refugees was difficult, and the 
disposal of deal livestock nearly impossible. Realizing the 
putrid conditions which warmer weather would bring, Indian 
officials decided to move their charges eastward to an area 
near Leroy, Kansas, in the Neosho River Valley.
The move to the Neosho began early in March, 1862 and 
with it the spirits of the refugees buoyed. Wood for fires 
and shelter was available in abundance, and a vast improvement 
in living conditions seemed imminent to the Indians. But 
these hopes were premature. The supplies which reached the 
refugee camp on the Neosho were scanty and inferior in 
quality, and white settlers in the area bitterly complained
^^Banks, "Refugees," CO, XLI, pp. 288-90; William G. 
Coffin to William P. Dole, March 24, 1862, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 
834.
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about the Indian consumption of their timber. When the 
Indians expressed dissatisfaction with these conditions 
the Indian office appointed George W. Collamore to investi­
gate conditions in the refugee camp. Collamore made his 
report to Commissioner Dole on April 21, 1862 pointing out 
that inadequate food and shelter along with an unusually 
severe winter had all contributed to the Indians' miseries.
He also noted that representatives of the Confederacy in the 
Indian Territory told the Indians prior to their flight that 
their so-called friends in the North would not provide for 
them, and the fulfillment of this warning had contributed 
to the restlessness and suspicion so prevalent in the refugee 
camp. In Collamore’s opinion, a speedy return of the refugees 
to their homes was the wisest and most humane policy for the 
Federal government to follow.
The Indians themselves concurred in this view, and the 
warriors willingly joined an Indian Brigade hastily formed at 
Leroy, Kansas. On June 14, the Brigade divided into two 
regiments and consisting of about 1,000 Creeks and Seminoles, 
sixty Quapaws, sixty Cherokees and a scattering of Delawares, 
Keches, Caddoes, Osages and Kickapoos, left Leroy to join the 
white troops at Humboldt. Rumors drifting up from the Indian 
Territory indicated that an additional 2,000 loyal Cherokees
Banks, "Refugees," CO, XLI, p. 291; Collamore to 
Dole, April 21, 1862, Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern 
Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 834.
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would join the expedition once it reached their country.
The white troops gathered at Humboldt were commanded 
by Colonel William Weer, a Wyandotte, Kansas, lawyer with 
military ambitions and a fondness for drink. In addition 
to the Indian troops, Weer's force consisted of cavalry and 
infantry regiments from Kansas, Wisconsin and Ohio along with 
two batteries from Indiana. Altogether, the white and Indian 
troops combined numbered about 6,000, and with this force it 
was hoped that Federal authority could be reasserted in the 
Indian Territory, the loyal refugees restored to their homes 
and the southern borders of Kansas and Missouri made more 
secure. On June 25, 1862, Weer's mixed column of Indian and 
white troops moved southward out of Humboldt.
Several civilian emissaries accompanied the expedition. 
One of these was E. H. Carruth, appointed by Superintendent 
Coffin to negotiate informally with the loyal Indians still 
in the Territory. The superintendent instructed Carruth to 
assure the Indians that the Federal government had no dispo­
sition to shrink its treaty obligations to any of the tribes 
that "have been, are now and remain loyal." Rather, at the 
"earliest practicable period" the government would restore to 
these people all the rights, privileges and immunities enjoyed 
before the rebellion. Appointed by Coffin to serve along with
42william G. Coffin to William P. Dole, June 13, 1862,
ibid.
43fbid.; Castel, Frontier State, pp. 97-98.
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Carruth was H. W. Martin, who was given the task of inquiring 
into the loyalty of the various tribal chiefs and headmen. 
Coffin believed that this information would be of assistance 
in the formulation of future Federal policy. Finally,
Baptist missionary Evan Jones accompanied the expedition 
carrying a letter from Coffin addressed to John Ross. In this 
message Coffin assured the Cherokee chief that the Weer expe­
dition was designed to protect the Indian Territory and 
expressed the hope that the day was not distant when all those 
Indians who had remained loyal might regain unimpaired all 
their former rights and privileges
Predictions that the Federal advance into the Indian 
Territory would be accompanied by numerous defections to the 
Union side were well founded. As early as December 25, 1861 
Albert Pike had informed Confederate Secretary of War Judah 
P. Benjamin that emissaries from Kansas, including some 
Indians, had circulated among the tribes of the Indian Terri­
tory stirring up discontent. Their predictions of the . 
inability of the Confederacy to meet its obligations combined 
with the talks which certain tribesmen held in Kansas with 
Federal officials threatened, he said, to overturn all that 
the Confederates had accomplished in recent months.
Coffin to Carruth, June 16, 1862, Coffin to Martin, 
June 23, 1862, and Coffin to John Ross, June 16, 1862, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 
234, Roll 834.
45pike to Benjamin, December 25, 1861, OR, I, viii, 
pp. 720-21.
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Shortly after Pike wrote to Benjamin, the threat of intra-
tribal civil war and defection to the Union side within the
Cherokee tribe became so great that Confederate Colonel
James McIntosh made a special trip to Fort Gibson early in
January, 1862. McIntosh came away from his meeting with
Cherokee leaders convinced of John Ross' unswerving fidelity
to the Confederate cause. Trouble, he predicted, might
continue to crop up between full and mixed-blood Cherokees,
but with a little determination all such disturbances might
"be nipped in the bud" by Southern officials.
Others, however, did not share this fairly optimistic
appraisal. Douglas H. Cooper in February, 1862, warned his
Confederate superiors that the Cherokees were on the verge
of civil war, and in May he predicted that if a Federal force
advanced into the Cherokee domain most of the members of the
47tribe would defect to the Union side.
Cooper's appraisal proved to be more nearly correct 
than that of McIntosh. Confederate forces in the Indian 
Territory provided no serious opposition to Weer's column, 
and on July 3, 1862 at Locust Grove in the Cherokee Nation, 
Weer inflicted a decisive defeat on a force of Missouri 
rebels led by Colonel J. J. Clarkson. Following this reversal 
about 1,500 Cherokees deserted and joined forces with the
James McIntosh to Stanley Cooper, January 4, 1862, 
ibid. , p. 732.
47oouglas H. Cooper to Albert Pike, February 10, 1862, 
and Cooper to Earl Van D o m ,  May 6, 1862, ibid., xiii, pp. 
823-24, 896.
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Fédérais necessitating the formation of a third Indian 
regiment which was placed under the command of William A.
Phillips.48
Weer now concluded that the time to approach John Ross
had arrived. From his camp on Wolf Creek, Weer sent a message
to the Cherokee chief on July 7, 1862 under a flag of truce.
Playing somewhat loosely with the facts, the Union commander
informed Ross that a portion of his tribe had been "seduced"
by designing men into revolting against the Federal government,
a government "whose administration has been so parental as to
well deserve the name 'Great Father.'" Weer asked to meet
with Ross at the Union camp on Wolf Creek "to effect a
restoration of good feeling" in the Cherokee country and
devise a plan by which the unfaithful portion of the Cherokees
might place themselves under the protection of Federal forces.
Ross answered the following day by denying Weer's request for 
49a meeting.
The actions of the Cherokee chief during this period 
can only be classified as extremely ambivalent. In complaining 
to President Jefferson Davis the preceding May about the small 
number of Confederate troops assigned to protect the Indian 
Territory, Ross had emphasized Cherokee fidelity to the
48william Weer to Thomas Moonlight, July 12, 1862, 
ibid., pp. 487-88; Abel, Slaveholding Indians, II, pp. 126- 
32.
49weer to Ross, July 7, 1862, and Ross to Weer, July 
8, 1862, OR, I, xiii, pp. 464, 486-87.
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Confederate cause. The Cherokees, he wrote, had allied with 
the Confederacy in good faith and expected "to abide the 
issue of the great struggle in which they are now engaged.
His quick rejection of Weer's request for a parley would seem 
to lend credence to the assumption that the Cherokee chief 
devoutly supported the South in its fight for independence.
Yet Ross' adherence to the Confederate cause was not 
as steadfast as it first appeared to be. In the spring of 
1862 Brigadier General James G. Blunt, who had recently 
succeeded Hunter as commander of the Department of Kansas, 
sent Indian scouts out into the Indian Territory. In 
reporting on these actions to Secretary of War Stanton, Blunt 
claimed that his scouts returned from the Indian Territory with 
verbal messages from Ross indicating that the chief really 
sympathized with the Union cause. On the basis of these 
reports. Blunt expressed confidence that Ross would cooperate 
with the United States as soon as he was convinced that 
Federal forces could hold the Cherokee country.
Ross' inconsistent behavior during this period strongly 
indicates that the Cherokee chief was first and foremost a 
sage politician bent on maintaining Cherokee unity and his own 
position of leadership. In order to attain these twin goals 
he would deal with the side that appeared to be ascendent at
^Oposs to Jefferson Davis, May 10, 1862, ibid., pp.
824-25.
^^Blunt to Stanton, July 21, 1862, ibid., p. 486.
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a given moment, and if neither appeared dominant he would 
treat with both simultaneously until the situation crystallized.
Following his rebuff by Ross, Colonel Weer sent out two 
reconnitering parties. One of these, led by Major William T. 
Campbell, was to inspect enemy positions south of the Arkansas 
River, while a second party, commanded by Captain Harris S. 
Greeno was dispatched to the Tahlequah area. Around July 14, 
Campbell's party occupied Fort Gibson without resistance, and 
the interrogation of local inhabitants revealed that the 
Confederates allegedly had about 6-7,000 men in the area of 
Fort Davis, an outpost recently constructed on the south
c oside of the Arkansas River in the Creek Nation.
Greeno with equal ease meanwhile surrounded and occupied 
the Cherokee capital on July 14. He then established a canp 
two and one-half miles south of Tahlequah and was informed by 
a Negro straggler that about 2-300 friendly Indians were near 
John Ross' home in the Park Hill area. On the morning of 
July 15, Greeno advanced to Park Hill where he found about 
200 Cherokees, including several who were officers in the 
Confederate service. The officers had just received 
instructions from Confederate officials to issue a procla­
mation calling on all Cherokee males eighteen to thirty- 
five to take up arms to repel the Federal invasion. All, from
^^William T. Campbell to William Weer, July 14, 1862, 
ibid., p. 162; Abel, Slaveholding Indians, II, p. 136.
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the chief down, were unsure what to do. Greeno quickly 
settled the issue by making them all prisoners of war, but 
Chief Ross was immediately paroled and permitted to remain at 
his home.^^
After receiving reports on the activities of Campbell 
and Greeno, Weer began planning an attack on Fort D a v i s . 5 4  A 
rapid chain of events, however, prevented these plans from 
being carried out. From the first, the Federal forces 
operating under Weer in the Indian Territory were bothered by 
the searing heat of the drought plagued country and the 
shortage of potable water. These uncomfortable conditions, 
along with Weer's imperious, short-tempered treatment of his 
fellow officers--who feared that the expedition's supply lines 
were over-extended--produced seething discontent and 
eventually open mutiny. On the evening of July 18, 1862 
Colonel Frederick Salomon placed Weer under arrest and issued 
a statement to the troops justifying his actions on the basis 
of Weer's alleged incompetence and unfitness for a position of 
command. Orders were issued instructing the entire command, 
with the exception of the Indian regiments, to begin a northward 
march at 2:00 a.m., on July 19. The Indian troops were to 
occupy a position around the junction of the Verdigris and
^^Harris S. Greeno to William Weer, July 17, 1862,
OR, I, xiii, pp. 161-62.
54william Weer to James G. Blunt, July 16, 1862, ibid.,
pp. 160-61.
93
Grand rivers and act as a "corps of observation."^^
Salomon's actions produced considerable consternation 
in some quarters. Superintendent Coffin's emissaries, E. H. 
Carruth and H. W. Martin, protested vehemently against the 
abandonment of the recaptured territory. A retreat, they 
maintained, would leave those Indians who had recently 
defected to the Union side exposed to the ravages of their 
enemies. Valid as these arguments were, Salomon simply 
brushed them aside and continued his retreat all the way to 
Fort Scott. Brigadier General Blunt, angered by this turn 
of events, convened a court martial at Fort Scott to investi­
gate Salomon's actions, but when he found that a large number 
of the expedition’s officers were involved in the mutiny he 
simply adjourned the court and took no further action.56
One of those individuals who traveled northward with 
Colonel Salomon was Cherokee Chief John Ross. Fearing death 
at the hands of Confederate supporters, the chief and his 
family accompanied the retreating column to Fort Scott, and
S^Address of Frederick Salomon to the troops of the 
Indian Expedition, and General Orders No. 1, July 18, 1862, 
ibid., pp. 475-77; Salomon to James G. Blunt, July 20, 1862, 
ibid., pp. 484-85; Abel, Slaveholding Indians, II, p. 138; 
Castel, Frontier State, p. 98.
5^E. H. Carruth and H. W. Martin to James G. Blunt,
July 19, 1862 and Blunt to Frederick Salomon, August 3, 1862. 
OR, I, xiii, pp. 478, 531-32; James G. Blunt, "General Blunt s 
Account of His Civil War Experiences," The Kansas Historical 
Quarterly, I (1932), p. 224 (hereafter cited as Blunt, 
Experiences," KHO, I).
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on August 13, 1862 he departed for Washington with a letter 
of introduction from General B l u n t . A h e a d  of him and his 
people there lay a long and difficult path.
^^Blunt, "Experiences," KHQ, I, p. 224; Blunt to 
Abraham Lincoln, August 13, 1862, Œ ,  I, xiii, pp. 565-66
CHAPTER IV
CONGRESS, KANSAS AND THE INDIAN QUESTION
In the early months of the Civil War, Federal officials 
expressed great sympathy for the plight of the Five Civilized 
Tribes. Among observers near the scene of hostilities one 
general view prevailed: Federal abandonment of the Indian 
Territory left the people of the area with little choice 
except to cast their lot with the South.^ Those officers of 
the Lincoln administration most directly concerned with 
Indian affairs shared this view least at first. In his first 
annual report in 1861 to the secretary of the interior, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dole for example, stated that 
after having been plied with promises, threats and lies by 
the rebels and after witnessing the treason of Federal 
officials, he was frankly surprised that the tribes of the 
Indian Territory had not more readily espoused the Southern
^Evan Jones to William P. Dole, January 21, 1861,
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee 
Agency, National Archives, Microcopy 234, Roll 99; E. H. Carruth 
to William G. Coffin, July 11, 1861, and Charles B. Keith to 
H. B. Branch, August 24, 1861, Letters Received, O.I.A.,
Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 834.
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cause. Dole added the opinion that the degree of loyalty to 
the Union found among these Indians was far greater than that 
of the whites of the rebellious states.^ Dole's superior, 
Secretary of the Interior Caleb Smith, expressed virtually 
identical views in his first annual report to the President, 
and stated his conviction that the tribes aligned with the 
Confederacy would renounce these ties as soon as the United 
States sent a military force to their country large enough
3to protect them.
Congress, likewise, at first showed little inclination 
to wreak vengeance upon the defecting tribes. The Indian 
Appropriations Act for the fiscal year 1861-1862, signed on 
March 2, 1861 made the usual appropriations for the tribes 
of the Indian Territory, a not too surprising event as the 
tribes had not yet entered into formal relations with the 
Confederate government.̂  And in its special session held in 
the summer of 1861, Congress was too preoccupied with other war 
measures to be concerned with Indian affairs.
Congress, however, did not long maintain this attitude
2Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 
the Year 1861, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 37 Cong., 2 Bess., 1862 
(Serial 1117"), p. 627 (hereafter cited as Commissioner's Report 
1861).
^Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess.i 1862, Appendix,
p. 12.
^Statutes at Large, XII, pp. 224-25, 230, 238.
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of indifference. In response to the demands and interests 
of land-hungry Westerners, Congress during the course of the 
war examined almost every facet of the Federal government's 
relationship with the Five Civilized Tribes. And out of this 
examination would emerge new policies having a profound impact 
upon the people of the Indian Territory.
American frontiersmen always maintained great interest 
in the Indian, usually viewing the red man as a barrier to 
the fulfillment of their aspirations. As one region after 
another fell to the white man's civilization, interest in 
Indian affairs receded, only to become a matter of critical 
concern in emerging frontier areas. As of the late 1850's 
and early I860's probably no area of the United States had a 
keener interest in the Indians than the emerging state of 
Kansa s .
From its inception, the destiny of Kansas was closely 
interwoven with the fate of the red man. The area later to 
become the Sunflower State was originally part of that ill- 
defined domain known as the Indian Country in which the 
Indians living east of the Mississippi were settled. As early 
as 1818 the Federal government began divesting the indigenous 
tribes--such as the Osage, Kansas, Pawnee and Otoe--of some 
of their holdings to provide an area in which the Eastern tribes 
might be colonized. By the early 1850's, slightly over 10,000 
Indians whose ancestral homes ranged from Pennsylvania and 
New York to Wisconsin, Iowa and Missouri had been re-located on
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reserves lying near the future Kansas-Missouri border. In 
those transactions, the resettled Indians were assured that no 
further moves were to be required. Their new homes were to 
remain theirs forever.^
The rapid expansion of white settlement from old 
established areas westward and from the Pacific coast eastward 
foredoomed all such promises. The faith of the United States 
was in fact broken on March 3, 1853 when Congress appropriated 
$50,000 for negotiations with the Indians west of Iowa and 
Missouri. In order to open new areas to avaricious whites. 
Congress hoped that these tribes would cede their domains 
either "in whole or in part" to the United States.^
The task of carrying on these negotiations fell on the 
shoulders of Commissioner of Indian Affairs George W.
Manypenny. Genuinely determined to protect and, if possible, 
improve the welfare of his Indian wards, Manypenny concluded 
that instead of making further removals to more distant and 
less hospitable areas, the tribes should be given smaller 
reserves in their present locations. Here tribal members 
migh_t receive individual land allotments and with encouragement 
learn to cultivate these plots like their white neighbors.^
5paul Gates, Fifty Million Acres; Conflicts over Kansas 
Land Policy, 1854-1890 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), 
pp. 14-15 (hereafter cited as Gates, Fifty Million Acres).
^Ibid., pp. 16-17; Statutes at Large, X, pp. 238, 277.
^(Sates, Fifty Million Acres, pp. 17-18.
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Manypenny's idea of advancing the status of the Indian 
by surrounding him with whites proved to be quixotic. From 
the beginning restless Westerners had little sympathy for the 
commissioner's insistence on dealing honorably with his wards. 
His hopes of protecting the Indians were complicated by fact 
that before any of the new Manypenny treaties were ratified, 
indeed, before two of the most important of them were even 
completed. Congress on May 30, 1854 opened the newly created 
Kansas Territory to white settlement. Ignoring the fact that 
whites technically did not yet have the legal right to settle 
on one acre of land in the new territory, would-be land 
speculators and railroad promoters, frontier ruffians, pro and 
anti-slavery fanatics and a few genuine farmers flocked into 
Kansas. The sudden admixture of this odd assortment, with their 
conflicting views and goals, along with the great uncertainties 
as to which lands would and would not be opend to white 
settlement combined to produce several years of turmoil and 
profound confusion. Had the slavery controversy not even 
existed, it seems not unreasonable to conclude that the mad 
scramble for lands in the territory alone would have produced 
enough bloodshed to make Kansas somewhat unique in the annals
Qof the American frontier.
Out of the chaos of Kansas' formative years there 
gradually emerged one theme upon which all Kansans could agree.
Bibid., pp. 1-152, passim.
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Indian removal. The dichotomous points of view separating 
railroad promoters from squatters, pro-slavery men from their 
anti-slavery opponents tended to blur with the passage of time 
as an increasing number of Kansans concluded that the Indians
Qmust be completely removed from their diminished domains.
It is not especially difficult to account for the degree 
of unanimity which Kansans achieved on the question of Indian 
removal. Among the greatest hardships faced by early Kansas 
settlers was the scarcity of adequate transportation and 
communication facilities. Except for the Missouri, the rivers 
of the state were unnavigable, only a few miles of railroad 
track had been laid by 1860, and Leavenworth was the only town 
with direct telegraphic connections with the East. Residents 
of the area realized that this primitive status could not long 
be maintained. If Kansas was to prosper economically, improved 
methods of transportation must be established linking local 
communities to one another and providing Kansans with access 
to markets lying north, east and south. The obvious solution 
to this need was railroad construction. More miles of track 
would bind the area together and provide its people with 
avenues to out-of-state markets. Fully aware of these facts, 
Kansans looked forward to the coming of the railroads with an 
eagerness which one of the state's historians has said was 
little short of desperate.
9lbid., pp. 106-07.
-^Albert Castel, A I______________________
1861-1865 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 7,
^®Al Frontier State at War; Kansas,
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Railroad construction, however, was an expensive 
venture requiring large sums of capital and a rather 
substantial population to make operations profitable. In 
an effort to provide both the capital and the needed population 
the people of sparsely settled Kansas began to cast covetous 
eyes on the remaining Indian holdings In their state. If 
the Indian Inhabitants were completely removed, some of the 
best lands In the state could then be thrown open to white 
exploitation. This development would go a long way toward 
providing Kansas with the capital to expand Its railroad 
system and the population needed to make Its operation 
profitable.
Throughout the war years James Lane and Samuel Pomeroy 
represented Kansas In the United States Senate. Although the 
relationship between the two became Increasingly strained, 
both were engaged In various railroad ventures and both were 
equally sensitive and responsive to the antl-Indlan sentiments 
of their constituents. And It seems only logical to conclude 
that other Western members of Congress whose states were not 
too far removed from the primitive rawness of the frontier 
shared these views.
Possibly because Lane was so engrossed In his military 
schemes Pomeroy at first took the lead In dealing with the 
Indian question. On January 22, 1862, for example, Pomeroy 
presented a petition drawn up by certain citizens of Kansas
lllbld., p. 218,
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calling for the negotiation of treaties with the Osage and
Cherokee tribes opening their lands in Kansas to white
settlement. Referred to the Senate Committee on Public Lands,
the petition was eventually discharged from the committee
1 ?without any action being taken. Undiscouraged, Pomeroy next
drew up a proposed bill providing for the consolidation of the
Indian tribes of Kansas. Precisely what type of consolidation
the senator had in mind, and exactly where the tribes would
be consolidated is not known, but almost certainly he favored
consolidation somevhere outside the confines of Kansas. A
draft of this bill was submitted to Secretary of the Interior
Smith who concluded that with a few alterations the bill would,
if consumated, greatly improve conditions of the Indians and
13reduce the expenses of the Indian service. The same day that 
this letter was written, March 24, Pomeroy presented his proposed 
Indian consolidation bill to the Senate only to see the bill 
eventually discharged without action by the Committee on Indian 
Affairs.
Never one to ignore a potentially profitable issue.
Lane meanwhile began submitting proposals of his own.
Apparently thinking in terms of bringing the potentially rich
^^Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 
37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1862, pp. 132, 191 (hereafter cited as 
Senate Journal) .
l^Caleb Smith to Samuel Pomeroy, March 24, 1862, Letters 
Sent by the Indian Division of the Office of the Secretary of 
the Interior, National Archives, Microcopy 606, Roll 4.
14genate Journal, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1862, pp. 332, 707.
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farm and grazing lands of the Indian Territory under Kansas' 
control. Lane on March 17, 1862, submitted a resolution to 
the Senate. Lane's proposal called upon the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs to examine the "propriety and expediency" 
of extending the southern boundary of Kansas down to the 
northern boundary of Texas, thus making the Indian Territory 
part of Lane's adopted state.
Long before the introduction of the Lane resolution, 
officials of the Interior Department had considered extending 
some sort of centralized governmental authority over the tribes 
of the Indian Territory. On December 23, 1861, Congressman 
William Vandever of Iowa introduced a resolution calling upon 
the House Committee on Territories to inquire into the 
"legality and expediency" of establishing territorial governments 
within the states or districts disloyal to the United States.
If carried out, this proposal might well result in the estab­
lishment of a territorial government over the Indian Territory, 
if, of course. Congress adopted the view that its inhabitants 
had revolted against the Federal government. In pondering the 
wisdom of such a move. Congressman J. M. Ashley, chairman of 
the Committee on Territories, asked for the views of Secretary 
of the Interior Smith. The secretary, in turn, sought the 
counsel of the commissioner of Indian affairs early in March, 
1862.
^^Ibid., pp. 309-10.
Journal of the House of Representatives, 37 Cong., 
2 Sess., 1862, p. 115.
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The secretary's request for advice gave Commissioner
Dole an opportunity to spell out his views on the Five
Civilized Tribes in some detail. In a rather lengthy letter
to Smith, written on March 17, 1862 Dole expressed grave
reservations about the propriety of establishing a territorial
government over the Indian Territory. Rather bluntly he
informed the secretary that he was unable to perceive any
advantage to be derived from the adoption of such a program.
By such a measure we should consequently gain 
nothing in the ability of the government to 
enforce its authority and secure a compliance 
on the part of the Indians to their treaty 
stipulations and should introduce a system 
at variance with out long established Indian 
policy from which I apprehend great 
confusion and embarassment Fsicl would 
arise in the execution of its details.
Continuing, Dole stated that to him the proposal to erect a
territorial government presupposed that "at no distant day
the country mentioned will be opened for the settlement of
the white man," a move which could only be disastrous to the
Indians. All past experience, he argued, taught that the
Indian suffered both morally and physically from contact with
the white man. The lands encompassed by the Indian Territory,
he believed, ought to be retained for the habitation of the
Indians alone, and any surplus lands not needed by the tribes
already there should be reserved for tribes living further
north who "may wish to remove from their present locations."
Finally in assessing the inqjact of recent events upon relations
with the Five Civilized Tribes, Dole expressed the view that
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whatever opinions might be held toward those Indians that had 
revolted against Federal authority, there could be no doubt 
that the Federal government's legislative and treaty obli­
gations remained intact "as to those who have remained 
loyal, . . And looking toward the end of the war the
commissioner somewhat grandiloquently visualized the eventual 
establishment of some sort of Indian state.
I look forward hopefully . . .  to that day 
when these children of the wilderness once 
more under the benign sway of our benificent 
rsicl laws and institutions, will be so far 
reclaimed and civilized that of their own 
volition they will seek to add another star 
to the flag of our country. . . .
On March 26, the secretary of the interior forwarded
a copy of Dole's letter to Chairman Ashley. By this time,
however, the Committee on Territories on March 12 had reported
a bill for the establishment of provisional governments over
those districts in revolt against the United States, but the
1 Rmeasure was immediately tabled.
Five days after Dole addressed his letter to the 
secretary of the interior. Senator James A. Doolittle, chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, asked for Smith's 
views on Lane's proposal to incorporate the Indian Territory
^Dole to Smith, March 17, 1862, Records of the Office 
of the Secretary of the Interior, Indian Division, Record 
Group 48, National Archives, Letters Received.
l^Smith to Ashley, March 26, 1862, Letters Sent, Indian 
Division, Secretary of the Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 
4; Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 1862, p. 1193.
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within the boundaries of Kansas. Again Smith turned to Dole, 
and again the commissioner urged restraint. In a letter of 
reply dated April 2, 1862, Dole reiterated many of the views 
expressed In his letter of March 17. Taking cognizance of the 
fact that the extension of the state's boundaries over the 
Indian Territory would not necessarily authorize Its 
settlement by white men, the end result he malùtalned, would 
be the same. The white population of Kansas, concluding 
that the surplus lands of the newly annexed area would soon 
be opened to sale and settlement, would rush In and despoil 
the Indians of their lands. To forestall this possibility.
Dole persisted In his contention that the area must be reserved 
for Its present occupants as well as other Indians who might 
be Induced to settle there. By maintaining the Indians In 
fertile areas far removed from white settlement they might In 
time become self-sustaining citizens. Secretary Smith 
forwarded a copy of Dole's letter to Doolittle on April 4, 
and voiced his own approval of the views expressed by the 
commissioner. After another exchange of letters between 
Doolittle and Smith, In which the secretary again expressed 
approval of the Idea of preserving the Indian Territory as a 
home for the red man, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on
19June 25 dropped the Lane resolution from further consideration.
l^Dole to Smith, April 2, 1862, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters 
Received; Smith to Doolittle, April 4 and May 23, 1862, Letters 
Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of the Interior, N.A., Micro­
copy 606, Roll 4; Senate Journal, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 707.
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Still another proposal submitted by Pomeroy met an
identical fate. While the merits of Lane's proposal were
being discussed, Pomeroy on April 16, 1862 introduced a bill
to incorporate the Indian Territory under a territorial
government. Under the Pomeroy bill the area was to become
known as the Territory of Laniwa. Referred to the Committee
on Indian Affairs, it too was discharged on June 25 as the
20committee cleared house prior to adjournment.
At the same time that this complex but largely behind- 
the-scenes activity took place, the pressure of circumstances 
forced Congress to begin a review of past and future policy 
toward the Five Civilized Tribes. These circumstances centered 
around the pro-Union refugee Indians in southern Kansas.
Despite the fact that officials of the Lincoln administration, 
from the President down, knew of the renewed factionalism 
within the tribes, brought to the surface by the secession 
crisis, the flight of Opothleyaholo's followers northward came 
as a surprise to the Indian Office. With typical lack of 
foresight, no preparations had been made to meet any such 
emergency, and the refugees initially depended upon army-issued 
rations to stay alive. The sustenance provided by the army, 
however, was not only inadequate, it was also limited. On 
February 6, 1862 Major General David Hunter informed Commissioner 
Dole that the army could not continue feeding the refugees after
^Ogenate Journal, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 401, 707,
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the fifteenth of the month. Obviously something must be
21done quickly to avoid mass starvation.
One possible means to meet the crisis was the annuities 
due the Five Civilized Tribes under their various treaties 
with the United States. Even though Congress in 1861 appro­
priated funds to fulfill its treaty agreements with the tribes 
of the Indian Territory, Commissioner Dole withheld the
22annuities, fearing that they would fall into rebel hands.
Faced with a dwindling supply of army rations. Dole might use 
these unpaid tribal annuities to purchase badly needed supplies 
for the refugees. Yet legally the commissioner had no right 
to spend these funds in this manner. When this impasse 
developed. Dole was in Kansas where he had gone to inspect 
conditions among the refugees, and on February 10 he sent a 
telegram to Secretary Smith seeking advice. The secretary 
quickly applied to Congress for financial assistance, at the 
same time authorizing Dole to purchase on credit the supplies 
required to meet the most pressing needs of the refugees.
23Congress, he told the commissioner, would provide the means.
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 
the Year 1862, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., 1863 
(Serial 1156), pp. 180-81 (hereafter cited as Commissioner's 
Report, 1862)i William P. Dole to Caleb Smith, February 10,
1862, R.Gl Î8, N.A., Letters Received.
^^Commissioner's Report, 1861, p. 628.
^^Commissioner's Report, 1862, p. 181; "Relief to Southern 
Refugees in Kansas,H. Ex. Doc. No. 132, 37 Cong., 2 Sess.,
1862 (Serial 1138), pp. 1-6; Caleb Smith to William P. Dole, 
February 10 and 14, 1862, and Smith to Cyrus Aldrich, February 
12, 1862, Letters Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of the 
Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 4.
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Secretary Smith's plea for assistance forced Congress 
to deal squarely with two questions. The first of these was, 
should Congress authorize the expenditure of already appro­
priated but withheld tribal funds to meet the current, critical 
needs of the refugees? Second, should Congress continue to 
appropriate funds to meet the stipulations of the treaties 
with the tribes which had joined forces with the South?
The first question was quickly answered. On February 
14, 1862 Senator Morton S. Wilkinson of Minnesota presented a 
joint resolution empowering the Secretary of the Interior to 
spend the withheld annuities of the Seminole, Creek, Choctaw 
and Chickasaw tribes for refugee relief. Passage was rapidly 
secured, and on February 22, 1862 President Lincoln affixed 
his signature to the resolution.^4
The second question facing Congress--whether to continue 
to appropriate funds to fulfill treaty obligations with the 
rebellious tribes--provoked a much more lengthy debate. The 
outcome of this debate hinged on whether or not the members 
of Congress believed that in linking arms with the South, the 
tribes of the Indian Territory had abrogated their treaties 
with the United States.
Consideration of this second and very important question 
came during the discussions on the Indian Appropriations Act for 
the fiscal year 1862-1863. Upon returning to Washington from
24Senate Journal, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 208, 216, 238,
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Kansas, Commissioner Dole conferred with Secretary Smith after 
which the secretary asked for a congressional appropriation of 
$200,000 to meet the future expenses of the refugees. Instead 
of specifically filling this request the House version of 
Indian Appropriations Bill contained a statement providing that 
all the appropriations, past and future, made to carry out 
treaty provisions with the tribes hostile to the United States 
might be suspended entirely or in part at the discretion of 
the President. In short, appropriations would continue to be 
made for the tribes that had joined the South, but the President
might suspend payment of these funds if he considered such
25action appropriate. But the House made no specific allocation 
for continued support of the refugees.
Recognizing this shortcoming, the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs proposed an amendment to the House bill on May 
13, 1862. This change authorized the secretary of the interior 
to spend for the continued relief of the refugees the interest
on various bonds owned by the rebellious tribes and held in
26trust for them by the Federal government. Senator Norton S. 
Wilkinson, however, quickly challenged this proposal. Taking 
the Senate floor the Minnesota senator argued that all five of 
the Civilized Tribes had fought against Federal forces at the 
Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, on March 6. Thus, he contended
^^Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., May 13-14, 
1862, pp. 2090, 2121-22.
26lbid., May 14, 1862, pp. 2121-22.
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that these Indians should not be paid one dollar until their
allegiance and fidelity to the Union was fully settled. After
listening to this broadside, the Senate immediately rejected
27the amendment proposed by the Committee on Indian Affairs.
Later that same day, Senator Doolittle presented still
another amendment to the House bill. It gave the secretary of
the interior the discretionary power to use for the support
of the loyal refugees in southern Kansas the annuities due the
rebellious tribes under their old treaties with the United
States. The Wisconsin senator pointed out that this proposal
would place about $179,000 at the secretary's disposal. The
Senate, acting as a committee of the whole, passed the
28amendment with no debate.
Certain members of the Senate, however, later had 
second thoughts about this amendment. Consequently, it too 
was challenged on the Senate floor the following day. May 14. 
This time senators William Pitt Fessenden of Maine and John 
Sherman of Ohio led the opposition. The crux of their argument 
was that the secretary of the interior should not have the 
authority to spend tribal annuities as long as the original 
treaties with these tribes remained in effect. The senators 
argued that if tribal funds were spent on refugee relief, once 
the hostilities ceased the Federal government might be forced 
to pay out all this money a second time to fulfill its
27lbid.. May 13, 1862, pp. 2093-94.
28lbid., May 13, 1862, p. 2093.
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legitimate treaty obligations. Senator Sherman, in contrast, 
advocated a complete abrogation of the treaties with the 
tribes aligned with the South. Once this step was taken, he 
said, the moneys normally due the tribes under the old pacts
might legitimately be used for the support of the loyal members
29of these tribes.
In rebuttal to Fessenden's statements, Doolittle 
maintained that mere concurrence in the House proposal would 
only give the President the authority to suspend tribal 
annuities. And it would not give him the power to use these 
funds for the relief of the loyal Indians. Nevertheless, 
Doolittle consented to the Senate's rejection of his amendment 
approved by the committee of the whole the preceding day. In 
return, Senator Fessenden promised to draw up some additional 
amendments to the House appropriations bill authorizing the
onuse of withheld annuities for refugee relief.
The Senate next spent time discussing the revamping of 
the Indian service in California, and then reopened the debate 
on the Five Civilized Tribes. Senator Sherman of Ohio submitted 
a proposal authorizing the President to issue a proclamation 
abrogating all treaties with any hostile tribe. After taking 
this step, the President might spend appropriated funds for 
refugee relief. Doolittle opposed this amendment, arguing that
29lbid., May 14, 1862, pp. 2121-23. 
SOlbid.
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the Indians were Induced by disloyal Federal Indian agents 
to support the South In the first place. Therefore, he 
believed that a provision requiring the abrogation of treaties 
by the President was unjustified. In the place of Sherman's 
proposal, Doolittle favored adding a provision to the pending 
appropriations bill permitting the chief executive to abrogate 
existing treaties If he believed the public Interest required 
such action. Sherman, after repeating some of his earlier 
arguments on the necessity of abrogating already existing 
treaties, finally agreed to modify his proposed amendment to 
the extent of authorizing rather than requiring the President
31to do away with the pacts. In this form, the amendment passed.
Still, the Issue was far from settled. Senator James
Harlan of Iowa pointed out that as the appropriations bill now
stood. If the President did not choose to abrogate existing
treaties, the Interior Department would have no funds to
relieve the destitute refugees. He submitted an amendment to
the Sherman amendment which he believed would remedy the
situation. But by this time the Issue had become so confused
that an agreement was reached to postpone further consideration
32until the following day. Perhaps In the Intervening time, 
the situation might crystallize.




change in the appropriations bill in an effort to reconcile 
conflicting views. Fessenden's proposal in essence authorized 
the President to spend appropriated funds for refugee relief 
regardless of whether he declared existing treaties void or 
not. Senator Sherman replied that this alteration would 
accomplish Harlan's purpose but not his own. With candor 
rare for a politician, especially one discussing Indian 
policy, the Ohio senator now admitted that his aim was to make 
the Indians suffer for waging war against the Federal government 
and force the abrogation of treaties which he believed were 
not beneficial to the United States. Without making any 
particular effort to be specific, Sherman contended that 
existing Indian treaties contained provisions which would 
arouse the opposition of two-thirds of the members of the 
Senate if read aloud before that body. But he claimed, again 
avoiding specifics, that the new treaties which he contem­
plated would prove more beneficial to both the Indians and the 
whites of the United States. With Sherman unwilling to 
acquiesce in Fessenden's latest proposal, and with members 
becoming increasingly confused by the plethora of amendments
and counteramendments, the Senate found it impossible to reach
33any agreement and passed on to other business.
The night of May 15 must have been a busy one for those 
senators interested in the Indian question. Unfortunately the
^^Ibid., May 15, 1862, pp. 2148-49.
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remaining records of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 
give no clue as to what maneuvers and manipulations occurred 
during the night. At any rate, when debate was reopened on 
May 16, both Sherman and Harlan acquiesced in the consid­
eration of one final amendment drawn up by the Indian Affairs 
C o m m i t t e e . T h i s  rather lengthy proposal was adopted with no 
debate, and after the appointment of two separate sets of 
conference committees to iron out other changes made in the
original House appropriations bill, the altered measure
35received the President's signature on July 5, 1862.
As finally adopted, the Indian Appropriations Act for 
the fiscal year 1862-1863 placed a great deal of discretionary 
authority in the hands of the President. The chief executive 
could, at his discretion, suspend, wholly or in part, appro­
priations made for the tribes hostile to the United States, 
including the Cherokees, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks and 
Seminoles as well as the Wichitas and other affiliated tribes. 
He might use \diatever portion of these funds that he chose for 
the support of the refugee Indians. Finally, and most 
importantly, in cases where the governmental organization of
^^To clear away parliamentary obstacles to the consid­
eration of this proposal the Senate, with Sherman's approval, 
reconsidered and rejected the Ohio senator's amendment, after 
which Harlan simply withdrew his particular proposal. Ibid., 
May 16, 1862, p. 2162.
^^Ibid., May 16, 1862, p. 2162; June 5, 1862, p. 2590; 
June 20, Î8ÏÏ2, p. 2842; July 1, 1862, p. 3049; July 2, 1862, 
p. 3062; July 9, 1862, p. 3195.
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any tribe stood in actual hostility to the United States, the 
law authorized--but did not require--the President, by 
proclamation, to declare all treaties with that tribe abrogated 
if, in his opinion, this action could be taken consistent with 
the nation's good faith and its legal and national obligations.
In a sense it was quite immaterial whether or not the 
President enforced this latter provision. The important fact 
was that it was on the statute books, and as part of the law 
of the land this provision might be and indeed was used to 
wring concessions from the tribes of the Indian Territory 
when the conditions were propitious. Before that time arrived, 
however, the Confederacy had to be hammered to its knees.
36 Statutes at Large, XII, p. 528,
CHAPTER V
A PROCLAMATION UNISSUED, A PEOPLE UNPROTECTED
The abortive Weer Expedition of 1862 did not permanently 
restore any significant portion of the Indian Territory to 
Union control. It did, however, provide those Cherokees 
dissatisfied with the Confederate alliance an opportunity 
to express support for the Federal cause. Believing that the 
United States would use the force needed to hold their country, 
many Cherokee males volunteered for service in the Union Army. 
When Colonel Salomon's mutiny cut short the expedition, the 
families of these Cherokee volunteers had little choice except 
to follow the retreating expedition northward. To remain in 
their country would mean certain intimidation and possible death 
at the hands of those Indians vAio remained loyal to the South.^ 
Among those Cherokees who fled their nation was Chief 
John Ross. Traveling with an entourage of thirty-three 
relatives and friends, Ross first made his way to Fort Scott,
iRiley Keys et ajL to James G. Blunt, November 11, 1862, 
John Ross Papers, Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American 
History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 185^3, H. Ex. Doc. 
No. 1, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., 1864 (Serial ll82), p. 292 (here­
after cited as Commissioner's Report, 1863).
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Kansas. Later he and his party left for Washington, and on 
September 12, 1862 the Cherokee chief met with President 
Lincoln at the White House. No record was kept of this 
encounter, but from remarks made later by Ross it seems that 
he attempted to impress upon the President the difficulties 
the Cherokees experienced as a result of the Federal govern­
ment's failure to protect them. Furthermore, he urged that a 
sufficient military force be sent to the Indian Territory to 
protect the area's inhabitants. Without specifically 
committing himself, Lincoln expressed a desire to extend all 
the protection in his power to those Indians loyal to the 
Union. In addition he asked Ross to present in writing his own
Odetailed views and ideas.
Ross responded to this request on September 16 by 
addressing a letter to Lincoln from Lawrenceville, New Jersey.
In it he discussed some of the ideas he had briefly mentioned 
four days earlier, ideas which various Indian leaders would 
expound repeatedly in the years ahead in an effort to excuse 
their people's actions in negotiating with the Confederacy.
The relations existing between the Cherokees and the United 
States, Ross pointed out, had been defined in numerous treaties.
2john Ross to Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln Papers, 
Library of Congress (microfilm copy). Series 1, Roll 41;
Ross to William P. Dole, October 13, 1862, Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, Cherokee Agency, National 
Archives, Microcopy 234, Roll 99; Ross to White Catcher ejt al, 
January 13, 1863, John Ross MSS, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa.
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Under the terms of these compacts, the Cherokees, as the weaker 
party, had placed themselves under the guardianship of the 
United States in return for solemn promises of protection 
against both foreign and domestic enemies. These promises had 
not been fulfilled. At the outbreak of hostilities in 1861, 
all Federal protection had been withdrawn, and the overwhelming 
pressure subsequently placed on the Cherokees left them no 
choice except to negotiate with the South. The advance of 
Union troops into their nation had given the Cherokees an 
opportunity to express support for the United States, and many 
had done so by fleeing to the Union lines, only to see their 
protectors again abandon the country to the Confederates.
What the Cherokees now desired, said Rocs, was ample military 
protection for their lives and property and a willingness on 
the part of the United States government to recognize the 
validity of all treaties negotiated before the war. Finally 
Ross concluded by suggesting that President Lincoln issue a 
proclamation to the Cherokee people enumerating his own ideas 
and future course of action toward them. A statement from the 
President, he said, would give encouragement and satisfaction 
to the Cherokees and would aid him in reassuring those 
members of his tribe suspicious of the future intentions of 
the Federal government.̂
Lincoln sent a note of reply on September 25. This
^Ross to Lincoln, Lincoln MSS, L.C., Series 1, Roll 41.
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letter contained an admission on the part of the President 
that he had formulated no definite views toward the Cherokee 
Nation. The "multitude of cares" claiming his attention, he 
admitted, had simply prevented him from examining past treaty 
relations between the United States and the Cherokees. Neither 
had he been able to examine the validity of Ross' assertion 
that the actions of the United States in effect excused the 
Cherokees from any responsibility for negotiating with the 
South. Therefore his letter, insisted Lincoln, must not be 
understood to decide anything on these questions. Lincoln 
assured Ross, however, that he would cause a careful investi­
gation to be made of the matter. In the meantime, those 
Cherokees who remained "practically" loyal to the United States 
would receive all the protection which could be given them 
consistent with the duty of the government to protect the 
entire nation.^
That same day, Lincoln sent an inquiry to Secretary of 
Interior Caleb Smith seeking information on past treaty 
relations between the United States and the Cherokee Nation.
This letter revealed that Lincoln possessed very little 
detailed knowledge of the Federal government's past dealings 
with the Indian Territory tribes. Specifically, the President 
asked for information on the government's financial obligations j' 
to the Cherokee Nation. In addition he wanted to know what
^Lincoln to Ross, September 25, 1862, Lincoln MSS, 
L.C., Series 1, Roll 42.
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protection the United States owed the Cherokees at the 
outbreak of the war and whether or not this obligation had 
been fulfilled. In replying to Lincoln on September 29,
Smith stated that the Federal government's basic obligations 
to the Cherokees were found In articles V, VI and VII of the 
treaty of December 29, 1835. The secretary pointed out that 
In these articles the United States had promised to protect 
the Cherokees from all enemies, and he conceded that In 1861
the United States had not lived up to this pledge of protection.
In terms of financial, as opposed to political, obligations 
Smith told the President that no annuities were payable to the 
Cherokees under the pre-war treaties. But he added that the 
United States held In trust for the Cherokees various 
securities nominally valued at slightly over $760,000, the 
Interest upon them payable annually to the tribe.^
During this exchange of letters between Lincoln, Ross 
and Smith, the President took pen In hand and began synthe­
sizing his views toward the tribes of the Indian Territory. In 
the process he composed a rough draft of a letter to Ross as
well as a proclamation to be Issued to the people of the Five
Civilized Tribes, and these documents, rough and Incomplete as 
they are, contain the only remaining clues to Lincoln's feelings 
toward the Indians who had entered Into alliances with the
Smith to Lincoln, September 29, 1862, Letters Sent by 
the Indian Division of the Office of the Secretary of the 
Interior, National Archives, Microcopy 606, Roll 4.
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Confederate states. Unfortunately neither document bears any 
date, but both were filed in the records of the Interior 
Department on December 5, 1862. Similarly neither the letter 
nor the proclamation actually bears the President's signature, 
but the wording of both clearly indicates that the writer was 
indeed Lincoln. The proclamation, for example, mentions the 
calamitous events following the writer's election to the 
presidency. The letter written to accompany the proclamation 
bears no salutation other than "Sir," but at one point 
mention was made that the person to whom it was written was 
the "Governor" of the Cherokee tribe, leaving little doubt 
that the missive was intended for Chief Ross.
The underlying tone of both documents is one of stern 
but understanding reproach. In the Ross letter Lincoln 
stated that he was gratified to learn from their recent 
exchange of views of the strong spirit of loyalty toward the 
United States found among the Five Civilized Tribes. The 
government of the United States, he assured Ross, entertained 
no feelings of resentment and revenge toward these tribes.
If the people of the Territory, Lincoln continued, used the 
powers at their command to demonstrate their loyalty and 
affection for the Federal government their actions would go 
far toward maintaining a spirit of forgiveness for any mistakes 
which these tribes might have made. Lincoln then added that 
since Ross expected to return soon to his people he was to 
inform the inhabitants of the Territory of Lincoln's feeling
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of friendship for those "who faithfully . . . exert themselves
to the utmost of their ability for the suppression of the
present rebellion. . .
The proclamation addressed "To the People of the
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, Seminole and Choctaw Nations"
was a five and one-half page address which outlined in greater
detail the views expressed in the Ross letter. After briefly
recounting the events that led to the settlement of these
tribes west of the Mississippi, Lincoln argued that the men
who drove the Indians from the places of their origin were the
same individuals who had taken up arms against the United
States. Taking substantial liberty with the facts, Lincoln
maintained that, in contrast, the men who now governed the
United States "faithfully resisted" all efforts to remove them
from their ancestral homes. Then the President warned:
If you tie yourselves to the rebels and they 
succeed, you have no security, that they will 
not covet your lands and take them too, and 
drive you forth into the desert of the West.
But suppose you link your fate to the rebels 
and they should fail,--suppose the six 
millions prove too weak for the twenty 
millions,--in that event, you cannot reason­
ably hope that the United States will still 
feel bound to protect you and comply with the 
Treaties, which you yourselves have despised 
and abandoned. . . .
Ask yourselves, then, my friends what it 
is you are bound to do, by your Treaties with 
the United States, and show yourselves ready
A copy of this undated, unsigned letter can be found 
in the Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, 
Indian Division, Record Group 48, National Archives, Letters 
Received Miscellaneous.
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and willing to keep your promises, and assure 
yourselves that this fidelity will be rewarded 
according to its desert.
Finally, in effect admitting that the United States had not
lived up to its obligation to protect these people, Lincoln
stated:
If at present, the United States have found 
themselves unable to secure you[r] rights, 
ascribe it not to want of the will, but to 
the sudden outbreak of a gigantic insur­
rection, not anticipated to be possible in 
the natural order of human a f f a i r s . 7
Apparently, neither the Ross letter nor the procla­
mation was ever issued. A vast quantity of Ross' wartime 
correspondence has been preserved, but no mention is made of 
either document. Nor does the correspondence of other tribal 
leaders contain any reference to any presidential procla­
mation issued specifically to the people of the Indian 
Territory. Lincoln evidently quashed both documents, rele­
gating them to the obscurity of the Interior Department's 
files.
Why this occurred is not at all clear. John Ross, who 
was to convey Lincoln's message to the Five Civilized Tribes, 
did not return to the Indian Territory. Instead, the Cherokee 
chief remained for the duration of the war in Philadelphia, 
but this fact does not explain why Lincoln did not issue the 
two documents which he had composed. Someone other than Ross
A copy of this proclamation accompanies the above 
mentioned letter in Record Group 48, Letters Received 
Miscellaneous.
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could certainly have served as the bearer of the President's 
message. A more realistic view is that the pressures exerted 
by his white constituents prevented Lincoln from expressing 
his views publicly. The year 1862 witnessed the tragic 
uprising of the Minnesota Sioux, and on October 20 Minnesota 
Governor Alexander Ramsey addressed a letter to Lincoln calling 
for the removal of these people as well as the Winnebagoes and
QChippewas from the state. Meanwhile, the senators from Kansas 
persisted in their efforts to secure the removal of their 
state's Indian inhabitants. In the face of these demands made 
by his Western supporters, the President found himself in a 
difficult situation. His own and Secretary Smith's analysis 
of recent events led him to the conclusion that the Federal 
government had not lived up to its obligation to protect the 
tribes of the Indian Territory. Yet, public admission of this 
fact could prove cumbersome if and when the government decided 
to use the negotiation of the Pike treaties as a lever to force 
the tribes to relinquish part of their domains for the 
settlement of other Indians. Perhaps better then to say
9nothing at this time, leaving room to maneuver in the future.
^Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoon, October 20, 1862, 
R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous.
9In writing to Superintendent Coffin in July, 1861, E.
H. Carruth noted that he had heard of rejoicing among people 
of the North over the fact that the tribes of the Territory 
were joining forces with the South, because such actions would 
result in the loss of their lands. Carruth to Coffin, July 11, 
1861, Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 834.
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Shortly after his encounter with Ross, Lincoln in 
effect passed on to Congress the task of formulating future 
Indian policy. In his State of the Union Message on December 
1, 1862 the President observed that during the past year the 
western Indian tribes had exhibited "a spirit of insubordi­
nation,” with those south of Kansas renouncing their allegiance 
to the United States. He added, however, that the chief of 
the Cherokees claimed that the tribes of the Indian Territory 
had been forced to adopt this course of action due to pressure 
exerted by the Confederacy. The President concluded his brief 
resume of Indian affairs by urging the member of Congress to 
consider the question of remodeling the "Indian system.” He 
gave no clue as to what changes should be made, stating only 
that a number of "wise and good men” had impressed him with 
the belief that this could be "profitably done.”^®
If Lincoln hesitated to disclose publicly and specifically 
his views of on Indian affairs, he did at least consider the 
possibility of sending another military expedition to the Indian 
Territory. Following the collapse of the Weer Expedition, the 
officers of the Indian regiments left behind by Colonel 
Frederick Salomon in the Cherokee country consolidated their 
troops into an Indian Brigade. Colonel R. W. Furnas was chosen 
brigade commander, and at first the colonel and his fellow 
officers vowed to hold the Cherokee country at all costs. But
^^James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1908 (Washington: 
The Bureau of National Literature and Art, 190$), VI, p. 132,
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faced with a dwindling supply of rations, and fearing that the 
supply lines of his force might be severed, Furnas soon 
retreated to the periphery of the Cherokee country, sending 
out occasional scouting parties in the direction of the Arkansas 
River. The wives and children of those Cherokees vÆio had 
joined the Union Army, meanwhile, settled in southeastern 
Kansas on the Cherokee Neutral Lands a few miles south of 
Fort Scott.
During the time that the Cherokee refugees occupied the 
Neutral Lands a conflict between civilian and military authori­
ties came to the surface that inhibited Federal handling of 
Indian affairs throughout the war. After learning of the 
failure of the Weer Expedition, General Blunt began making 
preparations to personally lead another advance into the Indian 
country. Hopefully his activities would make it possible for 
all the Indian refugees in Kansas to return to their homes, 
and, without consulting with Superintendent Coffin, Blunt 
announced that he would permit the families of the Indian troops 
to accompany the expedition. Around^the middle of.September 
Blunt slightly altered his plans and began ordering the Indian
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
for the Year 1862, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 37 Cong., 2 Sess. ,
1863 (Serial 1156), pp. 304-08, 311 (hereafter cited as 
Commissioner's Report, 1862); R. W. Furnas to James G. Blunt, 
July 25, 1862, The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies~TWashington: 
Government Printing Office: 1885), Series I, xiii, pp. 511-12 
(hereafter cited as ^  with series number in upper-case 
numerals and volume number in lower-case numberaIs).
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agents to make preparations to return all their wards to the 
Indian Territory.
These presunçtive moves by Blunt aroused the ire of 
Superintendent Coffin. While he had given general support to 
the earlier move to return the refugees to their homes, the 
superintendent was not agreeable to another such scheme at 
this time. Humanitarian, military and economic considerations, 
he believed, militated against such a move. Coffin was 
convinced that at least 20,000 troops would be needed to protect 
the refugees once they were restored to their homes, and he 
did not believe that the Federal government could spare a 
force of this size to serve in the Indian Territory. Further­
more, until the Arkansas River was opened to Union shipping, 
supplies for the returned refugees must be hauled overland at 
least 3-400 miles, a costly and dangerous venture. Therefore, 
rather than replant these people once more in enemy infested 
territory and run the risk of again abandoning them to the 
"barbarities of the heartless foe" Coffin believed it far 
wiser to keep the refugees in Kansas. A delegation of chiefs 
from the Sac and Fox tribe recently had offered to permit the 
refugees to settle on their lands, and Coffin favored accepting 
this overture. Quickly he wrote two letters expressing his 
views to his Washington superiors, followed on September 28,
William G. Coffin to Charles E. Mix, August 30, 1862, 
and James G. Blunt to George A. Cutler, September 13, 1862, 
Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 834.
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1862 by a letter to General Blunt in which he diplomatically
13told the general to mind his own business.
Secretary of the Interior Smith believed that Coffin's 
arguments in favor of retaining the Indians temporarily in 
Kansas were valid. With the backing of the secretary. Coffin 
in October and November began the task of moving the refugees 
northward to the general vicinity of the Sac and Fox reservation. 
Here he hoped supplies could be more easily procured than in 
drought plagued southern Kansas. Late in October the superin­
tendent visited the 1,900 Cherokee refugees on the Neutral 
Lands in an effort to induce them to undertake the trek to 
the Sac and Fox domain, but they refused. Extremely anxious 
to return to their own homes, these people had no desire to 
place any more distance than necessary between themselves and 
their country. When the Cherokees resisted his entreaties. 
Coffin began preparing to supply them at their present location. 
Again, however, his activities conflicted with those of 
General Blunt. Without consulting Coffin, Blunt in December 
started moving the Cherokee refugees to the area of Neosho, 
Missouri, where he planned to keep them only until their country 
could be cleared of enemy forces. Unable to stop this movement. 
Coffin dispatched Cherokee Agent Justin Harlan and a special 
agent, A. C. Proctor, to Neosho to look after the Indians'
^^Coffin to Charles E. Mix, August 30 and September 13, 
1862, and Coffin to Blunt, September 28, 1862, ibid.
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interests. Until the spring of 1863, Coffin and his agents 
worked in an uneasy alliance with military officials providing 
subsistence for the Cherokees in Missouri.
Late in 1862 the Federal military service in the West 
was reorganized and a number of campaigns staged which touched 
and affected the Indian Territory. The revamping began on 
September 24, 1862 when Kansas became part of the Department 
of the Frontier commanded by Major General Samuel R. Curtis. 
General Blunt remained in charge of the District of Kansas, and 
on October 1, 1862 his troops, including the Indian regiments, 
joined the forces of Brigadier General John M. Schofield in 
southwestern Missouri in a campaign to prevent a Confederate 
invasion of Kansas.
At this juncture Lincoln on October 10, 1862 telegraphed 
General Curtis. The President stated that he and John Ross 
wanted to know if it would be possible for the Indian regiments 
serving in Curtis' command, with some white assistance, to 
occupy the Cherokee country. By return wire Curtis answered that
^Sjilliam G. Coffin to Charles E. Mix, September 13,
1862, and Caleb Smith to Mix, September 22, 1862, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, 
Roll 834; H. W. Martin to William G. Coffin, December 20, 1862, 
and Coffin to B. S. Henning, December 28, 1862, ibid., Cherokee 
Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 99; Commissioner's Report, 
1862, p. 313; Commissioner's Report, 1863, pp. 292, 309-10.
James G. Blunt, "General Blunt's Account of His Civil 
War Experiences," The Kansas Historical Quarterly, I (1932), 
p. 225; Albert Castel, A Frontier State at War; Kansas, 1861- 
1865 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, T958), p. 99 (here­
after cited as Castel, Frontier State).
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while his troops might soon drive the enemy out of northwest 
Arkansas into the Indian Territory, he personally doubted the 
expediency of his forces occupying ground so remote from any 
source of supplies. Four days later, Schofield sent a message 
from Cassville, Missouri, to Curtis expressing confidence that 
he would soon be able to drive the enemy out of northwest 
Arkansas and march into the Indian Territory. In reply Curtis 
expressed the hope that Schofield would be able to operate in 
the Indian Territory as the President wanted to see Ross 
re-established in the Cherokee country.
This exchange of messages was followed by a rapid series 
of Union victories. Marching in advance of the rest of 
Schofield’s forces Blunt pushed into northwest Arkansas and on 
October 22, defeated a group of Confederates commanded by 
Douglas H. Cooper at old Fort Wayne on the Indian Territory's 
eastern border. On November 29 at Cane Hill, Arkansas, about 
twenty miles southwest of Fayetteville, he inflicted a similar 
defeat on a rebel force about 8,000 strong which had been 
preparing to advance into Missouri.
In a desperate attempt to prevent all of Arkansas from 
being overrun by Union forces Confederate Major General T. C.
^^Lincoln to Curtis, and Curtis to Lincoln, October 10, 
1862, Schofield to Curtis and Curtis to Schofield, October 14, 
1862, OR, I, xiii, pp. 723, 736,
H. Cooper to R. C. Newton, October 25, 1862, ibid., 
p. 232; James G. Blunt to Samuel R. Curtis, November 29, 1862, 
ibid., xxii, part 1, pp. 41-42; Castel, Frontier State, p. 99.
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Hindman hastily formed an army in hopes of striking a crippling
blow against either Blunt or Brigadier General Francis J.
Herron, commander of the other wing of Schofield's army.
Expecting to receive the brunt of this attack and cocksure that
he could whip at least 25,000 of the enemy, Blunt remained at
Cane Hill, Arkansas, only to be fooled by Hindman. The
Confederate general slipped around the left flank of Blunt's
army and attacked Herron at Prairie Grove. Hearing the sound
of firing. Blunt rushed to Herron's assistance and together at
the Battle of Prairie Grove on December 7, they battered
18Hindman's army, forcing the Confederates to retreat.
After a lapse of almost three weeks, Blunt and Herron 
met together on Christmas night, 1862 to work out the details 
of an attack on Van Buren, Arkansas. Operations began on 
December 27, and the town was easily captured. After plundering, 
burning and conducting an artillery duel with Confederates on 
the south side of the Arkansas River the Union forces moved
19back to Cane Hill where they dispersed to their winter quarters.
Prior to the Christmas day meeting with Herron, Blunt 
dispatched a force of 1,200 men commanded by Colonel William A. 
Phillips into the Cherokee country. Despite hard, driving 
rains, Phillips advanced steadily westward, and on December 27,
l&Castel, Frontier State, pp. 99-100; OR, I, xxii, part 
1, p. 1; James G. Blunt to Samuel R. Curtis, December 2, 1862, 
ibid., pp. 42-43.
^^F. J. Herron to Samuel R. Curtis, December 31, 1862, 
ibid., pp. 169-70; Castel, Frontier State, p. 100.
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captured Fort Gibson after driving across the Arkansas River. 
Next, Phillips himself crossed the Arkansas, taking Fort Davis 
and reducing the encampment to ashes.
While engaged in the capture of these various points, 
Phillips opened negotiations with certain Confederate Indian 
leaders. Perceiving that some tribal members were growing 
weary of the war, a weariness enhanced by the Confederacy's 
inability to provide supplies for its Indian allies, Phillips 
hoped that these negotiations might, as he put it, "open the 
Indian Nation and clear the way to Texas through a country of 
friends. . . .”20
The time for such actions certainly was opportune. By 
August, 1862 rumors had reached Richmond that the Confederacy's 
Indian allies were growing restive. In September the Confederate 
War Department ordered Commissioner of Indian Affairs S. S.
Scott to proceed to the Indian country and impress upon the 
people there the Confederacy's determination to fulfill its 
legitimate obligations to them. Scott reached the Indian Terri­
tory in the middle of October, 1862 and remained until December
1. Meetings were held between Scott and tribal leaders such as 
Samuel Garland of the Choctaws, Winchester Colbert of the 
Chickasaws, John Jumper of the Seminoles, and Ross' antagonist 
Stand Watie. In his report to his superiors, Scott expressed
James C. Blunt to T. J. Weed, December 30, 1862, OR,
I, xxii, part 1, p. 16; William A. Phillips to Samuel R. Curtis, 
January 19, 1863, ibid., part 2, pp. 61-65.
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confidence that his activities had largely smothered the flames 
of discontent among the tribes of the Territory. The events
which occurred during the Phillips expedition, however, indicate
21that the commissioner's appraisal was overly optimistic.
During his foray into the Indian country Phillips 
opened negotiations with Colonel D. N. McIntosh of the Creeks 
through two of McIntosh's close friends. According to Phillips' 
account of events, plans were worked out for a direct meeting 
between himself and McIntosh, but the meeting fell through when 
Blunt on December 27 ordered Phillips to move back down the 
Arkansas to guard Blunt's right flank during the operations 
against Van Buren. Following Phillips' withdrawal, possibly 
to protect himself from a possible charge of treason if his 
actions were discovered, McIntosh sent Brigadier General D.
H. Cooper a copy of a communication received from Phillips.
In reporting- the affair to General Hindman, Cooper admitted 
that unless a substantial number of white forces were sent into 
the Indian Territory soon, its inhabitants would readily 
surrender to the Fédérais if a full-scale invasion occurred in 
the spring.
Following the operations in the Indian Territory and
^^Report of the [Confederate] Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, January 12, 1863 (typescript copy in the Indian 
Records Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City).
^^illiam A. Phillips to James G. Blunt, December 28, 
1862, OR, I, xxii, part 1, p. 881; Phillips to Samuel R. Curtis, 
January 19, 1863; ibid., part 2, pp. 61-62; Cooper to T. C. 
Hindman, January 8, 1863, ibid., p. 770.
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the Van Buren area. Blunt left the scene of hostilities to 
take care of official but unspecified business in Kansas.
During his absence, Schofield slightly reorganized the troops 
serving in southwest Missouri and northwest Arkansas. The 
Third Brigade of Blunt's Kansas Division, commanded by Colonel 
William A. Phillips and consisting primarily of the three 
Indian regiments, was detached from the remainder of the 
division for separate service. In a personal meeting with 
Phillips on January 8, 1863 Schofield instructed the colonel 
to occupy the line of the Arkansas River and that portion of 
the Indian Territory northeast of the river. Phillips was to 
give as much protection as possible to the loyal Indians in 
the area so that they might prepare for the spring planting of 
crops. He was also to make peace with the rebel Indians, when 
in Phillips' judgment this could be done "with propriety," 
offering them the same terms accorded repentant rebels in other 
areas. Finally, Phillips was to keep his force as concentrated 
as possible, to avoid being overpowered by the enemy, and in a 
constant state of readiness to provide assistance if needed in 
Arkansas and Missouri. On January 13, Major General Curtis 
issued orders placing Phillips in command of the Eighth and 
Ninth Districts of the Department of the Missouri, enconçassing 
western Arkansas and the Indian Territory. Phillips was . 
instructed to make his future reports directly to Curtis. Later 
Curtis incorporated Phillips' command into the District of 
Kansas and instructed the colonel to report to Blunt as well
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as to departmental headquarters in St. Louis if the lines of
nocommunication to the city were "convenient."
In the weeks following the establishment of his command 
over western Arkansas and the Indian Territory, Phillips found 
himself confronted with a variety of problems. Refugees from 
the Cherokee country continued fleeing northward, and the task 
of feeding these people as well as those Indians remaining in 
their homes north of the Arkansas plus his own troops was no 
small one. Snow, sleet and rain made roads in the area nearly 
impassable and the transportation of supplies exceedingly 
difficult, a problem complicated by the fact that the supply 
train placed at Phillips' disposal consisted of only thirty 
uncovered wagons each drawn by four weatherbeaten mules.
Phillips, however, persevered. The main body of his 
troops moved from camp to canq> in northwestern Arkansas as the 
necessities of battle and the need for supplies dictated. A 
small mill in the Cherokee Nation near the Arkansas boundary 
was commandeered, and Phillips managed to grind out a scanty 
supply of flour barely adequate to meet the needs of his troops 
and the Indian families depending upon him for subsistence. 
Scouting parties were sent out periodically to distribute part 
of the flour to loyal Indians in the Cherokee country and to
23john M. Schofield to Samuel R. Curtis, January 1 and 
6, 1863, OR, I, xxii, part 2, pp. 6, 22; Schofield to William 
A. Phillips, January 11, 1863, ibid., p. 33; General Orders No. 
6, January 13, 1863, ibid., p. 40; Phillips to Curtis, January 
19, 1863, ibid., pp. 55-56; Curtis to Phillips, February 17, 
1863, ibid., pp. 113-14.
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drive any rebel parties that might venture north of the 
Arkansas back across the river. Special orders were issued 
by Phillips requiring all captured livestock to be turned over 
to the brigade quartermaster. The senior white officer in 
each Indian company was now to be’ held responsible for the 
prompt performance of duties assigned his troops, and efforts 
were made to stop the sale of liquor to the troops of the 
Third Brigade.
During this period Phillips also made slight progress 
in putting the Indian regiments in better fighting condition.
Of the troops at his disposal, Phillips reported that the third 
regiment, recruited during the Weer Expedition of 1862 was by 
far the most competent, but even its members frequently 
absented themselves without leave, a practice described by 
Phillips as a chronic Indian weakness. The second regiment, 
made up originally of fragments from a variety of tribes, 
showed some improvement after its Osage members were mustered 
out during, one of their frequent desertions, but the first 
regiment, made up of Creeks, remained on the verge of disinte­
gration. Its officers, with a few exceptions, he claimed, 
were useless individuals who made little effort to drill their 
troops or obey his orders. All in all, Phillips was not overly 
impressed with his Indian troops. "They are brave as death," 
he wrote, "active to fight, but lazy." If they were to be 
utilized at all, he added, they must be mounted, as they made
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very poor infantry.
Possibly the most significant event which took place 
at this time was the holding of a special session of the 
Cherokee National Council. A quorum of this body was present 
in the second and third Indian regiments, and by late January, 
1863 plans were being discussed to meet in special session to 
repudiate the Pike Treaty. These plans received Phillips' 
enthusiastic endorsement as he believed that any pro-Union 
demonstration on the part of the Council might have a bene­
ficial influence on the other tribes of the Territory, 
especially since this was the same body that had approved the 
Confederate alliance. Accordingly, Acting Principal Chief 
Thomas Pegg issued a proclamation on January 31, 1863 ordering 
the National Council into special session on February 4. The 
Cowskin Prairie located north of Fort Wayne was designated as 
the meeting place, and to provide needed protection Phillips
stationed the main body of his force at a hastily established
25cantonment appropriately named Canç John Ross.
Several days were spent in organizing the Council, and 
not until after the middle of February was anything of substance
William A. Phillips to Samuel R. Curtis, January 19, 
1863, and January 29, 1863, ibid., pp. 53, 86; General Orders 
Nos. 6, 12 and 19, ibid., pp. 58-60.
^^William A. Phillips to Samuel R. Curtis, January 29, 
1863, February 4, 1863, and February 6, 1863, ibid. , pp. 85, 96- 
97, 100-101; Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Voll ZFl, np, nd, 
p. 1, Indian Records Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, 
Oklahoma City (hereafter cited as Cherokee Laws, Vol. 251).
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accomplished. On February 17, Acting Chief Pegg delivered 
an address repeating the arguments which, while none the less 
true, were already becoming rather timeworn. Faced with the 
abandonment of their country by Union forces in 1861, the leading 
men of the Cherokee Nation were perplexed over what course to 
follow. To avoid the complete ruin of their nation they had 
no alternative except an alliance with the South, hoping that 
deliverance might soon come from their friends in the North.
Pegg concluded his address by recommending the abrogation of 
the Confederate alliance and the appointment of a delegation to 
represent the Nation's interests in Washington. He also called 
the Council's attention to the slavery question and urged that 
such steps be taken as the council members' wisdom might 
dictate.
Next came the passage of several important resolutions 
and pieces of legislation. A resolution of February 18 declared 
the Pike Treaty of October 7, 1861 abrogated, and that same 
day an act was passed authorizing the appointment of a Cherokee 
delegation to assure the President of the Nation's desire to 
abolish slavery and to ask compensation for those slaveowners 
not disloyal to the United States. February 19 witnessed the 
passage of a law empowering Cherokee authorities to use tribal 
funds to purchase supplies for the most destitute families in 
the Nation as well as an enactment naming the members of the
Z^Cherokee Laws, Vol. 251, pp. 1-2.
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tribe’s delegation to Washington. Those chosen were John
Ross, Lewis Downing, James McDaniel and Evan Jones. On
February 20, still another law removed from public office all
Cherokee officeholders disloyal to the United States, and on
February 21, apparently feeling that its earlier actions were
not entirely sufficient, the National Council formally abolished
slavery in the Cherokee Nation. Anyone found guilty of holding
any person in bondage after June 25, 1863 would be fined not
less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000.^^ Chief John Ross in
exile in Philadelphia was informed of the actions of the
Council, and in a letter of April 2, Ross duly informed
Commissioner Dole of the actions consumated at Cowskin Prairie,
urging at the same time that appropriate steps be taken to
28return his people to their homes.
Long before this letter reached the commissioner, the 
initial steps had been taken to restore the Cherokee refugees 
to their country. General Blunt's efforts late in the summer 
of 1862 had run into the opposition of Superintendent Coffin. 
Angered by the superintendent’s obstinancy, Blunt fired off a 
steaming letter to Secretary of the Interior Smith on November 
21, 1862 in which he attempted to justify his efforts to return 
the refugees on the grounds of military necessity. Those 
Indians serving in the Federal Army, he said, would not undertake
27ibid., p p . 3-9
*Ross to Dole,
Cherokee Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 99.
^^R  April 2, 1863, Letters Received, O.I.A.,
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another expedition to the Territory unless assured that their
families could return with them. In addition, Blunt expressed
concern that the refugees were being victimized by "mercenary
and unscrupulous speculators." The general did not mention
the names of those individuals whom he felt were dealing
dishonestly with the Indians, but when he said that they were
"superintendents and agents" serving the Federal government,
he could hardly have meant anyone other than Coffin and his 
29associates.
Several weeks after the receipt of this letter. Smith 
asked Dole to look into and make a report on Blunt's charges 
of corruption. If Dole made a report, no record of it was 
preserved in the records of the Interior Department. Seeing 
that his complaints had accomplished nothing, Blunt arranged 
a meeting with Coffin though the date of this meeting is not 
known. Blunt came away, however, convinced that he and Coffin 
could work together in the future, and he so informed Lincoln's 
new Secretary of the Interior John P. Usher on January 25,
1863. Blunt also stated unconvincingly that in his letter of 
November 21, 1862 he had not meant to attack Coffin but the
30"peculators" found around every department of the government.̂  
Phillips, like Blunt, favored the restoration of the
^^Blunt to Smith, November 21, 1862, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 834.
30smith to Dole, December 27, 1862, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 834; 
Blunt to the Secretary of the Interior, January 25, 1863, R.G. 
48, N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous.
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Cherokee refugees to their homes at the earliest possible 
date. From his vantage point In northwest Arkansas he quickly 
concluded that his responsibilities might be lessened and the 
plight of the loyal Cherokees Improved If Union military forces 
advanced Into the Cherokee country making It possible for 
Union sympathizers to plant a crop and become more self- 
sufficient the coming spring. Late In January, 1863 without 
waiting for the consent of his superiors, Phillips had begun 
planning an advance Into the Cherokee Nation scheduled for 
late February. Some 2-300 wagons, he believed, would be 
required to transport the supplies needed by his troops and the 
Union Cherokees. Recognizing that a venture of this size would 
necessitate the cooperation of the Indian Office, Phillips 
approached agents Harlan and Proctor at Neosho, Missouri, early 
In February and enlisted their support. Proctor, In turn, 
traveled to Leavenworth, Kansas, in an effort to convince 
Coffin of the wisdom of the venture. With some misgivings, 
the superintendent gave his approval, but In an economy move. 
Coffin agreed to provide fifty wagons to haul provisions for 
the returning refugees. Agent Harlan had requested 100 but 
Coffin believed that by making two trips each, fifty could do 
the job more cheaply. Even so, he believed that $21,000 would 
be needed to finance the return of the Cherokee refugees to 
their homes.
31willlam A. Phillips to Samuel R. Curtis, January 19, 
1863, OR, I, xxll, part 2, pp. 60-61; Phillips to A. G. Proctor, 
February 1, 1863, and William G. Coffin to William P. Dole, 
February 24, 1863, Letters Received, O.I.A. Cherokee Agency, 
N.A,, Microcopy 234, Roll 99.
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While the Cherokee National Council deliberated at 
Cowskin Prairie in February, Phillips pushed ahead with his 
plans. His appetite for action was whetted by news and rumors 
drifting up from the Indian country. Early in February he 
learned that a "long line of persons" was heading his way from 
the Creek Nation. These people reportedly wore on the right 
side of their hats a white piece of cloth, a sign which 
Phillips claimed had been worked out with McIntosh's two 
friends in December to identify Union sympathizers among the 
Creeks. At the same time he also learned that 2-300 mixed- 
blood and adopted white rebel Cherokees, disillusioned and 
dispirited by the war, had crossed over to the north side of 
the Arkansas near Fort Smith. Mid-February brought word that 
some of the officers in Stand Watie's command were planning 
to mutiny against their superiors. The news of all of these 
events combined to make Phillips unjustifiably optimistic.
That portion of the Indian country north of the Arkansas
o nseemed ripe for the taking.
To date, Phillips had received no word of sanction 
from either Blunt or Curtis, but on February 17 Curtis finally 
sent a message from his St. Louis headquarters saying that 
he and Blunt concurred in the colonel's plans. The department 
commander added that Phillips' proposals had been forwarded
^^William A. Phillips to Samuel R . Curtis, February 
6, 11, and 15, 1863, OR, I, xxii, part 2, pp. 101-02, 108- 
09, 111-12.
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to army headquarters In Washington. Blunt sent a more
specific message to Phillips on February 23. From Fort
Leavenworth he instructed Phillips to keep his force in the
best possible condition and be prepared for active service
as soon as there was grass enough to support the animals
needed to move a large body of troops. In the meantime,
Phillips should destroy all guerrillas in western Arkansas
and the Indian Territory, send out scouting parties as far
south as practical and carry on negotiations if possible with
the rebel Indians, promising them pardon and protection if
they would abandon the South. Blunt pointed out that he was
still determined to return the refugees to their homes "at
the earliest period practicable." The entire Indian country,
33he said, must be occupied by the summer of 1863.
By early March, Phillips had completed the plans for 
advance into the Cherokee country. In the meantime, however. 
Major General Curtis received a communique from Henry W. 
Halleck, commanding general of the army, instructing him to 
use all available forces to aid in capturing that portion of 
the Mississippi River still in Confederate hands. Victories 
on the southwestern frontier, in Halleck's opinion, were of 
minimal importance. " . . .  we may," he wrote, "defeat the 
enemy a dozen times on the western border . . . and our
33curtis to Phillips, February 17, 1863, and Blunt 
to Phillips, February 23, 1863, ibid., pp. 113-14, 121-22.
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victories, like those of Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove, be 
without important results." After receiving these instructions, 
Curtis ordered Phillips to hold up his advance.
As March, the best month for planting of crops in the 
Territory, slipped by, Phillips grew increasingly restive.
His Indian regiments, including the troublesome tattered first 
regiment, were drilling more diligently than in the past and 
were beginning..to acquire some of the precision and discipline 
of more experienced white units. Phillips constantly reminded 
both Blunt and Curtis that he was finding it increasingly 
difficult to explain to the Indian troops and their families 
why no expedition had been launched to recapture their country. 
Information received from the area south of the Arkansas 
indicated that Confederate officials were striving to placate 
their disillusioned Indian allies through the distribution of 
food and the payment of moneys due under the Pike treaties. 
Phillips was firmly convinced that any further delay in moving 
into the Indian country would irreparably damage the Federal 
government's chances of winning over these malcontents. "A 
small amount of means used now," he wrote Curtis, "\jould save 
a Creek and Choctaw regiment (one of each), which we may other­
wise have to fight this summer.
3^Halleck to Curtis, February 17, 1863, ibid., p. 113; 
William A. Phillips to Halleck, March 2, 1863, ibid., pp. 137- 
38.
35phillips to Curtis, March 3, 20 and 27, ibid., pp. 141- 
42, 165-67, 181-72 (Phillips' parentheses); Phillips to Blunt, 
March 19 and 21, 1863, ibid., pp. 162, 168-69.
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By some means Blunt was able to pry from the army's 
upper eschelons permission for Phillips to carry out his 
advance, and by April 2, the colonel's troops had reached the 
Park Hill area. This movement was followed closely by the 
arrival of about 12-1,300 Cherokee refugees from Neosho, 
Missouri, accompanied by agents Justin Harlan and A. G. 
Proctor. Much to the disappointment of Harlan, who wanted 
these people to settle in a compact area east of the Grand 
River, Phillips sent out a dispatch designating at least six 
different areas where the returning Cherokees might settle in 
safety. No amount of pleading by Harlan could prevent the
O  fi
delighted Indians from scattering.
Phillips' first report to Blunt upon re-entering the 
Cherokee country was almost euphoric in tone. All was going 
splendidly, and he believed that the reported concentration of 
rebel troops south of the Arkansas posed no problem; concen­
tration would simply make the task of locating and destroying 
the enemy that much easier. But the hard facts of reality 
soon intruded.
Not the least of Phillips' concerns was the inability 
of Blunt and Curtis to agree on the tactics to be employed 
in the Indian country. Curtis was beginning to question the 
wisdom of Phillips' advance, and in communications to Blunt
^^William A. Phillips to James G. Blunt, April 2 and 
24, 1863, ibid.. pp. 190-91, 247-48; Commissioner's Report, 
1863, pp. 3ÎÏP22.
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and Phillips he strongly implied that he now favored the
withdrawal of Federal forces back into Arkansas. Blunt, in
contrast, believed that control must be maintained over the
reoccupied territory if humanly possible. He also favored
making quick dashes across the Arkansas to break up enemy
3 7concentrations, a policy Curtis opposed.
While this divided counsel left Phillips perplexed, 
carelessness and logistical problems left his command hungry. 
With typical inattention to detail. Coffin and his agents had 
not taken adequate steps to support their wards until a crop 
could be harvested. Rather than the fifty wagons originally 
promised by Coffin, only about half that number were provided 
to transport supplies for the refugees. Most of the provisions 
carried by these vehicles were consumed on the trip from 
Neosho, Missouri. The shortage of troops to be used as 
supply train escorts made the shipment of added supplies from 
the north difficult, and Phillips was soon forced to begin 
distributing among the loyal Cherokees flour intended originally 
for his troops. By mid-May, the daily ration of flour had
O Qdwindled to two ounces per person.
^^Phillips to Blunt, April 2, 1863, OR, I, xxii, part 
2, pp. 190-91; Curtis to Phillips, April 20, 1863 and Curtis 
to Blunt, April 23, 1863, ibid., pp. 230, 244-45.
38william A. Phillips to the Secretary of the Interior, 
April 15, 1863, John Ross MSS, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa; 
Phillips to James G. Blunt, April 15, 1863, OR, I, xxii, part 
2, pp. 283-84; Blunt to Samuel R. Curtis, April 29, 1863, 
ibid., pp. 260-61.
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Not surprisingly when the Cherokee National Council
met at Kee Too Wah in May, an act was passed critical of Agent
Harlan and his assistant, Proctor. This enactment of May 14,
1863 authorized the principal chief to appoint an agent or
agents to forward to the Cherokee delegation a full statement
of the failure of the Federal agents to furnish the Cherokees
an adequate supply of foodstuffs. The law also extended the
thanks of the National Council to Phillips for his "untiring"
39efforts to relieve the Cherokee people.
Despite the hardships faced by his command, Phillips 
remained convinced that militarily his position was strong.
The men of his command, despite the short rations, were in 
good spirits and Fort Gibson, after its recapture in early 
April, had been rebuilt on "scientific principles" and was in 
Phillips' view impregnable. This illusion of military strength 
was shattered on May 21 when a force of rebel Indians dashed 
suddenly into the country north of the Arkansas. Horses, 
cattle, wagons, farm implements and anything else of value 
that could be moved were seized. In panic, the Union Cherokees, 
mostly women and children, working near-by lands, dashed to 
Fort Gibson. With the military still unable to provide them the 
protection needed to work their fields they had no choice 
except to remain within the protective confines of the fort.
^^Cherokee Laws, Vol. 251, p. 5
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and there they languished for the remainder of the year, 
helpless refugees in their own land.^O
^^William A. Phillips to James G. Blunt, April 27, May 
1 and 9, 1863, OR, I, xxii, part 2, pp. 256, 266, 276-77; J.
M. Bell to Mrs. J. M. Bell, May 29, 1865, Cherokee Nation 
Papers--Civil War Letters 1861-1874, Division of Manuscripts, 
Bizzell Library, University of Oklahoma, Norman; Commissioner* s 
Report, 1863, p. 297.
CHAPTER VI
EARLY TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE KANSAS IMBROGLIO
While General Blunt and Colonel Phillips grappled 
with the task of returning the Cherokee refugees to their 
homes, Washington politicians continued to debate the 
Federal government's future course in dealing with the Five 
Civilized Tribes. The two senators from Kansas, Lane and 
Pomeroy, played prominent roles in this discussion. On 
November 13, 1862 Pomeroy addressed a letter to Caleb Smith 
who was completing his last two months as secretary of the 
interior.1 The senator reminded Smith that Kansans had long 
been interested in treaty negotiations leading to the removal 
of the tribes from their state and added significantly that 
he himself had recently met with one of the members of the 
Ross family to discuss the idea of resettling the Kansas tribes
Because of a heart condition. Smith resigned from the 
Lincoln cabinet on December 31, 1862. The President subse­
quently appointed him to a Federal district judgship in 
Indiana, and John P. Usher, who had served as assistant 
secretary since November, 1862 became secretary. Caleb Smith 
to Abraham Lincoln, November 12 and December 31, 1862, Abraham 
Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress (microfilm copy). Series 1, 
Roll 54; Burton K. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1946), pp. 347-48.
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in the Indian Territory. Pomeroy maintained that from all
he could l e a m  the idea was "entirely feasible," and he
urged that immediate steps be taken to negotiate removal 
2treaties.
Pomeroy followed up this letter with a memorial submitted 
jointly to the commissioner of Indian affairs and the Interior 
Department on November 15. In this document, he listed the 
advantages to be derived from the removal of the tribes from 
the frontier states and their resettlement and consolidation 
in the Indian Territory. In an apparent effort to give his 
arguments a non-political ring, Pomeroy discarded the use 
of official Senate stationary and referred to himself merely 
as "a citizen of the state of Kansas" rather than a United 
States Senator. The thrust of his argument--an argument to 
be repeated many times in the near future--was quite simple: 
the surrounding of small, defenseless tribes by whites 
demoralized the Indian and led to his extermination, while his 
consolidation in a domain of his own would not only halt the 
process of decline but would contribute significantly to the 
improvement of the red man by making it possible for him to 
govern himself and preserve the best of his heritage. Citizen 
Pomeroy candidly admitted that removal and consolidation would 
"stimulate and facilitate the settlement and wealth" of those
Pomeroy to Smith, November 13, 1862, Records of the 
Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Indian Division, Record 
Group 48, National Archives, Letters Received Miscellaneous.
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states vacated by the Indians. He confessed as well that his 
desire to negotiate removal treaties was heightened by the 
Sioux outbreak in Minnesota and the recognition that his own
Ostate contained "the same combustible material. . . ."
On November 22, Commissioner Dole submitted to Secretary 
Smith a reply to Pomeroy's memorial. Since the beginning of 
his tenure as commissioner. Dole had been considering how the 
Federal government might best conduct its future affairs with 
the tribes west of the Mississippi, particularly those tribes 
in the Kansas-Nebraska-Indian Territory area. As early as the 
summer of 1861, Dole instructed one of the special agents 
employed by the Indian office, a man by the name of Augustus 
Wattles, to discuss with the tribes in the Kansas area the 
idea of removing to the Indian Territory. In reporting on his 
activities in March, 1862 Wattles asserted his firm conviction 
that most of the Indians desired to move south, a step which 
he believed would not only reduce the administrative expenses 
of the Indian service by one-half but would open an estimated 
thirty million acres in Kansas and Nebraska to white settlement.
In keeping with the report of Special Agent Wattles,
Dole did not question the idea of attempting to remove the
^Pomeroy to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the 
Department of the Interior, November 15, 1862, ibid. , Letters 
Received.
battles to Caleb Smith, March 4, 1862, ibid.. Letters 
Received Miscellaneous.
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tribes to the Indian Territory. Instead, he merely challenged 
the wisdom of attempting such an undertaking under existing 
conditions. Writing to Secretary Smith on November 22, 1862 
he stated:
No one who has carefully observed the present 
condition of the tribes In Kansas and those 
elsewhere similarly situated . . . can fall to 
appreciate the magnitude of the evils of their 
present situation. . . .  I have long believed 
. . . that the civilization of the Indian and 
the perpetuation of his race depend upon his 
Isolation from the whites.
The proposal to remove to the Indian Territory those tribes
living In places such as Kansas and Nebraska, he continued,
offered "more of hope and promise for the future welfare,
development, civilization, and perpetuation of the Indian
race than any as yet devised." Yet the time for such a move
was not right. If the country were at peace, and the tribes
could be guaranteed possession of new homes in the Indian
Territory, Dole was confident that many of the tribes would
gladly consent to removal. Until that time arrived, he could
see no sense In appointing a special commissioner, as had
been suggested by Pomeroy, to negotiate with the tribes
concerned. The regular agents. Dole asserted, could present
the Idea of removal to the tribes In their charge, "and thus
they will be prepared to act so soon as order and security to
person and property are again established In the 'Indian
Country.'
^Dole to Smith, November 22, 1862. Ibid., Letters 
Received.
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Dole's argument against immediate negotiations did not 
prevent Pomeroy's colleague Lane from introducing a bill to 
facilitate the removal of the Kansas tribes. On December 8,
1862 Lane announced in the Senate that he planned to introduce 
a measure authorizing the secretary of the interior to negotiate 
removal treaties with the Indian tribes of Kansas. On 
December 15 he submitted his proposal, and the measure was 
immediately referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs.^ 
The Lane Bill remained in the committee slightly over 
one month. During this time the original measure was substan­
tially altered. In its modified form the proposed law autho­
rized the President, rather than the secretary of the interior, 
to negotiate with the tribes in Kansas in order to extinguish 
their title to lands in that state and secure their removal to 
s’ome area not lying within the boundaries of any other state.
The measure also authorized the chief executive to carry on 
simultaneous negotiations with the loyal tribes of the Indian 
Territory, or loyal portions of those tribes, to secure new 
homes for the Indians who were to be uprooted in Kansas.^
The amended bill was reported from the Indian Affairs 
Committee by Lane himself on January 20, 1863 and debate on the 
proposal began six days later. Lane remarked at the outset
^Congressiona1 Globe, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., December 8 and 
15, 1862, pp. 16, 84.
^Ibid., January 26, 1863, p. 505.
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that the measure would excite no discussion, a statement 
which proved that he was not a particularly gifted prophet. 
Rather than slipping quickly and quietly through Congress, 
Lane's modified bill was quickly challenged by a number of 
Senate skeptics. The first of these was William Pitt Fessenden 
of Maine. Doubtless thinking of the Manypenny treaties, 
Fessenden demanded an explanation of the measure, remarking 
that it did not seem to be in harmony with the government's 
recent efforts to promote Indian-white co-existence. In a 
disjointed and not overly convincing reply. Lane argued that 
the Indians of Kansas were anxious to leave the state, that 
the Indian Territory lying south of Kansas could accomodate 
every Indian east of the Rocky Mountains, and that all treaties 
with the tribes of the Territory were void as a result of the 
course adopted by these Indians after the outbreak of war. For 
good measure he added that by settling upon and improving the 
lands adjacent to the Kansas reservations, whites had increased 
the value and price of the Indian lands, a circumstance which 
Lane claimed was highly unsatisfactory to his constituents. In 
short, better to move the Indians out immediately before the 
advance of white settlement increased the prices that Kansans 
must pay for Indian lands'.®
Two of Lane's senate associates quickly came to his 
assistance. James Harlan of Iowa pointed out that any expenses
®Ibid., January 20 and 26, 1863, pp. 413, 505.
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incurred in removing the tribes from Kansas could be defrayed 
through the sale of the vacated tribal lands, while Pomeroy 
repeated assertions earlier made in correspondence with the 
Interior Department that removal and consolidation would halt 
the wasting away of a once proud people.^
Several members of the Senate were unmoved by these 
statements. Henry M. Rice of Minnesota claimed that there was 
no need for legislation of this sort as the President already 
had the power to negotiate treaties. Pomeroy quickly responded 
to this criticism by claiming that the secretary of the interior 
and the commissioner of Indian affairs would not undertake the 
responsibility of inaugurating a new Indian policy without 
some authority from Congress. Lane then added that the 
alterations incorporated into his original bill had been drawn 
up by the Interior Department, a statement which indicates 
that the proponents of removal had collaborated with officials 
of that department during the time that the Lane Bill was in 
c o mm i t t e e . A p p a r e n t l y  during this period those individuals 
within the Interior Department charged with the conduct of 
Indian affairs had agreed to begin removal negotiations if this 
policy first received Congressional endorsement.
After Harlan, Pomeroy and Lane each had their say.
Senator Fessenden again took the floor. The Maine senator 
admitted that he still hoped that the white and red man could
9Ibid., p. 506 
lOlbid.
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live peacefully side by side and that the Indian would eventually 
become a bona fide, landowning citizen. Could anything be 
gained, he asked, in again moving the Indians one step away 
from the whites, and addressing Pomeroy, he demanded to know 
how long it would be before whites began encroaching on the 
proposed new domains within the Indian Territory. Pomeroy 
asserted that the bill under consideration would reserve the 
Indian country "forever" for its occupants. This statement 
prompted Fessenden to retort that at best forever would mean 
about fifteen years, and then the timeworn practice of removing 
the Indians to a slightly more inaccessible area would again be 
repeated. Arguing for some departure from the monotony and 
tragedy of the past, Fessenden stated that he could not see 
the "justice or the propriety of yielding day after day, 
month after month, and year after year, to the repetition 
of the same arguments" when the end result was always the 
same.
In an effort to effect a compromise on the question of 
Indian removal, Iowan James Harlan proposed an amendment to 
the Lane Bill. Harlan's proposal authorized the President "to 
enter into treaties with the several tribes of Indians . . . 
now residing in the State of Kansas, providing for the 
extinction of their titles to lands held in common, and for the 
removal of such Indians of said tribes as hold their lands in
lllbld.
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common to suitable localities elsewhere . . . outside the 
limits of any state." In theory, this proposition would result 
in the removal of those Indians in Kansas who refused to adopt
pastoral pursuits while allowing their more peaceful, sedentary
12kinsmen to remain in the state.
With a minimum of discussion the Senate accepted the
Harlan amendment. One apparent reason for its easy passage
was that the proponents of Indian removal believed--as Lane
himself stated on the Senate floor--that in operation the
measure would actually result in the removal of all Indians
from Kansas, both those that had and those that had not made
progress in attaining the white man's type of civilization. By
voice vote on January 27, 1863 the Lane Bill, as amended by
13Harlan, passed the Senate without further discussion.
Once through the upper chamber, the measure was submitted
14to the House Committee on Indian Affairs on February 18.
Here the bill died, never reaching the House floor for debate. 
Refusing, to accept defeat, the supporters of Indian removal 
and consolidation adopted a different tact. On February 25,
1863 James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin, chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs, proposed two amendments to the
IZlbid., p. 507.
l^Ibid., p. 507, and January 27, 1862, p. 527. 
l^ibid., February 18, 1863, p. 1056.
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Indian Appropriations Bill, recently passed by the House of 
Representatives. Together these amendments embodied the 
essential features of the Lane Bill \diich had become bogged 
down in the lower chamber. The first authorized the President 
to enter into treaties with the Indians in Kansas providing for 
the extinction of their titles to lands held in common and 
their removal elsewhere, while the second authorized the chief 
executive to secure through negotiations with the tribes of 
the Indian Territory new homes for the Kansas tribes. After 
a short discussion the amendments were approved that same day 
by a vote of twenty to fifteen. Despite the opposition of 
the House Ways and Means Committee, the House of Representatives 
concurred in the Senate amendments on February 28, 1863 and 
on March 3, President Lincoln signed the appropriations bill 
into law.^^ Technically, the way was now clear to remove the 
tribes of Kansas to the Indian Territory.
In a very real sense, the extensive debate in Congress 
over the negotiation of removal treaties was purely academic. 
Whatever their other differences, Kansans appear to have been 
unanimous in their desire to rid their state of its Indian 
inhabitants, and long before Lincoln affixed his signature to 
the Indian Appropriations Act in March, 1863 negotiations 
looking toward removal to the Indian Territory had begun. The 
first victims of these maneuvers were the members of the 
Kickapoo tribe.
^^Ibid. , February 25, 1862, p. 1282; ibid., February 
28, 1863, p. 1392; ibid.. March 2, 1863, p. 1361.
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As the historian of this tribe has written, the effort 
of frontier railroad promoters, bankers and businessmen to 
deprive the Kickapoos of their lands in Kansas in the I860's 
comprises a sordid chronicle of man's inhumanity to man.
A fiercely independent and proud people, the Kickapoos, since 
the coming of the first Europeans to North America, had 
refused to accept the economic, political and religious doctrines 
which the white man sought to impose on them. Like their other 
red kinsmen, however, the tribe eventually yielded to the 
avarice of the frontiersman and moved gradually westward. In 
July, 1819 United States officials negotiated a treaty whereby 
the bulk of the tribe moved to Missouri from the original 
tribal domain south and west of Lake Michigan. In a later 
treaty negotiated in October, 1832 the Kickapoos surrendered 
their title to their Missouri lands in exchange for a new home 
over 700,000 acres in size located still further west on the 
Missouri River near Fort Leavenworth. Still another treaty was 
signed in 1854 in which the tribe ceded 618,000 acres of this 
tract to the Federal government, reserving 150,000 for its own 
use.
This westward movement and the diminution of the 
Kickapoo domain was accompanied by the splintering of the tribe. 
By the 1830's small parties of the tribe had of their own
A. M. Gibson, The Kickapoos ; Lords of the Middle 
Border (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 19é3), p. T24 
(hereafter cited as Gibson, The Kickapoos).
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volition begun migrating in a southwesterly direction.
Generally the most restive and recalcitrant of the tribe, these 
maraunders became known as the Southern Kickapoos, and their 
wanderings covered an area ranging from the Indian Territory 
down through Texas and into northern Mexico. Their more 
sedentary brethren, the Northern Kickapoos, remained on the 
diminished reserve near Fort Leavenworth adopting peaceful 
agricultural and pastoral pursuits.
Unfortunately for the Northern Kickapoos, their lands 
were situated on some of the major western highways, and whites 
bound for places such as New Mexico, California and Oregon 
crossed the tribe's domain. Worse still, the eastern portion 
of the projected trans-continental railroad line was expected 
to traverse their reservation. Drooling over the profits to 
be reaped from the commerical traffic of this line, as well 
as from the sale of homesteads to incoming settlers, railroad 
promoters and land speculators began pressing for the nego­
tiation of a treaty in which the Kickapoos would accept 
individual allotments and surrender their claim to the rest 
of the tribe's land. Talks were opened during the Buchanan 
administration, and after the Republican accession in 1861 
they were continued by the Lincoln-appointed Kickapoo agent, 
Charles B. Keith. In this endeavor Keith received the assistance
17lbid., pp. 1-126, passim.
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of Senator Pomeroy who served simultaneously as president of 
the Atchison and Pike's Peak Railroad.
By June, 1862 Keith had succeeded in drawing up a 
proposed treaty. When the agreement was submitted to the 
commissioner of Indian affairs in the latter part of that 
month, Keith stated that it had been properly approved by the 
tribe. The pact provided that the Kickapoo domain near Fort 
Leavenworth was to be surveyed by the secretary of the interior, 
and each person whose name appeared on the tribal roll was to 
receive an allotment: 320 acres to each chief; 160 acres each 
to the heads of families, and forty acres to all other persons. 
All land remaining after the granting of these allotments was 
to be sold to the Atchison and Pike's Peak Railroad for $1.25 
per acre. Those members of the tribe who still wished to hold 
their lands in common would remain on a diminished reserve. If 
a majority of the adult males in this group agreed to remove 
from the state the Kansas reserve would be sold and the 
proceeds used to purchase a new tract for these people in the 
Indian Territory. Finally, the wandering Southern Kickapoos 
were required to return to Kansas within one year in order to 
be eligible to receive allotments.
The ratification of this treaty by the United States
IGlbid., pp. 120-28.
^^Ibid., pp. 128-29; Charles J. Kappler (ed.), Indian 
Affairs. Laws and Treaties. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1903}, II, pp. 637-41.
163
Senate in March, 1863 was followed by a rising crescendo of
protest from Kansans who claimed to be duty bound to protect
the Kickapoos from injustice and exploitation. In reality,
those who complained the loudest were rival railroad
entrepreneurs who resented the coup scored by the Atchison
and Pike's Peak Railroad in securing the residue of the
valuable Kickapoo domain. The naive Northern Kickapoos
appear not to have fully realized what they had agreed to
until the treaty was ratified, and they, too, joined the 
20protesters.
Chief among those complaining about the Kickapoo pact 
was W. W. Guthrie, the attorney general of Kansas who undertook 
an extended campaign to have the treaty negated. In the 
spring of 1863 Gutherie convened a grand jury in Topeka to 
investigate the events surrounding the treaty negotiations.
After becoming convinced that there was indeed evidence of 
fraud in the tactics employed by Agent Keith, Gutherie attempted 
to bring these abuses to the attention of the commissioner of 
Indian affairs, the secretary of the United States House of 
Representatives, the president of the Senate and President 
Lincoln. In these endeavors, the Kansas attorney general had 
the active support of James Henry Lane who was closely 
affiliated with railroad promoters who were rivals of the 
Atchison and Pike's Peak line. In the light of the evidence
20Gibson, The Kickapoos, p. 129.
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uncovered in Gutherie's investigation, Lane wanted the treaty 
to be submitted a second time to the Senate, confident that 
the pact could not again muster a two-thirds majority before 
that body.
This widespread opposition forced the suspension of 
the treaty while Commissioner Dole investigated the charges of 
fraud. Traveling to Kansas the commissioner established head­
quarters at the Kickapoo Agency, and during the late summer 
and early fall of 1863, listened to the testimony of the 
conflicting parties. Apparently working in close collusion 
with the Atchison and Pike's Peak interests. Dole submitted a 
written report favorable to the treaty. The suspension was 
subsequently lifted, and the Kickapoo treaty was allowed to
o pstand as negotiated.
Before the Kickapoos or any other tribe could relocate 
in the area south of Kansas, new treaties must be negotiated 
with the tribes of the Indian Territory. A first effort in 
this direction came in 1863. Early in April, 1862 the loyal
21lbid., pp. 130-31; James H. Lane to John P. Usher, 
September 1, 1863, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous
^^Gibson, The Kickapoos, pp. 131-35; evidence of 
collusion is seen in a letter written by Pomeroy to Dole on 
September 19, 1863 in which Pomeroy cryptically noted that the 
Kickapoo treaty was being "fixed up" just as they both agreed 
it should be and that "all will soon be satisfied." It should 
also be noted that the Atchison and Pike's Peak later sold 640 
acres of land to Dole's wife for the munificent sum of one 
dollar. Pomeroy to Dole, September 19, 1863, Abraham Lincoln 
MSS, L.C., Series 1, Roll 59; Paul W. Gates, Fifty Million 
Acres; Conflicts over Kansas Land Policy, 1854-1^90 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1954),p. 139.
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Creeks in exile in Kansas organized a tribal government of
their own, choosing Oktarsas Harjo--commonly known as Sands--
principal chief. In a letter of April 5, 1862 the new chief
informed Commissioner Dole that the loyal Creeks were fully
prepared to do business "in every respect" with the United
States government. Sands asked to have tribal annuities paid
to his people, just as if no portion of the tribe had rebelled
against Federal authority, and voiced the opinion that the
disloyal Creeks had forfeited all claims to the property and
23annuities of the Creek Nation.
Whether or not Sands had the negotiation of a new treaty 
in mind when he wrote to Dole is debatable. Almost one year 
later, however, in March, 1863 Superintendent William G.
Coffin informed Dole that the leaders of the refugee Creeks 
in Kansas were unanimous in their desire to negotiate a new 
pact with the United States. Coffin suggested that the 
commissioner and the secretary of the interior draw up a 
tentative treaty to be submitted to tribal leaders for their 
consideration. The superintendent expressed the hope that this 
treaty would serve as a model for the later ones to be nego­
tiated with the other tribes of the Indian Territory.
23gands et £l to Dole, April 5, 1862, Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, Creek Agency, National 
Archives, Microcopy 234, Roll 230.
^^Coffin to Dole, March 22, 1863, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 
835.
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But Coffin and Dole disagreed on one essential point. 
Coffin favored the old Manypenny approach; consolidate the 
tribes west of the Kansas-Nebraska area in the Indian Terri­
tory, grant individual allotments to each Indian and throw 
the remaining lands open to the whites in the belief that the 
contiguity of the white and red man would result in the 
letter's improvement. Dole's correspondence with the secretary
of the interior, on the other hand, clearly indicated that he
25favored reserving the Territory exclusively for the Indian.
Not surprisingly, the views of the commissioner prevailed. 
In the spring of 1863 Dole sent a letter to the leaders of the 
Creek refugees dealing with the negotiation of a new treaty.
The bearer of this missive was Major Perry Fuller, a peripatetic 
Kansan deeply involved in the business of supplying goods to 
the refugee Indians. In addition. Fuller had recently secured 
appointments to act as attorney for the loyal Creeks and for 
the handful of Choctaw, Chickasaw and Quapaw refugees who 
refused to support the Confederate c a u s e . A f t e r  Fuller's 
arrival. Creek Agent George A. Cutler and Superintendent Coffin 
held a series of meetings with tribal leaders at the Sac and 
Fox Agency during which Sands and his followers agreed to
^%illiam G. Coffin to Charles E. Mix, September 1, 
1862, ibid., Roll 834.
26perry Fuller to William P. Dole, April 15, 1863, 
ibid., Roll 835; Fuller to Dole, March 21, 1863, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Creek Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 230.
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cede a fifty by seventy mile portion of their territory to 
the United States. In return for this cession, which 
reportedly included some of the best of their lands, the 
Creeks insisted on a number of stipulations. They wanted 
their new treaty to be in basic harmony with the pre-war 
treaties. More stringent safeguards to prevent white 
encroachments on their lands and a voice in the selection of 
those individuals allowed to trade with the tribe were also 
desired. Most importantly, the refugee Creeks vociferously 
opposed the idea of sectionalizing and granting individual 
land allotments, and they wished to be consulted as to 
which Indians would be located on the ceded Creek lands. In 
this way Creek leaders hoped to promote tribal tranquility by 
seeing that only peaceful, industrious Indians were resettled 
in proximity to their tribe. If possible, tribal leaders 
hoped to hold their treaty negotiations in Washington where 
they might meet with Lincoln and effect some plan whereby the 
Creeks themselves might clear the enemy forces out of their 
country. According to Agent Cutler, by this time they had
lost all hope of anything being accomplished by Federal mili-
27tary forces.
Z^George A. Cutler to William P. Dole, May 1863, and 
June 6, 1863, Letters Received, O.I.A., Creek Agency, N.A. , 
Microcopy 234, Roll 230; William G. Coffin to Dole, May 23, 
1853, ibid.. Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, 
Roll 835.
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Commissioner Dole fully realized the importance of 
establishing military control in the Indian Territory. No 
plan to return the refugees remaining in Kansas to their 
homes or to resettle Kansas Indians in the Territory could 
hope to succeed until the supremacy of Federal arms in the 
area was firmly established. The commissioner, therefore, on 
July 29, 1863 sent a letter to the secretary of the interior 
requesting that steps be taken to reinforce General James G. 
Blunt who at that time was cançaigning in the Indian country. 
Dole was convinced that the number of troops at Blunt's 
command was totally insufficient to repossess the area. Usher, 
in turn, suggested to the Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton 
that reinforcements be provided Blunt by mustering into the 
Federal service as many of the able-bodied Indians of Kansas as 
possible. This proposal worked its way down the military's 
chain of command, and on August 10, 1863 Major General John 
M. Schofield issued instructions to Blunt authorizing the 
general to augument his forces by organizing as qdickly as 
possible those Kansas Indians willing to join the Federal 
military service. Blunt thought this idea totally impractical 
and made no effort to undertake the task of organizing the 
Kansas tribes. Among his reasons for doing nothing was the 
great amount of time which such an effort would consume combined 
with his dim view of the usefulness of Indian troops. He would 
not, he wrote Schofield, exchange one regiment of Negro troops
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nofor ten regiments of Indians.
Meanwhile, Dole himself traveled to Kansas to investigate 
the Kickapoo treaty and to supervise negotiations with the Creeks. 
By early September, 1863 the task was largely completed and the 
negotiators placed their signatures on the finished document 
on the third day of that month. Signing as representatives 
of the United States were Dole, Coffin, Cutler, Pomeroy, H. W. 
Martin, who served at various times as a special agent for 
Coffin, and J. M. Winchell, a person whose official status is 
not known.
The Creek treaty of 1863 began with a statement to the 
effect that the current treaties between the tribe and the 
United States were insufficient to meet their mutual necessities 
From that point. Article I of the agreement promised perpetual 
peace and friendship between the contracting parties with the 
Creeks pledging themselves to remain "firm allies and lieges" 
of the United States forever. The United States, on its part, 
promised the tribe the quiet possession of its country after 
the close of the war. And to insure this possession the tribe 
acknowledged the right of the Federal government to station
28uole to Usher, July 29, 1863, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters 
Received; Usher to Stanton, July 29, 1863, Letters Sent by the 
Indian Division of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, 
N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 4; Schofield to Blunt, August 10, 
1863, and Blunt to Schofield, August 22, 1863, The War of the 
Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1888), Series I, xxii, part 2, pp. 440, 465 (hereafter cited as 
OR, with series number in upper-case numerals and volume number 
in lower-case numerals).
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troops within its territory at any time, with the stipulation 
that the expense of maintining these forces be met by the 
United States.
In the second article the tribe recognized the necessity, 
justice and humanity of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation 
issued the preceding January. The right of persons of 
African descent to occupy tribal lands was granted, and the 
laws of the Creek Nation were to be equally binding on all 
persons, regardless of their color. The consolidation scheme 
found expression in Article III. The tribe agreed to cede to 
the United States a parcel of land in the northeastern corner 
of its domain where tribes from outside the Indian Territory 
could resettle. The United States would pay $200,000 for this 
tract, but the purchase money was to remain in the United States 
Treasury as a perpetual tribal trust fund. The secretary of 
the interior could either pay the annual five percent interest 
accruing on this fund directly to the tribe or use it to pay 
for "mechanical labor or useful articles" needed by the Creeks.
What proved to be the most controversial provisions of 
the treaty were found in Article IV. Here the United States 
acknowledged the validity of all previously existing treaty 
stipulations with the Creek Nation that were not inconsistent 
with the new compact. Further, the United States agreed to 
reimburse the loyal members of the tribe for all losses--other 
than slaves--sustained during the war through the actions of 
either Union or Confederate forces. To carry out this promise
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of repayment, Article IV stipulated that immediately upon 
ratification of the treaty the Creek agent would make out a 
conçlete roll of all the loyal members of the tribe. The 
exact amount to be paid these persons would then be determined 
by a three member commission appointed by the President of the 
United States.
In Article V the United States agreed to furnish the 
Creeks $1,000 worth of farm inq)lements when the refugees 
returned home, while Article VI stipulated that no person would 
receive a license to trade in the Creek Nation unless recommended 
by a majority of the tribal chiefs. Article VII dealt primarily 
with the payment of salaries to the chiefs of the tribe and 
provided for the per capita payment of future tribal annuities. 
The eighth article provided for the sale of a Creek school 
house located on the ceded lands.
Finally, the ninth article dealt with those Creeks who 
had joined forces with the Confederacy. This last article 
provided that nothing in the treaty was to prevent the Creek 
chiefs and council from receiving back into the tribe those 
persons participating in the rebellion against the United 
States. None of these individuals, however, were to be 
entitled to compensation for damages under the provisions of 
the treaty nor could they hold any public office in the Creek 
Nation unless they could prove to the secretary of the interior 
that they had always remained loyal to the United States. All 
in all, the terms of this treaty were pleasing to loyal Creek
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leaders, and they were anxious to see it carried out. But 
29it never was.
While Dole and his associates wrestled with the tasks 
of fixing and negotiating treaties. Federal military commanders 
in all theaters continued their efforts to suppress the foe.
In the Indian Territory and its environs, however. Federal 
authorities frequently seemed more determined to destroy one 
another than the eneny. Here the struggle against the 
Confederacy throughout much of 1863 became something of a 
sideshow affair played out in some obscure back lot, while in 
the main arena. Federal officials, military and civilian, 
squabbled over the spoils of war like caged lions fighting for 
a solitary loin of beef. And only on rare occasions did these 
individuals take into consideration the needs of the loyal 
refugee Indians.
Trouble began in the Southwest in May, 1863. On the 
thirteenth of that month. Secretary of War Stanton, at the 
behest of President Lincoln, instructed Major General John M. 
Schofield to assume command of the Department of the Missouri, 
relieving Major General Samuel R. Curtis. Established in 
September, 1862 the department encompassed the states of 
Missouri, Arkansas and Kansas as well as the Indian Territory.
29lhe ratification question will be discussed in 
Chapter VIII. Copies of the Creek treaty can be found in the 
Unratified Indian Treaty File, N.A., Microcopy T-494, Roll 8 
and in the Creek National Papers, Federal Relations, Section 
A, Indian Records Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, 
Oklahoma City.
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Lincoln appointed Curtis commander hoping that the general
could steer a neutral path between the radicals and the
moderates in this department, the former favoring a severe
treatment of Confederate sympathizers, while the latter
advocated more leniency. In the months following his appointment,
much to the displeasure of the moderates, Curtis followed
military and administrative policies highly favorable to the
radicals in Missouri and Kansas. By May, 1863 criticism of
Curtis had become so intense that Lincoln decided that he
must be removed, and Schofield, a professional no-nonsense
30soldier, was named as Curtis' successor.
Relations between James G. Blunt and the new department 
commander had never been overly cordial. Friction between the 
two dated back to the campaign waged under Schofield's super­
vision in northwestern Arkansas late in 1862. Following the 
Battle of Prairie Grove, displaying the envy which the 
professional frequently has for the successful novice, Schofield 
characterized Blunt's operations against General T. C. Hindman's
forces as "a series of blunders" and recommended to General
31Curtis that Blunt be relieved of his field command.
With a past relationship of this type, future conflict
^^Abraham Lincoln to William R. Curtis, January 5,
1863, OR, I, xxii, part 2, pp. 17-18; Lincoln to the Secretary 
of War, May 11, 1863, and Henry W. Halleck to John M. Schofield, 
May 13, 1863, ibid. , p. 277; Albert Castel, A Frontier State at 
War: Kansas, 1861-1865 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 195ÏÏ7, 
p. 110 (hereafter cited as Castel, Frontier State).
31schofield to Curtis, January 1, 1863, OR, I, xxii,
part 2, p. 6.
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between the district and departmental commanders was all but
inevitable. And it soon came. On June 9, 1863 Schofield
issued orders dividing the District of Kansas into two sections.
One of the two, the District of the Frontier, was to consist
of that portion of Kansas below the thirty-eighth parallel as
well as the Indian Territory and the western tier of counties
in Missouri and Arkansas below the same parallel. Blunt was
placed in charge of this district with headquarters at Fort
Scott, Kansas. The other section, the District of the Border,
was placed under the command of Brigadier General Thomas
Ewing, Jr., with headquarters at Kansas City. Ewing's command
included Kansas north of the thirty-eighth parallel plus the
two western tiers of counties in Missouri north of that parallel
3 ?and south of the Missouri River.
For a variety of reasons. Blunt was incensed by
Schofield's actions. Firjt and obviously, his pride was hurt
by having his command reduced by a hated rival. But more than
sentimentality was involved. As long as he had command of
the entire state of Kansas, Blunt--and his close friend James
H. Lane--stood to make a great deal of money off the contracts
let at Fort Leavenworth, a strategic Western supply depot. The
individuals favored with contracts at the post were expected to
cut Blunt and Lane in on their profits, but now that Blunt's
command no longer included Fort Leavenworth, this source of
33plunder was gone.
32ceneral Orders No. 48, June 9, 1863, ibid., p. 315
S^Castel, Frontier State, pp. 84, 110.
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Determined to maintain some semblance of authority and 
control at Fort Leavenworth, Blunt claimed the right to give 
orders to Major L. C. Easton, the fort's chief quartermaster, 
on the grounds that the orders issued by Schofield on June 9 
made Easton quartermaster of several districts, including the 
District of the Frontier. Easton denied Blunt's claim of 
authority and was sutained by Schofield. In discussing the 
case in a letter of July 5, 1863 written to Henry W. Halleck, 
commanding general of the Union armies, Schofield stated that 
he was trying to correct the "irregularities and abuses" 
which previously existed in the department. He further noted 
that if Blunt could not submit to proper restrictions he saw 
no way of preventing the recurrence of these abuses except by 
relieving Blunt of his command. Halleck concurred in this 
opinion. Blunt, on the other hand, did not concur, but for 
the time being events in the Indian Territory prevented him 
from pressing his case.^4
In a letter of May 22, 1863 Colonel William A. Phillips 
informed Blunt of the Confederate attack of May 20 which had 
forced the refugee Indians to flee to Fort Gibson. Sorely 
pressed for troops himself. Blunt could do nothing to aid 
Phillips except to promise to give him all the support possible 
and to appeal to Schofield for reinforcements. Because of the
^^Schofield to Halleck, July 5, 1863, OR, I, xxii, part
2, p. 327; Castel, Frontier State, pp. 154-55.
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exigencies of the Vicksburg campaign, Schofield was unable 
to provide additional troops for use in the Indian Territory, 
and he warned Blunt on June 10 that if Phillips could not 
maintain his position at Fort Gibson without too great a risk
he must simply fall back. Three days later on June 4, Blunt
35moved his headquarters from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Scott.
Early in June the troops in Phillip^ command fought a 
series of skirmishes with Confederate forces led by, among 
others. Stand Watie. The rebels hoped to cut off all supply 
lines leading to Fort Gibson, but a sudden rise in the 
Virdigris and Grand rivers which inhibited troop movements 
prevented them from accomplishing this goal. On the other 
hand, Phillips was not able to appreciably expand the area 
under his control, and he still exercised sway only over that 
area within range of the guns at Fort G i b s o n . 36
Late in the month Blunt was at last able to provide 
Phillips some assistance, sending 1,600 troops to reinforce 
the garrison at Fort Gibson. Soon after their departure Blunt 
learned that the enemy was planning an attack on the Arkansas 
River outpost, and this disclosure prompted the general to
^^Blunt to Phillips, May 30, 1863, and Schofield to 
Blunt, June 10, 1863, OR, I, xxii, part 2, pp. 297-98, 315; 
James G. Blunt, "Generâî Blunt's Account of His Civil War 
Experiences," The Kansas Historical Quarterly, I (1932), p. 
242 (hereafter cited as Blunt, "Experiences, KHQ, I).
36william A. Phillips to James G. Blunt, June 20,
1863, OR, I, xxii, part 1, pp. 348-50; William Steele to W. R, 
Boggs, July 7, 1863, ibid., part 2, pp. 909-11.
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take to the field again. On the evening of July 5 he left
Fort Scott for Fort Gibson accompanied by four companies of
the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, one section of the Second Kansas
Battery, one company of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry and one
company of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry. By the morning of
July 11, Blunt and his force had reached Fort G i b s o n . ^7
The scene that awaited the general was none too
pleasant. The area held by Phillips' troops was about one and
one-half miles square and within this space, in addition to
the soldiers, about 6,000 refugee Indians from the Cherokee,
Creek, Seminole and Euchee tribes were crowded. A recent
smallpox epidemic had caused a number of deaths, and the
survivors within the confines of the fort were half naked and
many suffered from dysentery. On the south side of the
Arkansas, according to Blunt's account, 6,000 Confederates
were preparing for an attack against the fort, while rebel
spies enjoying the full confidence of Colonel Phillips moved
38freely within the conq)ound.
Displaying considerable courage. Blunt mustered a force 
of about 3,000 men and on July 17, attacked and defeated a
^ James G. Blunt to John R. Schofield, June 26, 1863, 
and C. W. Marsh to H. Z. Curtis, July 6, 1863, ibid., part 2, 
pp. 337-38, 354; Blunt, "Experiences," KHQ, I, pp. 243-44.
^^Blunt, "Experiences," KHQ, I, p. 244; Henry Smith 
to William G. Coffin, July 16, 1863, Letters Received,
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A. , Microcopy 234, Roll 
835.
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rebel force led by Douglas H. Cooper at Honey Springs near 
the Creek Agency. Suffering from some unnamed malady, and 
fearful of being overwhelmed by what he believed to be a 
superior Confederate force at Fort Smith, Blunt fell back to 
Fort Gibson on July 19.^^
Schofield remained singularly unimpressed with Blunt's 
performance as district commander. In point of fact, in 
corresponding with Army headquarters in Washington on July 15, 
Schofield reported that information had reached him from both 
official and unofficial sources concerning fraud, corruption 
and maladministration in the Department and District of Kansas 
while under Blunt's command. These allegations did not contain 
enough substance to permit Schofield to frame specific charges 
against Blunt, but he did feel that they warranted the 
convening of a court of inquiry for the purpose of "ascertaining 
the facts and bringing the guilty to punishment.
Schofield was not the only person interested in securing 
Blunt's removal. In November, 1862 Kansans went to the polls 
and chose a new governor, Thomas Carney, a wealthy Leavenworth 
merchant. C a m e y  won election with Senator Lane's backing, but 
soon after his inauguration the new governor came to a parting
^^Blunt, "Experiences," KHQ, I, pp. 244-45; Castel, 
Frontier State, p. 155.
^^John R. Schofield to E. D. Townsend, July 15, 1863,
OR, I, xxii, part 2, p. 319.
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of the ways with Lane, and Lane's cohort Blunt, vdien he opposed 
the senator's efforts to dictate the choice of officers in 
the military units organized in Kansas. In July, 1863 Carney 
met with Secretary of the Interior John P. Usher in Washington 
and asked that Blunt be removed from his command and that 
General Ewing's district be extended to include all of Kansas.
In forwarding..these requests to Lincoln, without saying exactly 
how. Usher voiced the opinion that Blunt's activities in 
Kansas had adversely affected Indian affairs in that state.
Learning of these machinations. Blunt turned his 
attention from the Confederate forces in the Indian Territory 
to what he called the "traitors and secret assassins" at his 
rear. In a searing letter sent to Secretary of War Stanton 
on July 26, 1863 Blunt exalted his own record and excoriated 
practically everyone else with whom he had come in contact since 
the beginning of his military service. Major L. C. Easton, the 
quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth, was branded a traitor, while 
Governor Carney and Southern Superintendent William G. Coffin 
were common thieves whose "wholesale robbery of those poor, 
unfortunate refugee Indians is so gross and outrageous that 
their names are a stench in the nostrils of every loyal 
Indian. . . . "  In reality, said the general, Carney and 
Coffin were the ones responsible for the efforts to secure 
his removal as district commander as they realized that he was
^^Usher to Lincoln, July 16, 1863, and Lincoln to 
James H. Lane, July 17, 1863, Lincoln MSS, L.C., Series 1, Roll 
55.
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"on their track." Claiming that he had h o m e  past insults 
as long as could be reasonably expected. Blunt expressed the 
view that the President should convene a court of inquiry 
so that he might have a direct confrontation with his accusers. 
In an embittered missive sent to Lincoln five days later Blunt 
employed a dazzling array of vitriolic language in describing 
his adversaries. General Schofield, for instance, was an 
individual who enjoyed "a reputation among the soldiers of 
the west for cowardice and imbecility. . . . "  Blunt asked for 
a full investigation of all charges lodged against him by his 
opponents, and in an obvious play for presidential sympathy 
recounted his recent victory over General Cooper while empha­
sizing the precariousness of his own advanced position.
If Secretary Stanton replied to Blunt's letter of July 
26, there is no record of it. Lincoln, however, did send a 
note of reply dated August 18. With characteristic temperance-- 
and with some degree of evasiveness--Lincoln stated that 
Governor C a m e y  of Kansas had left some papers with him dealing 
with Blunt, but these had made no great impression on him. The 
President further expressed regret that Blunt saw fit to 
denounce so many people as liars, scoundrels, fools and thieves 
And with regard to Blunt's precarious position in the Indian 
Territory, Lincoln simply asked whether anyone had forced him
^^Blunt to Stanton, July 26, 1863, OR, I, xxii, part 2, 
pp. 398-99; Blunt to Lincoln, July 31, 1863, ibid., liii, pp. 
565-67.
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to get into such a predicament, doubtless knowing that no
, , 43one had.
Because of his renewed activities against the enemy 
Blunt did not receive Lincoln's letter until late September. 
After his campaign against Cooper in the middle of July,
Blunt remained at Fort Gibson until the latter part of August 
calling on Schofield for reinforcements that would permit him 
to resume his activities against the rebel forces south of the 
Arkansas River. Eventually, 1,500 additional troops commanded 
by Colonel William F. Cloud were placed at Blunt's disposal. 
These troops reached Fort Gibson on August 22, 1863 and shortly 
thereafter Blunt crossed the Arkansas with the intention of 
attacking a Confederate force encamped near Perryville in the 
Choctaw Nation. Before an engagement could be fought, however, 
the main body of the rebel troops, commanded by Brigadier 
General William Steele, retreated southward toward the Red 
River whereupon Blunt turned his force to the east and captured 
Fort Smith, Arkansas, without opposition on September 1. Never 
one to understate his own accomplishments, on September 11 he 
reported to Schofield that "the entire Indian Territory and 
western Arkansas" were in his possession and that the area was 
now open to the settlement of the Kansas Indians.
^^Lincoln to Blunt, August 18, 1863, ibid., liii, p.
567; Castel, Frontier State, p. 157.
44james G. Blunt to John M. Schofield, August 27, and 
September 3, 1863, OR, I, xxii, part 1, pp. 597, 601-02; William 
Steele to Thomas L. Snead, August 28, 1863, ibid., pp. 599-600;
W. T. Cloud to Schofield, September 8, 1863,~~I5Td. , pp. 598-99; 
Blunt to Schofield, September 11, 1863, ibid., part 2, pp. 525-26
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This statement was, to say the least, a gross exagger­
ation. The declining military fortunes of the Confederacy-- 
especially after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the 
last Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi, in July,
1863--made it increasingly difficult for the Richmond government 
to maintain a cohesive force in the Indian Territory. Confed­
erate leaders in the area, however, were doggedly tenacious, 
and the continued resistance of their scattered, poorly 
equipped and oftimes discouraged troops made the resettlement 
of any of the Kansas tribes impossible.
Schofield was still unimpressed by either Blunt's 
accomplishments or his bravado. In reporting the capture 
of Fort Smith to Major General Halleck in Washington, Schofield 
gave the credit to Colonel Cloud rather than Blunt. By the 
latter part of September an investigation of affairs in Kansas 
and the Indian Territory by officers appointed by Schofield 
had been completed. The reports submitted by Schofield's 
inspectors convinced the department commander that Blunt had 
allowed the troops in his command to fall into a shameful state 
of inefficiency and had failed to protect the interests of the 
United States against individuals bent on defrauding the 
government. Schofield thus concluded that he had no choice 
except to relieve Blunt and place Brigadier General John McNeil 
in command of the District of the Frontier. On October 1,
1863 he informed Halleck of his decision, and on the nineteenth 
of the month orders were issued relieving Blunt of his command.
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These same orders expanded Ewing's District of the Border to 
embrace the entire state of Kansas, and Blunt was instructed 
to proceed to Leavenworth, Kansas, to await further orders.
While Union leaders exchanged embittered denunciations, 
the refugees in the Fort Gibson area fared none too well.
Despite Blunt®s recent impressive victories, the Indian Terri­
tory outside the Fort Gibson area remained a no-man's land, 
criss-crossed sporadically by rebel raiding parties that shot 
Union sympathizers and helped themselves to the livestock and 
scanty crops of the refugees around the fort. Foragers, supply 
contractors and wagoners in the employ of the Federal service 
often took what the rebels left behind, thus leaving the 
refugees almost totally dependent on the rations doled out at 
Fort Gibson. Because of the difficulties encountered in supplying 
this outpost, these rations were not especially plentiful, and 
more than once the idea of sending the refugees back to Kansas 
was discussed, although no movement was actually undertaken.
The plight of the refugees was undoubtedly worsened by 
the petty bickering among civil and military authorities in 
the Indian Territory. Relations at Fort Gibson between military 
officers and agents of the Indian Bureau were at best strained, 
each blaming the other for the miseries of the Union Indians in 
and around Fort Gibson. When, for instance, military authorities
^^Schofield to Halleck, September 12, and October 1, 
1863, ibid., part 2, pp. 527, 586; Schofield to E. D. Townsend, 
November 3, 1863, ibid., pp. 595-97; General Orders No. 118, 
ibid., p. 666; Blunt, "Experiences," KHQ, I, pp. 251-64.
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accused the Indian agents of sloppy administration and connivance 
with the dishonest supply contractors, the agents criticized 
the military for allegedly trying to undermine Indian confidence 
in the Indian Bureau and for failing to cooperate in the trans­
portation of badly needed supplies. Cherokee Agent Justin 
Harlan in December, 1863 wrote in disgust that the Federal troops 
at Fort Gibson spent most of their time drinking, dancing, 
carousing and recovering from "sundry diseases not brought on 
by any particular piety." Unfortunately, these charges were 
rarely documented, but there was probably some measure of truth 
in the accusations leveled by both sides.
To the north the 7,000 refugees in Kansas were not much 
better off. Diseases such as pneumonia, gastritis and smallpox 
brought on by poor food, inadequate clothing and shelter and 
the shortage of medical supplies and doctors, took a heavy toll. 
And those who somehow avoided death were often debilitated 
mentally by their prolonged s u f f e r i n g s . ^7 Their stay in this 
land of suffering, however, was nearing its end, for as the fall 
of 1863 darkened into winter, forces were conspiring to push 
them back into the Indian Territory.
Justin Harlan to William G. Coffin, August 8, 1863, and 
Coffin to William P. Dole, August 10, 1863, Letters Received,
0.1.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 835; 
Coffin to Charles E. Mix, August 31, 1863, ibid.; Milo Gookins 
to Coffin, October 17, 1863, ibid.; A. G. Proctor to Coffin, 
November 20, 1863, ibid.; James G. Blunt to John P. Usher, August
1, 1863, ibid.; Justin Harlan to "Dear Sir" [William G. Coffin?] 
December 7, 1863, ibid., Cherokee Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, 
Roll 99.
47Dean Bank, "Civil-War Refugees From Indian Territory 
in the North, 1861-1864," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI (1963), 
pp. 294-95.
CHAPTER VII 
RETURN OF THE REFUGEES
The confusing array of events which occurred in the 
Southwest in 1863 was climaxed by yet another military 
departmental change at the end of the year. James G. Blunt's 
removal as commander of the District of the Frontier, 
accompanied by the incorporation of all of Kansas into the 
District of the Border, commanded by Thomas Ewing, Jr., was a 
severe blow to James H. Lane. These moves deprived the senator 
of the last semblance of control that he previously had 
exercised through Blunt over army contracts and the organi­
zation of troops in Kansas.
In desperation the senator turned to Lincoln and 
successfully urged upon the President the idea of again 
converting Kansas into a separate department under the command 
of another of his friends, Samuel R. Curtis. By this time 
Lincoln had already reached the conclusion that it was inçossible 
for one commander, like Schofield, either to satisfy the people 
of both Missouri and Kansas or reconcile their differences. 
Therefore, when Lane submitted his request Lincoln on December
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31, 1863 sent instructions to Secretary of War Edwin M.
Stanton telling him to take care of the Kansas matter. The 
following day, January 1, the War Department issued orders 
again establishing a Department of Kansas which embraced not 
only that state but Colorado and Nebraska territories, Indian 
Territory and the military post at Fort Smith. As requested 
by Lane, these orders designated Major General Curtis depart­
mental commander.^
Shortly after this change occurred. Brigadier General 
John McNeil, in command at Fort Smith, ordered Colonel William
A. Phillips to launch a campaign southward from Fort Gibson
2toward the Red River with his Indian regiments. Although the 
exact purpose of this expedition was never spelled out, one 
of its obvious goals was to distribute in enemy held territory 
copies of Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation issued December 8, 
1863. Hopefully, its non-vindictive spirit might spread 
dissension among the Confederate Indians. In addition, this 
campaign would provide Phillips' troops with an opportunity 
to forage for supplies such as c o m  and cattle badly needed at 
Fort Gibson.
^Albert Castel, A Frontier State at War : Kansas, 1861- 
1865 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 162-63; The 
War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of 
the Union and Confederate Armies (Wasïïington; Government Printing 
Office, 1891), Series I, xxxiv, part 2, p. 7 (hereafter cited 
as OR with series number in upper-case numerals and volume 
numBer in lower-case numerals).
^William A. Phillips to Samuel R. Curtis, February 16, 
1864, OR, I, xxxiv, pt. 1, pp. 106-08.
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The time was certainly propitious for such a move.
The continued occupation of a substantial portion of their 
country by Federal troops, the non-payment of annuities, the 
scarcity of arms, clothing, and food had all combined to create 
a sense of malaise and discontent among the rebel Indians 
not at all unlike the feelings they had toward the United 
States in 1861. Ruefully aware of these sentiments. Confederate 
field commanders in the Indian Territory pleaded with their 
superiors to get the Confederate government to give evidence
3of good faith and intention to meet its treaty obligations.
The delegates who met in Grand Council in November,
1863 under the terms of the North Fork Agreement of 1861 
were cognizant of the needs of their people and the failure 
of the Richmond government to meet its treaty obligations. The 
principal address at this council, held at Armstrong Academy 
deep in the southwestern corner of the Choctaw Nation, was 
delivered by Stand Watie. While admitting that it appeared 
that they had been temporarily abandoned by their white allies, 
Watie urged his listeners to remain steadfast. Honor and self- 
interest, he asserted, both dictated that the Confederacy would 
meet its legitimate obligations, and history would justly
^J. M. Bell to Caroline Bell, September 2, 1863, 
Cherokee Nation Papers--Civil War Letters, 1861-1874, Division 
of Manuscripts, Bizzell Library, University of Oklahoma, 
Norman; Stand Watie to S. S. Scott, August 8, 1863, OR, I, 
xxii, part 2, pp. 1104-05; S. B. Maxey to E. Kirby Smith, 
February 26, 1864, ibid., xxxiv, part 2, pp. 994-97; R. W.
Lee to S. B. Maxey, February 26, 1864, ibid., pp. 997-98.
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condemn those who abandoned the struggle during this moment 
of crisis. Following this speech, which doubtless had a 
mollifying effect upon the assembled delegates, an appeal to 
President Jefferson Davis was drawn up on November 24, calling 
for the establishment of both an Indian brigade and a separate 
military department in the Indian Territory. Davis eventually 
sent a cordial letter of reply, but conditions remained 
unchanged among the Confederate Indians.̂
This November meeting was followed by a similar session 
held at Armstrong Academy in early February, 1864. Here plans 
were to be laid for the establishment of an alliance with the 
plains Indians and the launching of an expedition into Kansas. 
Both these ideas seem to have originated with the rebel 
Indians, and nothing came of either of them at this time, but 
the proposals were not forgotten. In point of fact, the high­
light of this meeting was an address by the Confederate 
commander in the Indian Territory, Brigadier General Samuel B. 
Maxey. The general promised to place a force between Fort 
Gibson and the Canadian River to protect the Confederacy's
^Ira G. Clark, "Attempts to Form an Indian Confederation 
in Oklahoma," (Unpublished M.A. thesis. University of Oklahoma, 
1937), p. 39 (hereafter cited as Clark, "Confederation"); 
Jefferson Davis to Israel Folsom et al, February 22, 1864,
Allan Nevins and James D. Richardson"%eds. ), The Messages and 
Papers of Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy Including 
Diplomatic Correspondence 186l-l#65 (New York; Chelsea House- 
Rooert Hector, l9o6), I, pp. 477-79; Address of Stand Watie, 
as Principal Chief, to the Assembled Grand Council, November 
12, 1863, Cherokee Nation Papers--Civil War Letters, Division 
of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma.
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allies, and he urged the Indians to remain at their homes and 
raise crops for the coming year. Eye witnesses reported that 
these remarks had an excellent effect on the flagging spirits 
of the delegates, but this buoyant spirit did not last long 
as Maxey himself soon fled across the Red River.^
The beginning of Phillips' dash southward from Fort 
Gibson coincided with the opening of this latest session of 
the Grant Council. Moving in a southwesterly direction, 
Phillips' force cut across the southeastern edge of the Creek 
Nation. Minor skirmishes were fought with small enemy units 
on February 5, 6, and 8, and by February 11 the entire force 
had reached the Little River. Here the expedition paused for 
three days waiting to be reinforced by the Fourteenth Kansas 
Cavalry. When these troops failed to appear, Phillips resumed 
his march on the fourteenth moving on toward the Wichita 
Mountains. As Phillips approached, the troops commanded by 
Generals Maxey and D. H. Cooper fled across the Red River into 
Texas. Had he received the cavalry reinforcements he had been 
promised before leaving Fort Gibson, Phillips was confident 
that he could have pushed into northern Texas himself and 
brought out a number of Union sympathizers and recruits. As 
it was, he contented himself with dispatching copies of the 
President's Amnesty Proclamation to the Choctaw Council, to
I. G. Vore to S. B. Maxey, January 29, 1864, OR, I, 
xxxiv, pt. 2, p. 928; D. H. Cooper to S. B. Maxey, February, 
1864, ibid., p. 959; Clark, "Confederation," pp. 40-41.
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Chief John Jumper of the Semlnoles and Chickasaw Governor 
Winchester Colbert. These copies of the proclamation were 
accompanied by personal letters in which Phillips urged tribal 
leaders to persuade their people to take advantage of the 
generous terms offered by the President and renew their 
allegiance to the United States. With his ammunition running 
critically low and with forces numerically superior to his 
massing south of the Red River, Phillips began his return 
movement on February 17 after reaching a point 165 miles south­
west of Fort Gibson. By the twenty-fourth the expedition had 
returned to its point of origin, having killed an estimated 
250 of the enemy.^
Upon his return to Fort Gibson, the colonel found a 
letter from Major General Curtis who had reconnoitered the 
northeastern corner of the Indian Territory during Phillips' 
absence. In this dispatch Curtis raised an important point-- 
the rights to be guaranteed those rebel Indians who might want 
to renew their allegiance to the United States. Lincoln's 
Amnesty Proclamation, copies of which had been distributed by 
Phillips, offered a full pardon and restoration of all property 
rights, except property in slaves, to those individuals who 
would take the prescribed oath of allegiance to the United 
States. And while the proclamation did not say specifically
William A. Phillips to Samuel R. Curtis, February 16 
and 24, 1864, OR, I, xxxiv, pt. 1, pp. 106-09; itenary of the 
of the expedition in ibid., pp. 111-12.
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that these terms applied to the rebel Indians, there likewise 
was nothing in the document specifically exempting these people 
from its generous terms. Aware of this ambiguity, Curtis 
cautioned Phillips that it would be unwise to offer terms of 
peace to the rebel Indians that implied a relinquishment of 
legitimate forfeitures. As a department commander he wished 
"to avoid any and all conclusions against our Government as to 
future rights of Indians who have made war upon [the United 
States] in their national capacity." What these Indians 
received, he wanted it clearly understood, they received "on 
the score of humanity and generosity." He was especially 
concerned with the Choctaws who had supported the Confederacy 
with almost complete unanimity. "The Choctaw Nation," he 
asserted, "has clearly forfeited all right of property . . . 
and I trust the President's terms of amnesty will not disre­
gard belligerent rights so clearly acquired or so vast in 
value to our Government."^
In a letter of reply dated February 29, 1864 Phillips 
concurred in the views of the department commander. The 
Chickasaws and Seminoles, he pointed out, had largely fled 
from their tribal lands, and few were expected to return. As 
to the Choctaws, \dio apparently were still present in signifi­
cant numbers on their lands, Phillips did not expect them nor 
did he want them as a nation to make peace.
^Curtis to Phillips, February 11, 1864, ibid., pt. 2,
pp. 301-02.
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I fully agree with what I conceive to be the 
spirit of your letter to me that it is not now 
desirable to get back the Choctaws with their 
rights as a people. They have rebelled so 
grievously and so wickedly, and would be so 
troublesome, that I am satisfied that the true 
policy is to sweep their nation with fire and 
sword. . . .
Some individual Choctaws, he noted, might want peace, and it
was in an effort to "shake the best of them" that he forwarded
his letter to the Choctaw Council along with a copy of the
Amnesty Proclamation.
In addition to expressing a degree of vindictiveness
toward the Confederate Indians, Phillips also discussed another
idea in this letter. Despite wartime damages, the Indian
Territory, blessed with an abundance of natural resources,
was still a country of vast potential wealth, a fact duly
noted by Curtis during his brief tour. The Cherokee lands
south of the Arkansas, along with the Choctaw, Chickasaw and
Seminole nations could make "a fair State." The establishment
of such a state, he observed, "lying where it does, filled with
a loyal population, is a consideration the Government in the
settlement of the questions for the future in the Southwest
cannot overlook." Phillips conceded, however, that since he
had no white troops at his disposal, he dared not discuss this
proposal openly, thus admitting that the idea of statehood was
unpopular among the Indians and would have a demoralizing effect
8on his regiments.
^Phillips to Curtis, February 29, 1864, ibid., pp,
467-68.
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At the same time that Curtis and Phillips were
exchanging views, Washington officials discussed a closely
related matter, the return of the refugee Indians to their
homes. On January 27, 1864 James R. Doolittle, chairman of
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, by letter requested
Secretary of the Interior John P. Usher's opinion as to whether
conditions in the Indian Territory would permit such a move.
Before answering, the secretary asked for the opinion of
Commissioner William P. Dole who, in turn, sought the advice
oof James G. Blunt.
After his removal as commander of the District of the 
Frontier, Blunt had threatened to resign his commission unless 
assigned to an active field command. At the request of 
Senator Lane and Kansas Congressman Abel C. Wilder, the
general was summoned to Washington for consultations on the
removal of both the refugees and the indigenous tribes from 
Kansas. On February 5, Dole asked for Blunt's views on the
wisdom of attempting to return the refugees to their homes.
In particular, he wanted to know if Federal forces were present 
in sufficient numbers to make reasonably certain that the 
refugees could cultivate their fields without fear of being
^Doolittle to Usher, January 27, 1864, Records of the 
Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Indian Division, 
Record Group 48, National Archives, Letters Received 
Miscellaneous.
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forced by enemy raiding parties to flee to some military
post.
Blunt penned a generally optimistic note of reply that 
same day. After briefly recounting Federal victories in the 
Territory in 1863 he asserted that the best interests of the 
government and the refugees required that these people be 
returned to their homes as early as possible. He conceded, 
however, that the recent departmental reorganization in the 
Southwest presented a problem. Since the re-establishment of 
the Department of Kansas, all the troops that previously 
served in the District of the Frontier, with the exception of 
the three regiments of Indian Home Guards, were now reporting 
to Major General Frederick Steele, commander of the Department 
of A r k a n s a s . T h i s  situation left General Curtis with very 
few troops with which to defend the Indian Territory, and to 
remedy this situation. Blunt recommended that Curtis* forces
l^James G. Blunt to Edwin M. Stanton, December 9,
1863, OR, I, xxii, pt. 2, pp. 735-36; James G. Blunt, "General 
Blunt's Account of His Civil War Experiences," Kansas Historical 
Quarterly, I (1932), pp. 249-50; Abraham Lincoln to Edwin M. 
Stanton, January 9, 1864, Roy P. Basler (ed.). The Collected 
Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press,~T953) , VII, p 119; William P. Dole to James G. Blunt, 
February 5, 1864, Letters Sent by the Office of Indian Affairs, 
National Archives, Microcopy 21, Roll 73.
l^In this letter Blunt actually referred to Steele as 
commander of the Department of Missouri, but he meant to say 
the Department of Arkansas. The constant shifting of department 
lines left even the participants confused. Blunt to Dole, February 5, 1864, Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superin­
tendency, Microcopy 234, Roll 835.
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be augmented by adding to his department the two western 
tiers of counties in Arkansas. If this change occurred and 
authority was granted to organize both white and Negro troops 
in northern Texas, Blunt felt confident that the refugees 
could be safely returned to their homes. Two days after making 
these remarks Blunt left Washington for Kansas, and on 
February 27 Curtis issued orders placing him back in command 
of that portion of the old District of the Frontier included 
within the boundaries of the Department of Kansas.
Unfortunately, one can only surmise what Dole's views
were regarding the immediate return of the refugees. After
receiving Blunt's statement he forwarded a letter of his own
to Usher on February 9, and the secretary forwarded this missive
13to Doolittle with his endorsement. No copy of the Dole 
letter of February 9 remains in the records of the commissioner's 
office, but at least one circumstance points to the conclusion 
that the commissioner and Secretary Usher were less than 
optimistic about the prospects of an immediate return of the 
refugees. On Thursday, March 3, 1864 Jim Lane introduced in 
the Senate a resolution authorizing the President to take the 
steps necessary for the return of the refugee Indians to their 
homes. Following its introduction Lane admitted to his Senate 
colleagues that the Interior and War departments had different
l^Ibid.; OR, I, xxxiv, pt. 2, p. 447.
^^Usher to Doolittle, February 13, 1864, Letters Sent 
by the Indian Division of the Office of the Secretary of the 
Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 4.
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views on the wisdom of returning the Indians at this time,
and to settle the matter a statement of opinion from Congress 
14was needed.
This resolution was referred to the Committee on Indian 
Affairs, but Dole himself soon obviated the need for its 
passage. Whatever his earlier doubts, the commissioner on 
March 21, 1864 wrote a letter to Usher urging the immediate 
return of the refugees. Two things seem to have prompted 
Dole's apparent reversal. First, in an exchange of letters 
with the Interior Department, General Curtis, while admitting 
that his department was undermanned, promised to use his best 
efforts to protect both Indians and whites within his command. 
Second, information had reached Washington that Major General 
Nathaniel P. Banks was planning to launch an expedition from 
his base in Southern Louisiana up the Red River, and Dole 
believed that Confederate efforts to stop this drive would 
drain the Indian Territory of all organized rebel troops, 
leaving behind nothing but a few scattered guerrilla forces 
to attack the returning refugees.
Events, in Congress at least, now moved with unaccustomed 
rapidity. On March 25, Senator Doolittle introduced Senate
^^Congressional Globe, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., March 3, 1864,
p. 921.
^^John P. Usher to Samuel R. Curtis, February 17, 1864, 
Letters Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of the Interior, N.A. , 
Microcopy 606, Roll 4; Curtis to Usher, March 9, 1864, and Dole 
to Usher, March 21, 1864, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received.
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Bill Number 198 to aid the refugee Indians to return to their 
homes. Referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, the 
measure was reported favorably to the Senate on April 4. In 
its final form the bill appropriated $223,000 to be used to 
shift the refugees back to the Indian Territory and to support 
them and their kinsmen already there until June 30, the end of 
the current fiscal year.
On April 7, the Senate, sitting as a committee of the 
whole, began deliberation on the proposal, and Chairman 
Doolittle tried to explain the optimistic rationale upon which 
it was based. Officials in the Indian Bureau and the Interior 
Department, he said, had estimated that it would cost about 
$473,000 to remove the refugees, provide them necessary agri­
cultural implements and support them and the refugees already 
in the Territory for the duration of the calendar year.
Doolittle explained, however, that his committee decided to 
recommend the appropriation of about one-half that amount.
This sum would suffice to transport the refugees to their homes, 
provide them with agricultural implements and subsist all the 
refugees--those to be returned and those already in the 
Territory--for ninety days. Beyond that point, no assistance 
other than the regular annuity payments would be required as 
the Indians could produce their own food.
To any individual familiar with conditions in the 
Territory such an explanation would have seemed grossly sanguine 
Few members of the Senate, however, possessed knowledge in
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depth on affairs in the Indian Territory and after the presen­
tation of Doolittle's simplistic explanation the bill passed 
without further debate. On April 21 it was introduced in the 
House and referred to that body's Indian Committee. Favorably 
reported from the committee, the measure passed the House with 
no debate on May 2 and received the President's signature two 
days later.
In a haphazard fashion, plans for the return of the 
refugees had nearly been completed by the time this measure 
reached the President's desk. After Senate passage of Bill 
Number 198, Dole sent a letter to Superintendent Coffin on 
April 13 ordering him to take the steps required to remove 
the refugees from Kansas to their homes. The commissioner 
admitted that technically there were no funds available to 
finance the move, but he expressed confidence that the Senate 
measure would soon receive House approval. Therefore, he had 
decided to instruct Coffin to make the necessary preparations 
so that the Indians might arrive at their homes in time to put 
in a crop during the current growing season.
The task assigned Coffin was no small one. Not the
^^Congressional Globe, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., March 25,
1864, p. 1274; ibid., April 4, 1864, p. 1402; ibid., April 7, 
1864, pp. 1455-5FT"ibid., April 21, 1864, p. ITWYf ibid., May 
2, 1864, p. 2031; 15137, May 4, 1864, p. 2117.
^^William P. Dole to William G. Coffin, April 13,
1864, Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 835.
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least of his worries was the uncertainty of obtaining escort 
troops to protect the refugee train during its movement 
southward to Fort Gibson. At precisely this time, Union 
military commanders in the West were involved in a complex 
dispute over whether Fort Smith and the area immediately 
surrounding it were under the jurisdiction of the Department 
of Kansas or the Department of Arkansas. After prolonged 
wrangling the controversy was submitted for settlement to 
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant who had recently been 
asked by the secretary of war to investigate the affairs of the 
Western military departments. In a report addressed to Union 
Army commander Henry W. Halleck on April 16, 1864 Grant voiced 
the opinion that the state of Arkansas and the Indian Terri­
tory should be under one man, and he requested that the 
President be asked to transfer both the Territory and Fort 
Smith to the Department of Arkansas. An order complying with 
Grant's request was issued at the direction of the President the 
following day. This same dictate also instructed James G.
Blunt to return to Fort Leavenworth and report to Major General 
Curtis.
^^William P. Dole to William G. Coffin, April 13,
1864, Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 835.
1 8Samuel R. Curtis to Edwin M. Stanton, February 10,
1864, OR, I, xxxiv, pt. 2, pp. 292-93; E. R. S. Canby to Curtis, 
February 17, 1864, ibid., p. 356; James G. Blunt to Curtis, 
March 9, 1864, ibid., p. 537; Grant to Halleck, April 17, 1864, 
ibid.. pt. 3, p. 178; General Orders No. 164, ibid., p. 196.
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In addition to revealing the obtuseness and pettiness 
that afflicted the Union high command, this confusing array of 
events left Superintendent Coffin in the lurch. Because of 
the scarcity of troops and the dispute among the generals of 
the Southwest over departmental boundaries. Coffin had no 
guarantee that his refugees would receive a military escort 
back to their homes or adequate protection once they arrived.
The issuance of the order of April 17 attaching the Indian 
Territory to the Department of Arkansas, if anything, made the 
superintendents' position more precarious, for now General 
Curtis had no authority whatever to provide an escort for the 
returning refugees beyond the border of Kansas. On the other 
hand, the planned participation of General Steele's forces in 
General Bank's Red River campaign in Louisiana meant that the
1 9Department of Arkansas probably could provide little protection. 
And protection might be sorely needed if the campaign in north 
Louisiana failed and the Confederates in the West turned their 
attention suddenly from their southeastern flank toward the 
Indian Territory.
The assistance which Coffin received from his Washington 
superiors was minimal. When he informed Dole by wire on April 
22 of the need for troops to protect his charges, the commissioner
In reality, logistical problems prevented Steele's 
forces from leaving Arkansas, but Indian Bureau officials had 
no way of foreseeing that these troops would remain nearby 
rather than advancing into Louisiana to aid Banks as originally 
planned. Ludwell H. Johnson, Red River Campaign; Politics and 
Cotton in the Civil War (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,T95B)T --
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in a two line telegram of reply, simply acknowledged receipt
of Coffin's dispatch and instructed him to proceed to carry out
20the instructions of April 13. Obviously Dole at this point 
was not overly impressed with the problems confronting the 
superintendent, but events soon caused him to have second 
thoughts about the wisdom of returning the refugees.
By early May, Bank's Red River campaign was on the 
verge of collapse, and on the seventh of the month Dole 
addressed one of his typically rambling and poorly organized 
letters to Coffin. He told the superintendent that a requi­
sition for $45,000 had been issued in his favor for the removal 
of the refugees and their temporary subsistence after their 
arrival in the Territory. The original intention, said Dole, 
was to send more money, but because of the lateness of the 
season and the apparent failure of the Red River campaign he 
and Secretary Usher had decided to send only $45,000. From 
their vantage point in Washington it now appeared, he admitted, 
that it would be "unsafe and impolitic" to remove the refugees, 
but the final decision was to be Coffin's. If upon receipt of 
this letter everything appeared auspicious for the undertaking 
he should proceed with the return movement, and more funds 
would be forwarded. On the other hand if Coffin decided that
Coffin to Dole, April 22, 1864, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 
835; Dole to Coffin, April 28, 1864, Letters Sent, O.I.A., 
N.A., Microcopy 21, Roll 74.
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a removal would end disastrously he could use the $45,000 to
maintain the refugees in Kansas. But no more of the recent
Congressional appropriation could be used for that purpose as
Congress intended for this money to be used primarily for
removing the refugees from the state rather than maintaining 
21them there.
Before this letter reached Kansas, Coffin telegraphed 
Dole on May 10 informing the commissioner that he would leave 
in a matter of days with the refugees from the Indian Terri­
tory. General Curtis would furnish an escort to the Kansas 
border, and Coffin asked Dole to request that the Department 
of Arkansas furnish protection from that point onward. Acting 
on instructions from Secretary Usher, Dole sent a return wire 
to Coffin the following day telling him to do nothing until he 
received the letter of May 7 and then act on his own respon­
sibility. If Coffin decided to proceed, an escort would be
22requested from the War Department.
It is impossible to say precisely how the Indians 
themselves felt about returning home, as tribal leaders were 
amazingly reticent on the subject. Presumably, most were more 
than anxious to return after spending three miserable winters
Z^Dole to Coffin, May 7, 1864, Letters Sent, O.I.A.,
N.A., Microcopy 21, Roll 74.
^^Coffin to Dole, May 10, 1864, Letters Received, O.I.A.
Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 835;
undated note of instructions to Dole signed by John P. Usher,
ibid.; Dole to Coffin, May 11, 1864, Letters Sent, O.I.A.,
N.A., Microcopy 21, Roll 74.
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in Kansas, shifting from one locale to another as necessity 
dictated.
Understandably, Superintendent Coffin had serious
misgivings about assuming the responsibility for making the
final decision on leaving Kansas. Despite the miseries
endured, the refugees at least had not been subjected to enemy
attack since their arrival in the state, and reports from the
south made it abundantly clear that this type of immunity could
not be expected in the Indian Territory. Special Agent Milo
Gookins reported from Fort Gibson on May 9 that conditions in
the Territory were still very unsettled. Bands of bushwackers
infesting the country made weekly raids in the vicinity of the
fort, and in a recent attack eight Union sympathizers had been
killed. Also weighing heavily on the superintendent’s mind
was the question of money; removal to the Indian Territory
would greatly increase the expense of maintaining the Union
Indians because of the added distance between them and the
23sources of supply in Kansas.
Ironically enough, it was the shortage of funds available 
for refugee support that finally induced Coffin to begin the 
return trek to the Indian Territory. A provision was incor­
porated into the Indian Appropriation Act for the fiscal year
^^Gookins to George A. Cutler, May 9, 1864, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 
234, Roll 835; William G. Coffin to Charles E. Mix, September 
18, 1863, ibid. ; Coffin to William P. Dole, January 6, 1864, 
ibid.
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1863-1864, Identical to the proviso in the act for the previous 
year, authorizing the use of the annuities of the rebellious 
tribes for refugee relief. This action placed $362,410 at the 
disposal of the Indian Bureau, but as early as mid-September,
1863 Coffin warned Washington officials that this amount would 
not be enough to carry him through the fiscal year. If the 
refugees were to be properly cared for Congress would have to 
appropriate at least $200,000 more. No special appropriation 
was made, however, and the money appropriated in the act for 
the fiscal year 1864-1865 would not become available until 
after June 30, 1864. With his funds fast dwindling away, the 
only money readily available to Coffin in the crucial spring 
of 1864 was the $223,000 appropriated in April, yet this money 
could be used only for removal purposes. Thus, the refugees 
were faced with the stark alternative of leaving Kansas or 
starving. Well aware of this fact. Coffin, with grave misgivings 
made the only choice which he could under the circumstances, 
and on Monday, May 16, 1864 the refugees started home.^^
Prior to their departure those making the trip had been 
assembled by Coffin and his agents at the Sac and Fox Agency, 
and it was from this point that the refugee train departed. 
Approximately 5,000 Indians, mostly Creeks, Cherokees, Euchees, 
Chickasaws, with a scattering of Seminoles, made the southward
94William G. Coffin to Charles E. Mix, September 14, 
1863, ibid.; Coffin to William P. Dole, May 14, 1864, ibid.; 
Charles E. Mix to John P. Usher, February 22, 1864, R.G. 48, 
N.A., Letters Received.
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trek. Left behind at Neosho Falls on the Neosho River in 
charge of Agent George C. Snow, was the bulk of the Seminole 
refugees, numbering about 550. A recent smallpox epidemic had 
compounded their miseries and made it dangerous for these 
people to mix with the other refugees.
The refugee train, made up of about 300 wagons, and 
stretching six miles from end to end, moved at an average pace 
of eight to twelve miles per day. By June 1, Coffin and his 
wards had advanced as far south as the Osage Catholic Mission, 
about forty miles north of the Kansas-Indian Territory boundary, 
where they waited for a military escort from Steele's Department 
of Arkansas to meet them. On May 26, Secretary of War Stanton 
informed the Interior Department that Steele had been ordered 
to provide an escort. After a short delay the troops appeared, 
the refugees then resumed their march, and on June 15 they 
reached Fort Gibson.
All things considered, the return movement was accom­
plished with relative ease. The only event approaching a 
serious incident was the theft of thirty head of cattle by a 
roving band of brigands never apprehended. Only six people 
died on the trail, four of them from lightning, and there were 
sixteen births. The presence of the escorting troops provided 
by Curtis and Steele doubtless discouraged the rebels from 
trying to disrupt the train, and for once even Coffin had 
something nice to say about the military. The troops accompanying
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the refugees he characterized as "vigilant, active and 
accomodating.
This spirit of rapport did not last long. Before the 
year was out Indian Bureau officials, with justification, 
would again blame the military for the difficulties encountered 
in maintaining the Union Indians.
Edwin M. Stanton to John P. Usher, May 26, 1864, 
Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 835; Henry Smith to William P. Dole, 
June 6, 1864, ibid.; William G. Coffin to Dole, June 3, 7, 
and 16, 1864, ibid.
CHAPTER VIII 
LATER TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
Early in 1864 the Creek treaty of September, 1863 met 
an ignominious fate. After being submitted by President 
Lincoln to the United States Senate on December 15, 1863 the 
pact was altered so drastically that in its final, ratified 
form it was no longer acceptable to the Creeks.^ The fate of 
this treaty, in a sense, was symptomatic of the difficulty 
encountered by the Federal government in negotiating with the 
tribes of the Southwest. The Civil War generated a congeries 
of complex issues for the tribes of the Indian Territory, and 
all wartime efforts to negotiate solutions to these problems, 
as well as those pending at the outbreak of the hostilities, 
failed.
The Senate practice of considering treaties in closed, 
executive sessions makes it virtually impossible to retrace 
the process by which the Creek treaty was defaced. Once in 
the hands of the Senate, it was referred to the Committee on
^Lincoln to the United States Senate, December 15, 1863, 
Roy Basler (ed.). The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, l9F3), VI1, p . 69 
(hereafter cited as Basler (ed.). Collected Works).
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Indian Affairs. The committee, in turn, asked two of its 
members, Oregon's James W. Nesmith and James H. Lane of Kansas, 
to examine closely the treaty's provisions. On January 22,
1864 Lane addressed a letter to Commissioner William P. Dole 
asking for an explanation of the treaty's fourth article in 
which the United States acknowledged the validity of all 
existing treaty stipulations with the Creeks and agreed to 
remunerate the loyal members of the tribe for all losses, other
pthan slaves, sustained during the war. But the events that 
occurred from this point onward are still shrouded in obscurity. 
If Dole submitted a written reply to Lane's letter, no record 
of it was preserved in the records of the commissioner's office. 
In a similar vein, the existent records of the Department of 
the Interior and the published correspondence of President 
Lincoln are strangely quiet on the topic, and neither gives any 
clue as to what transpired behind the Senate's closed doors.
A quick examination of the final draft of the treaty, 
however, reveals that changes of great importance occurred 
behind those portals. As amended, the treaty received the 
Senate's approval on March 8, 1864 and in its final form it 
offered to the Creek tribe terms considerably less generous 
than those found in the original document. Under the agreement 
of September 3, the tribe in Article III agreed to cede to the
2Lane to Dole, January 22, 1864, Letters Received by 
the Office of Indian Affairs, Creek Agency, National Archives, 
Microcopy 234, Roll 231.
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United States a tract of land in the northeastern corner of 
its domain for the resettlement of Indians from outside the 
Indian Territory. In return the United States had agreed to 
establish a tribal trust fund of $200,000, and in Article IV 
acknowledged the validity of previous treaty stipulations and 
promised to repay the tribe for most damages growing out of 
the war. In the draft that emerged from the Senate, Article
III remained essentially unchanged, but the original Article
IV with its important guarantee of past treaty stipulations 
was discarded. In its place the Senate inserted a totally new 
article, containing no recognition whatever of earlier treaty 
provisions, which required the tribe to cede additional terri­
tory to the United States. The new article stated that those 
Creeks--constituting about one-half of the nation--who had 
united with the Confederacy had "absolutely forfeited forever" 
all rights and claims to the lands of the Creek tribe. Their 
portion of the tribal domain, making up, as the Senate awkwardly 
phrased it, "the one undivided half of all the lands and 
territory remaining . . .  to the said Creek nation," was ceded 
in fee simple to the United States. The United States, in 
turn, would hold this land in trust, reserving it for the use
of those hostile Creeks who re-established amicable relations 
with the Federal government, as well as "such other friendly 
tribes and persons" who might be settled there" with the assent 
of the council of said Creek nation. . . . "  It was expressly 
stated, however, that the terms of this article in no way gave
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the United States the authority to settle or to permit the 
settlement of whites on any portion of the Creek domain.
For this added cession the Federal government was to 
deliver to the Creek Nation over a five-year period a total 
of $120,000 worth of stock, horses, sheep, clothing and "such 
other articles as the secretary of the Interior, Fsicl with 
the assent of the council of said nation, may direct." But 
the Creeks could look forward to no further recompense of any 
kind. Article IV as rewritten by the Senate stipulated that 
in consideration of the payment of the sums provided for in 
the treaty, plus the large amounts of money over and above 
the regular annuities already spent in supporting the Creek 
refugees in Kansas, and in consideration of the United States’ 
relinquishing all further claims for damages inflicted by the 
hostile Creeks, the treaty would be considered "a friendly 
settlement of all claims for indemnity by either party.
Over a month passed before Superintendent William G. 
Coffin received a copy of the revamped treaty. In a letter 
of April 16, 1864 Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Charles E. Mix forwarded a duplicate of the document to the 
superintendent and instructed him at the earliest possible
3Unratified Indian Treaty File, National Archives, 
Microcopy T-494, Roll 8. In addition to these major changes 
the Senate struck out all of Article V, in which the United 
States agreed to provide the tribe with $1,000 worth of farm 
implements, as well as that portion of Article VII providing 
for per capita payment of all future Creek annuities.
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date to submit it to the Creeks, explaining to them the reasons 
that induced the Senate to make changes in the original treaty. 
Two months earlier Coffin had traveled to Washington for 
consultations on the proposed removal of the refugee Indians 
from Kansas and while there met with the members of the Indian 
committees of both houses of Congress. Presumably while in 
the capital city he must have learned of the contemplated 
changes in the treaty as well as the reasons, whatever they 
were, that prompted the alterations.^
In the midst of the preparations for the return to 
the Indian Territory, Coffin held a council with Creek leaders 
at the Sac and Fox Agency early in May, 1864. No official 
record of this session was preserved, but within days 
unofficial accounts appeared in various western newspapers 
such as the St. Louis Democrat and the Leavenworth Daily Times 
which made it clear that the Creeks had no intention of meekly 
acquiescing in the Senate version of the treaty. According 
to these news stories the leaders of the loyal Creeks rejected 
the treaty, contending that any lands forfeited by their rebel 
bretheren should remain under the control of the loyal portion 
of the tribe instead of being ceded in trust to the United States 
Coffin quickly challenged the accuracy of these reports.
^ i x  to Coffin, April 16, 1864, Letters Sent by the 
Office of Indian Affairs, National Archives, Microcopy 21, 
Roll 73; Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
for the Year H. Ex., Doc. No. 1, 30 Cong., 2 Sess.,
1865 (SeriaL 1220), p. 451 (hereafter cited as Commissioner* s 
Report, 1864).
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In a letter to the editor of the Daily Times dated May 12, 
the superintendent adamantly denied that the tribe had rejected 
the treaty. Coffin insisted that he neither expected nor 
attempted to get a final decision from the Indians at the 
recent meeting. The council, he said, was held merely to 
explain to the Creeks the changes made by the Senate, and 
once these were fully understood he expressed confidence that 
the treaty would "be willingly and cordially ratified."5
This prediction went unfulfilled. On June 23, 1864 
Coffin held a second meeting with the Creeks, this one at 
Fort Gibson. On this occasion the leaders of the tribe clearly 
and indignantly refused to accept their amended treaty. After 
meeting with Chief Sands the following day. Colonel William A. 
Phillips wrote to Secretary of the Interior John P. Usher 
suggesting that the lands desired for the settlement of other 
tribes could best be acquired from the Creeks by recognizing 
their former treaty rights and purchasing a portion of their 
lands for a fair price rather than, in effect, confiscating 
them for the paltry sum of $120,000. Later in the year, on 
December 9, Chief Sands sent a letter to Commissioner Dole 
expressing disapproval with the changes made by the "Great 
Council" in Washington and asking that tribal delegates be 
summoned to the capital for the negotiation of a new compact. 
Either because of lingering hopes that the Creeks would yet
^Commissioner* s Report, 1864, p. 482,
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accept the amended treaty or because of a feeling of hopelessness 
over negotiating a new agreement satisfactory to all, the 
chief's request was ignored. Thus, for the duration of the 
war official treaty relations between the Federal government 
and the loyal Creeks remained in a state of limbo.^
In addition to muddling the Creek treaty, the Senate 
in the first half of 1864 briefly considered the possibilities 
of negotiating with the Choctaws. Contemporary observers 
generally agreed that of the tribes of the Indian Territory 
the Choctaws most solidly supported the Confederacy. Yet 
even among these people the voices of dissent could be heard, 
albeit faintly. Early in 1864 a faction of about 300 malcon­
tents, most, perhaps all, of whom were adopted white citizens 
of the Choctaw Nation, began making plans to hold a pro-Union 
convention. Their original plans called for the meeting to be 
held at Doaksville, deep in the southern portion of the nation, 
but for safety's sake the site was transferred to Scullyville, 
about twenty miles southwest of Fort Smith. There on March 
14 a small convention met and established a provisional 
government headed by an adopted white, Thomas Edwards. That 
same day the convention appointed Edward P. Perkins, another
Phillips to Usher, June 24, 1864, Records of the 
Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Indian Division, 
Record Group 48, National Archives, Letters Received 
Miscellaneous; Sands to Dole, December 9, 1864, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Creek Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 231
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adopted citizen, to act as the government's delegate in 
Washington.^
At Fort Gibson, Colonel Phillips learned of these 
events and hastily dispatched a letter to Commissioner Dole 
giving his own appraisal of affairs in the Choctaw Nation.
In a missive dated March 22, 1864 the colonel pointed out to 
Dole that the Scullyville government represented a mere handful 
of the Choctaws, while the majority of the tribe was still in 
a state of revolt. He also made it quite clear in this letter 
that he believed the best interests of the United States 
could be served in the Southwest after the war through the 
establishment of a state, open to whites, embracing the Choctaw 
domain. In time, possibly even the Creeks and Cherokees might 
be persuaded to "vote for a more secure organization and 
community." Phillips pointed out that he had been very cautious 
in making promises to the rebel Indians, and, in an effort to 
keep all avenues of future action open, he urged Dole to act 
in a similar manner in dealing with Perkins. No promises 
should be made which might only have to be broken once hostil­
ities ceased. In a reply dated April 6, Dole assured Phillips 
that he was unwilling to renew treaty relations with either 
the Choctaws or the Chickasaws without securing a portion of 
their lands for the resettlement of other tribes. He asserted
Edward P. Perkins to John P. Usher, April, 1864, R.C.
48, N.A. , Letters Received Miscellaneous; Comicssioner* s Report, 
1864, p. 45 7; Angie Debo, The Rise and Fall of̂  the Choctaw 
Republic (Norman: University o£ Oklahoma Press, 1961), p. 84.
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his own belief, however, that these ceded areas must be
Qreserved exclusively for the use of the Indian.
Early in April, Perkins reached Washington, and his 
presence in the capital soon became a topic of discussion in 
the Senate. Learning of the desire of the Scullyville 
government to enter into relations with the United States, the 
Senate on April 20 passed a resolutuion instructing the 
Committee on Indian Affairs to determine if any sort of 
legislation was needed to aid in bringing the Choctaws back 
under Federal protection. In a letter of April 28 committee 
chairman James R. Doolittle asked Usher for any information 
the secretary might have on the subject.^
As was his custom when questioned about Indian policy. 
Usher turned to Commissioner Dole for advice. Together the 
two decided to let the Choctaw issue ride for the time being.
On May 5 the commissioner wrote to Usher saying that so far 
as he could determine no considerable number of the Choctaws 
had as yet decided to support the United States, although he 
believed most would give their support as soon as the government 
could offer them permanent protection. Thus, no congressional 
action of any type was needed at present. On the eleventh of
^Phillips to Dole, March 22, 1864, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Choctaw Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 176; Dole 
to Phillips, April 6, 1864, Letters Sent, O.I.A., N.A., 
Microcopy 21, Roll 73.
^Doolittle to Usher, April 28, 1864, R.G. 48, N.A., 
Letters Received Miscellaneous.
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the month. Usher sent to Doolittle a copy of Dole's letter 
along with his own endorsement of the commissioner's views, 
and on May 16 Doolittle's committee, with the Senate’s approval, 
quietly dropped the resolution of April 20.^^
During his stay in Washington, Perkins communicated 
with Secretary Usher on at least one occasion. In a letter 
received at the Interior Department on April 18, the Scullyville 
delegate briefly summarized the recent occurrences in the 
Choctaw Nation, pointing out that his compatriots were anxious 
"to prove to the Government their loyalty by such a course of 
conduct as shall meet with your entire approbation." He then 
closed his brief message by expressing the hope that his 
government would receive Washington’s recognition. From all 
indications, it appears that Usher never answered this letter, 
and after suffering a rebuff both from Congress and the 
Interior Department, Perkins presumably rejoined the Union 
Choctaws huddled in the Scullyville-Fort Smith area.^^
Washington's almost indifferent response to the over­
tures of the Choctaw provisional government revealed at least 
two things of importance. The events which transpired in 
Washington in the spring of 1864 first foreshadowed the
l^Dole to Usher, May 5, 1864, ibid.; Usher to Doolittle, 
May 11, 1864, Letters Sent by the Indian Division of the Office 
of the Secretary of the Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 4; 
Congressional Globe, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., May 16, 1864, p. 2274.
llperkins to Usher, April, 1864, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters 
Received Miscellaneous.
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relatively minor role that the President played in the 
settlement of the issues growing out of the Civil War in the 
Indian Territory. There is no indication that Lincoln was 
consulted on the Choctaw question in the spring of 1864 nor 
is there any indication that Lincoln felt slighted by his 
failure to be consulted. Burdened by what appeared to be far 
more omnious issues, Lincoln, after the drafting of his 
unissued proclamation of 1862, willingly relegated to the 
Interior Department and to Congress the task of settling 
affairs with the tribes of the Indian Territory. To a great 
extent, this same course of action was followed by his 
successor Andrew Johnson. Second, the response in Washington 
to the Choctaw overtures reveals that the officials charged 
with the settlement of issues in the Indian Territory did not 
approach these problems with the same openmindedness with which 
Lincoln approached the question of Southern reconstruction.
The President's plan of reconstruction outlined in the Amnesty 
Proclamation of December, 1863 demonstrated that Lincoln was 
willing to deal with loyal minorities in reasserting Federal 
authority in the South. The Interior Department, in contrast, 
committed to a policy of Indian resettlement, was determined to 
deal only with dominant tribal groups, believing that minority 
factions, such as the Scullyville government, could not make 
the desired territorial cessions. Thus no promises or 
concessions were extended to the Union Choctaws, for seemingly 
nothing could be gained by such a course of action. Only later.
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when it became apparent that there was strong opposition to 
Washington's proposed policies in the Indian Territory, would 
the Interior Department deal with any faction willing to do 
its bidding.
If little could be gained through negotiations with the 
Scullyville Choctaws, much conceivably could be accomplished 
through talks with John Ross' Union Cherokees, who unquestionably 
constituted a large portion of their tribe. Perhaps the most 
attractive prize to be gained was that tract of land in Kansas 
known as the Cherokee Neutral Lands. Despite treaty provisions 
prohibiting, white intrusion, approximately 2,000 Kansans had 
settled on this tract by the outbreak of the Civil War. 
Recognizing the futility of attempting to hold on to this 
territory the Cherokees, through their delegation in Washington, 
had indicated their willingness to cede these lands as early 
as May, 1860 but negotiations on this question were delayed 
until late 1863. And even then no final solution was reached 
on this or any other issue at stake between the Cherokees and 
the United States.
The Indian Bureau made overtures to the Cherokees in 
November, 1863. Commissioner Dole on the third of the month 
addressed a letter to John Ross in exile in Pennsylvania asking 
the principal chief to come to Washington to discuss a number
l^Sen. Mis. Doc. No. 61, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 1861 
(Serial 1038); House Mis. Doc. No. 75, 37 Cong., 2d Sess., 
1862 (Serial 1141); Paul W. Gates, Fifty Million Acres: 
Conflicts over Kansas Land Policy, 1854-1890 (Ithaca, New 
York: CornellUniversity Press, 1 9 54),p. 154.
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of items including the possible resettlement of the Delaware 
tribe on the Cherokee domain in the Indian Territory. The 
chief and the other members of his tribe’s delegation, Lewis 
Downing, James McDaniel and Evan Jones, responded by assembling 
in Washington within a matter of days. On November 19 Assistant 
Commissioner Charles E. Mix sent an inquiry asking if the 
Cherokees were willing to retrocede the Neutral Lands to the 
United States, and, if so, whether or not the delegation felt 
it had the authority to enter into negotiations. Ross and his 
companions answered both questions in the affirmative.
It was not just the impossibility of controlling these 
lands that prompted the tribe's desire to dispose of them. 
Weighing heavily on the minds of the tribe’s leaders was the 
need for money with which to ease the plight of the loyal 
Cherokees huddled in the Fort Gibson area. The condition of 
these people was summarized in a petition to President Lincoln 
drawn up by Union Cherokee leaders in January, 1864. Carried 
to Washington by the tribe’s treasurer, Lewis Ross, the 
document pleaded with the President not to turn a deaf ear to 
the Cherokees' anguished cry for assistance. Among other 
things, tribal leaders in this missive asked that their people 
be provided with more adequate military protection in order
IT Dole to Ross, November 3, 1863, John Ross Papers, 
Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma; Ross to Dole, November 11, 1863, ibid.; Mix to John 
Ross et al, November 19, 1863, ibid.; Ross et al to Dole, 
Noven5er"?l, 1863, ibid.
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that adequate crops might be planted in the spring of the 
year. They also requested that the interest arising from the 
tribe's invested funds be turned over to their leaders to aid 
in caring for the more than 1,000 orphaned Cherokee children. 
When this document reached the President on February 18,
Lincoln quickly forwarded it to Commissioner Dole with a 
request for a report on the case.^^
Well aware of their people's impoverished condition, 
the Cherokee delegation had earlier submitted a request to 
Dole. On January 19, 1864 the delegates sent a letter to the 
commissioner asking for a statement on the condition of the 
Cherokee funds invested by the United States for the tribe’s 
benefit under the pre-war treaties. When the commissioner 
replied that the interest due the Cherokees arising from the 
investment of their tribal funds amounted, as of January 1,
1864 to $153,403.04, Ross and his associates asked that this 
amount be turned over to treasurer Lewis Ross. They carefully 
explained that this money was to be used to ease the financial 
plight of their fellow tribesmen as well as to re-establish 
their national institutions.^^
^^Thomas Pegg et al to Lincoln, January 20, 1864, 
Cherokee Nation Papers--Civil War Letters 1861-1874, Division 
of Manuscripts, Bizzell Library, University of Oklahoma, 
Norman; Lincoln to Dole, February 22, 1864, Easier (ed.). 
Collected Works, VII, p. 196.
ISjohn Ross al to Dole, January 19, 1864, and 
February 23, 1864, Letters Received, O.I.A., Cherokee Agency, 
N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 99.
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At least one circumstance made difficult the payment 
of this accrued Interest. The tribal funds had been Invested 
by Federal authorities In the bonds of states that had seceded 
from the Union, and those states had paid no Interest on these 
bonds since the outbreak of hostilities. If the Cherokees 
were, therefore, to receive the Interest to which they were 
entitled. Congress would have to appropriate funds directly out 
of the Federal treasury. By contrast, had the war never 
occurred. Southern state officials would simply have turned 
over the accrued Interest to Federal officials who In turn 
would have given this money to tribal officials at no expense 
to the United States government. Cognizant of these facts,
Dole, on February 27, forwarded a communication to Secretary 
Usher requesting In behalf of the Cherokees a special appro­
priation for the amount due the tribe. On March 1, Usher sent 
Identical letters to Thaddeus Stevens and William Pitt Fessenden, 
the respective chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee 
and the Senate Finance Committee. The Cherokee claim, he said, 
appeared reasonable and just, and he asked for Congress's 
favorable consideration In the matter.
The Cherokee's request was approved by the House. As 
passed In mid-May, 1864 the Indian Appropriations Bill for the 
fiscal year 1864-1865 contained an omnibus provision appro­
priating a total of $350,220.50 to meet the Interest on
l^Usher to Stevens and Fessenden, March 1, 1864, 
Letters Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of the Interior, 
N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 4.
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$1,704,300 worth of Indian funds invested in bonds of the 
Confederate States. This amount covered not only interest 
due the Cherokees but the Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek and 
assorted Kansas tribes as well.^^
In the Senate this provision ran into rather determined 
opposition. As was the usual practice with House passed 
appropriations measures, the bill was turned over to Fessenden's 
Finance Committee where the omnibus interest provision became 
a topic of discussion. Eventually the committee concluded 
first that a proposal of such importance should be striken 
without a full examination of its merits and second, that the 
Finance Committee had neither the time nor was it the proper 
body to undertake such an investigation. Thus, Fessenden’s 
committee left the interest appropriation in the bill but 
called the proposal to the attention of Doolittle's committee 
in order that it might rule on the legality of that portion of
1 Qthe Indian Appropriations Bill.
When the bill came before the Senate on June 10 and 11, 
Doolittle's Indian Affairs Committee quickly made known its 
decision on the omnibus provision. On the latter date 
Doolittle himself moved that the proposal be striken entirely 
from the bill. This motion was followed by a meandering 
discussion during which the Wisconsin senator spoke several
^^Congressional Globe, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., May 21, 
1864, p. 2392; ibij7T~June 11. 1864, p. 2869.
l^ibid., June 11, 1864, p. 2871.
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times in defense of the position taken by his committee.
The relationship between the United States and the tribes in
question, he asserted, was similar to that of a trustee and a
ward. If the trustee acts in good faith in making an investment
for his ward, his responsibility ends at that point. The
trustee is under no obligation to replace the money invested
if, by some unforseen accident, the investment should be
depreciated or destroyed. Looking to the future, the Wisconsin
senator remarked to his colleagues that when the current
hostilities ceased new treaties must be made with those tribes
at war with the United States, adding pointedly that "this
very pending claim might be one of the means which could be used
19in making proper negotiations with those Indian tribes. . . . "
Among those challenging Doolittle's position was Reverdy 
Johnson of Maryland. The thrust of Johnson's argument was 
that after having invested Indian funds in bonds that subse­
quently became worthless the United States was morally and 
legally bound to pay the tribes the interest they had expected 
to receive from the states. In the name of "humanity and 
Christian civilization" the Maryland senator pleaded with his 
fellow senators to leave the proposal in question in the 
appropriations bill. This emotional harange earned Johnson a 
letter of thanks from John Ross, but most of the members of 
the Senate were unswayed by his argument. Shortly after 
Johnson concluded his remarks the Senate eliminated by a voice
l^Ibid.. June 11, 1864, pp. 2869, 2873.
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vote that portion of the appropriations bill providing for the
payment of the back interest due the Cherokees and the other
20tribes named in the measure.
During the argument over the payment of back interest 
the negotiations on the Neutral Lands question came to a 
complete standstill. To break the impasse John Ross and his 
cohorts sent an inquiry to Commissioner Dole on May 23.
Reminding the commissioner that they had convened in Washington 
at his summons, they asked to be informed as to whether the 
government intended to take any further action at this time on 
the Neutral Lands issue and other questions troubling the 
Cherokees. In replying the following day Dole stated that the 
current military struggle had placed such a heavy burden on the 
United States' financial,resources that Federal authorities 
were now hesitant to enter into negotiations that might further 
tax the national treasury. To the extent that any desire now 
existed to acquire the Neutral Lands, that desire was due to 
the well-known wishes of the people of Kansas to have all the 
lands within their state thrown open to white settlement. He 
suggested, however, that a treaty might be made in which the 
United States would become a trustee, handling for the Cherokees 
the sale of these lands. Dole concluded his letter by voicing 
his conviction that the Cherokees had in the Indian Territory 
more land than they needed and that everyone's best interest
ZOlbid., June 11, 1864, pp. 2872-73, 2878; Ross to 
Johnson, June 18, 1864, John Ross MSS, Gilcrease Institute, 
Tulsa.
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would be served if the tribe would permit the settlement of
91some of the Kansas Indians on its surplus lands.
The delegation's response to these assertions and 
suggestions was less than enthusiastic. As the tribe's need 
for money was pressing, a trustee type of arrangement with no 
promise of immediate recompense for the Neutral Lands was not 
attractive. Neither was the idea of making Cherokee lands in 
the Indian Territory available for the resettlement of large 
numbers of Kansas Indians, and the delegation made its position 
on these points clear in corresponding with the commissioner 
on May 25. But they did express a willingness to allow the 
Delawares to settle among the Cherokees on just and liberal 
terms and asked that a commissioner be appointed to negotiate 
on this question as well as on "other subjects of interest 
and importance to the Cherokee Nation." In response Dole 
designated Jameg Steele--an individual whose origin and past 
record is unknown--to open taIke with a Delaware delegation 
then in Washington and the Ross delegation for the purpose of
22securing a home for the former tribe in the Indian Territory.
The talks between Steele and the Cherokees got nowhere.
21john Ross eT al to Dole, May 23, 1864, John Ross MSS, 
Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa: Dole to Ross, May 24, 1864, Letters 
Sent, O.I.A., N.A., Microcopy 21, Roll 74.
22ROSS eL al to Dole, May 25, 1864, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Cherokee Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 99; Dole 
to Ross, May 26, 1864 and Dole to James Steele, May 26, 1864, 
Letters Sent, O.I.A., N.A., Microcopy 21, Roll 74.
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In letters of May 27 and June 7 Steele bluntly Informed the 
delegation that the primary purpose of their talks was to 
secure a home for the Delawares within the Cherokee Nation.
If no agreement could be reached on this point he said, "our 
negotiations may be considered at an end." In reply Ross and 
his colleagues asserted that while they were willing to discuss 
the resettlement of the Delawares on the Cherokee domain, to 
them this topic was at best a secondary issue. Their primary 
aim still was to negotiate an agreement whereby the tribe would 
receive an immediate payment for the retrocession of the 
Neutral Lands to the United States.^3 The absence of any 
further correspondence between Steele and the Cherokees 
indicates that after this exchange of discordant views, the 
abortive talks ended.
The negotiations with the Delawares were somewhat more 
fruitful, but not much. On June 15 a treaty was signed with 
the tribe, and Lincoln soon transmitted a copy to the Senate. 
After almost two years the Senate on May 4, 1866 passed a 
resolution whereby it refused to consent to the ratification 
of this document. Again the Senate practice of considering 
treaty matters in executive sessions makes it impossible to 
tell why the document was rejected. Nor is it known what its 
terms were at the time of its signing, for no copy was preserved
23steele to John Ross et al. May 27, 1864, and Ross 
et al to Steele, June 8, 1864, John Ross MSS, Gilcrease 
Institute, Tulsa.
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in the Unratified Indian Treaty File maintained by the 
Federal government. There can be little doubt, however, that 
it provided for the removal of the Delawares to the Indian 
Territory.^4
Nearly as insoluble as the task of negotiating satis­
factory removal treaties, was the duty assigned Superintendent 
Coffin of adequately caring for the refugees in the Fort Gibson 
area. After his arrival with the refugees in early June, 1864 
a quick examination of current conditions convinced the 
superintendent that the coming months would be difficult. The 
Indians transported to Fort Gibson from Kansas had arrived 
too late to plant a crop, and even if they had reached their 
destination earlier, the inability of the military to prevent 
attacks by rebel guerrilla bands made the cultivation of crops 
nearly impossible. Further complicating matters was the 
shortage of funds which could be used for refugee support, a 
circumstance which the superintendent did not hesitate to 
complain about. In a tartly worded letter written to Commissioner 
Dole from Fort Gibson on June 16, Coffin argued that had he been
Abraham Lincoln to the U. S. Senate, June 21, 1864, 
Easier (ed.). Collected Works, Vll, p. 403.
A copy of the resolution in which the Senate refused to 
consent to the ratification of the Delaware treaty was preserved 
in the Unratified Indian Treaty File in the National Archives, 
(Microcopy T-494, Roll 8) but strangely no copy of the treaty 
accompanies this document. Presumably during subsequent 
negotiations with the Delaware tribe in the late I860's 
Federal negotiators took the copy of the unratified treaty 
out of the files for reference purposes and neglected to return 
it.
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given the $473,000 originally requested for the return and
subsistence of the refugee Indians, the sum, along with the
funds made available under the appropriations act for the
coming fiscal year, would have seen the refugees safely through
the winter. As matters stood, however, all the money now at
his disposal would be insufficient to provide the 16,000
refugees in the Fort Gibson area with quarter rations of corn,
flour and beef until next spring.^5
Shortly after dispatching this message. Coffin returned
to his headquarters at Leavenworth, Kansas. After spending
several weeks handling the miscellaneous affairs of his office,
the superintendent left for Washington near the middle of July,
and while in the capital city he and Dole hit upon a scheme
which they hoped would assist them in meeting the expenses of
26the Southern Superintendency. Coffin and Dole hoped to use 
the unexpended portion of the Choctaw Net Proceeds settlement 
of 1861 for refugee support. By an act of March 4, 1861 
Congress awarded the Choctaw tribe $500,000 in settlement of 
the Net Proceeds Claim arising from the sale of former tribal 
lands east of the Mississippi River. According to this 
enactment, half the settlement was to be paid in cash, the 
remainder in bonds. On April 18, 1861 the tribe received the 
cash portion of the award. The $250,000 in bonds, on the other
Z^Coffin to Dole, June 16, 1864, Letters Received, O.I.A., 
Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 835.
ibid.
^^William G. Coffin to William P. Dole, July 9, 1864,
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hand, was not delivered prior to the tribe's alignment with 
the Confederacy, and it was this amount that Coffin and Dole 
hoped to use in getting the refugees around Fort Gibson 
through the winter of 1864-1865.
Secretary Usher readily sanctioned this proposal. In 
letters to President Lincoln and William Pitt Fessenden, 
recently appointed secretary of the treasury following the 
resignation of Salmon P. Chase, Usher explained the rationale 
behind the proposed use of the Choctaw funds. The secretary 
pointed out the fact that the Indian Appropriations Act for 
the fiscal year 1862-1863 contained a provision granting to 
the President the discretionary authority to use for the 
support of the loyal refugees all sums appropriated to fulfill 
treaty obligations with the rebellious tribes. The $500,000 
award of 1861 amounted to nothing more than an appropriation, 
and the President was fully empowered by the subsequent act 
of 1862 to use the unexpended portion of this appropriation to 
meet the needs of the loyal Indians huddled in the Fort 
Gibson area.
In reaching a decision on this particular question 
Lincoln deferred to the Treasury Department. When the proposal 
first came up. Secretary Fessenden was not in Washington, but 
upon his return, after consulting with other members of his 
department, he declined to authorize the use of the Choctaw 
bonds for refugee relief. The reasoning behind his decision is 
not known, but apparently he concurred in the view expressed
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earlier in the month by the assistant secretary that under the 
act of March, 1861 the bonds in question could only be issued
o 7to authorities of the Choctaw tribe.
With this avenue of assistance closed. Commissioner 
Dole next proposed a simple expedient, the purchase of refugee 
supplies on credit. In a letter of October 1 to the Interior 
Department, Dole asked that his office be authorized to buy 
on credit about $200,000 worth of goods needed to sustain the 
refugee Indians through the coming winter. That same day this 
request was forwarded to Lincoln, and the President immediately 
endorsed the proposal, noting that he would "most cheerfully" 
recommend to Congress that the claims of those persons 
extending credit to the government be recognized and paid.
By the end of the day Dole had been informed of the President's
favorable decision and was told to begin purchasing the needed
28supplies of food and clothing.
This move by no means ended the problems facing the 
officials charged with maintaining the loyal Indian refugees. 
Equally as vexing as the task of obtaining the badly needed
27usher to Fessenden, August 15 and 20, 1864, Letters 
Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of Interior, N.A., Microcopy 
606, Roll 5; Usher to Lincoln, August 15, 1864, ibid.; W. T. 
Otto to John P. Usher, September 1, 1864, ibid.
^^Dole to W. T. Otto, October 1, 1864 and Otto to 
Lincoln, October 1, 1864, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received; Otto 
to Dole, October 1, 1864, Letters Sent, Indian Division, 
Secretary of Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 5.
Lincoln's endorsement is on the back of the letter which 
the President received from Otto, the assistant secretary of 
the interior.
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funds was the problem of transporting the supplies, once
purchased, to Fort Gibson. The perplexing nature of this task
was graphically Illustrated on September 19, 1864 when a rebel
force led by Stand Watle attacked a supply train bound for
Fort Gibson at Cabin Creek, about fifty miles north of the
post. This move, which seems to have taken all the Federal
forces In the area completely by surprise, resulted In the
9Qloss of $60-100,000 worth of badly needed goods.
Adding to the difficulty of transporting supplies to 
Fort Gibson was the rapacity of the troops assigned to escort 
the trains southward from Kansas. If the word of Superintendent 
Coffin and Cherokee Agent Justin Harlan can be accepted, the 
troops furnished for this duty systematically plundered the 
trains they were assigned to protect. In some cases the 
depredations began even before the wagons left Fort Scott, 
Kansas, for the trek to the Indian country. Complaints to the 
War Department about this situation went unheeded, and by the 
end of the year the situation had become so bad that some 
teamsters, fearing their Federal protectors far more than rebel
Perry Fuller to William P. Dole, September 20, 1864, 
Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superlntendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 835; S. B. Maxey to W. R. Boggs, September 
20, 1864, The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1893), Series I, xll, part 1, 
p. 778; Stand Watle to D. H. Cooper, September 21, 1864,
Ibid., p. 783.
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bushwackers, preferred to travel without an e s c o r t .
All things considered, however. Superintendent Coffin
in submitting his annual report to the commissioner's office
late in the year, concluded that the policy of returning the
refugees to the Indian Territory was not as unfortunate as
he had originally thought it to be. If nothing else the loyal
Indians were now in a position to reach their homes in one
or two days once the spring growing season arrived, provided
31of course they received adequate military protection.
Coffin to William P. Dole, October 5 and December 1, 
1864, Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 835; Harlan to Coffin, January 2, 1865,
R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received.
O  1 Commissioner's Report, 1864, p. 448.
CHAPTER IX 
CONTRACTORS AND CATTLE THIEVES
The decision made late in 1864 to supply the Indian 
refugees on credit had unforseen consequences. This move 
contributed to the outbreak of a forenisic battle, and 
William A. Phillips was the chief protagonist in this encounter. 
As commander of the three Union Indian regiments the colonel 
made himself guardian of the welfare of both his troops and 
the refugees huddled in the Fort Gibson area. As early as 
mid-May, 1863 he reported to Major General James G. Blunt in 
Kansas that he had prevented gamblers and assorted loafers 
from entering his command and had punished the liquor dealers 
who were trying to corrupt his troops. Phillips hinted rather 
darkly that "certain parties" offended by his actions were now 
trying to hinder his operations by interrupting the normal flow 
of supplies from Kansas to Fort Gibson.^
Phillips to Blunt, May 15, 1863, The War of the 
Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies. (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1896), I, xxii, part 2, pp. 283-84 (hereafter cited as 




Phillips' statements were at best vague. The colonel 
did not name either the persons in the Fort Gibson area whom 
he had chastised or those in Kansas offended by his actions.
But this reticence did not last. Events occurred in the spring 
of 1864 that prompted Phillips to make more specific accusations
In mid-March, 1864 Southern Superintendent William G. 
Coffin wrote Washington recommending that the mercantile firm 
owned by Alexander McDonald of Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Perry 
Fuller of Douglas County, Kansas, be awarded a contract to 
supply goods to the refugee Indians at Fort Gibson. This 
recommendation received the approval of Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs William P. Dole and Secretary of the Interior John P. 
Usher. On April 16, 1864 just before his removal as commander 
of the District of the Frontier, General Blunt issued General 
Order No. 7 making the licensed traders and army disbursing
2officers the sole purchasers of stock in the Indian Territory.
It is an understatement to say that this order, which 
forced the Indians to deal with licensed traders McDonald and 
Fuller in disposing of their cattle, was highly unpopular. One 
of the first to voice a protest was W. L. G. Miller, an adopted 
Cherokee, who submitted a complaint to Secretary Usher on 
April 23. Order No. 7, issued for the benefit of speculators
William G. Coffin to William P. Dole, March 16, 1864, 
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern 
Superintendency. National Archives, Microcopy 234, Roll 835; 
Dole to John P. Usher, March 19, 1864, Records of the Office 
of the Secretary of the Interior, Indian Division, Record Group 
48, National Archives, Letters Received.
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"notorious for their heartlessness," violated the spirit of 
Lincoln's Amnesty Proclamation by denying the Indians the 
right to dispose of their stock as they wished, and he asked 
that it be rescinded immediately. Smith Christie, acting 
principal chief of the Cherokees, also asked that the order 
be set aside while from Fort Gibson Daniel Ross, nephew of 
long-time Cherokee chieftan John Ross, informed his uncle that 
employees of McDonald and Fuller had boasted that Blunt 
received $50,000 for the issuance of Order No. 7. The younger 
Ross also asserted that thieves were rapidly stripping the 
Cherokee country of its remaining cattle and horses. Some of 
those participating in this traffic, he said, were Federal
3troops stationed at Fort Scott, Kansas.
Those individuals driving Indian stock out of the 
Territory did not go unchallenged by Colonel Phillips. On 
July 10, 1864 the Fort Gibson commander reported the arrest of 
nine Kansans with a herd of stolen cattle on the Verdigris 
River north of Fort Gibson, but such captures were relatively 
rare. In pursuing cattle thieves, Phillips' troops were at a 
distinct disadvantage because they had few mounts ; after two 
to three years of hard service, the ponies these men brought 
with them when they joined the army were simply worn out. In 
an effort to alleviate this situtation Phillips in July requested
^Miller to Usher, April 23, 1864, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Roll 835; Smith 
Christie to Frederick Steele, John Ross Papers, Thomas Gilcrease 
Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Daniel 
Ross to John Ross, July 7, 1864, ibid.
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that at least half his men be provided with government
 ̂ 4remounts.
The proposal was spurned by Phillips' immediate 
superiors. In rejecting Phillips' request Brigadier General 
John M. Thayer, commander of the District of the Frontier, 
and Major General Frederick Steele, who commanded the Department 
of Arkansas, argued that it would cost $160,000 to remount the 
colonel's troops. In the brief time remaining before the 
mustering out of the Indian regiments the generals insisted 
these troops could not render any service which would justify 
the outlay of that sum.^
On the surface this explanation might seem plausible.
But further reflection arouses doubts as to the candor and 
honesty of Thayer and Steele. If these men themselves were 
somehow involved in the profits derived from the sale of 
stolen Indian cattle they would not be especially anxious to 
see the Indian regiments remounted. Mounted troops, after all, 
would be far more effective than foot soldiers in pursuing 
cattle thieves.
The events that followed the rejection of Phillips' 
request lend credence to this suspicion. On July 30, 1864 
orders were issued by Brigadier General Thayer instructing
^Phillips to John M. Thayer, July 10, 1864, OR, I, 
xli, part 2, pp. 107-08; Phillips to Frederick Steeli", July 
11, 1864, ibid., pp. 123-24.
^The comments of Thayer and Steele are found with 
Phillips' letter of July 11 to Steele, ibid., pp. 123-24.
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Phillips to turn over his command to Colonel Stephen H. Wattles 
and to report immediately to Thayer's headquarters at Fort 
Smith. Before these orders could reach Phillips, the colonel 
fired off a scorching letter to Secretary Usher on August 2 
requesting the cancellation of the license of McDonald and 
Fuller and the ordering of the firm's employees out of the 
Indian country. He charged that the company, taking advantage 
of the monopoly it enjoyed under Order No. 7, purchased beef 
from the Indians at one and one-half to two and one-half cents 
per pound. This meat was then re-sold to the government, for 
distribution among the refugees, for ten cents per pound. 
Phillips said that through one of its employees, Henry McKee, 
the company had attempted to bribe him and had threatened to 
secure his removal if he did not cooperate with their schemes. 
Three days after writing this letter to Usher, when he received 
Thayer's order of July 30, Phillips quickly concluded that 
McDonald and Fuller were behind his removal.^
Others shared this opinion. One of these was Smith 
Christie who wrote to John Ross on August 19, 1864 complaining 
of the miserable conditions which prevailed at Fort Gibson. 
Despite the monopolistic privileges enjoyed under Order No. 7, 
Christie insisted that McDonald and Fuller had failed miserably 
in fulfilling the terms of their contract to supply the refugee
^Special Orders No. 117, July 30, 1864, ibid., p. 476; 
Phillips to Usher, August 2, 1864, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters 
Received Miscellaneous; Phillips to Thomas Ewing, Jr., August 
17, 1864, Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, 
N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 835.
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Indians. In his opinion the primary objective of the company 
was to make money at the expense of the Indians and the 
government rather than to meet adequately the needs of the 
loyal refugees. Christie maintained that Phillips had been 
removed because he was not corrupt or subser^^ient enough to 
suit the purposes of the licensed traders. Since his departure 
from Fort Gibson a number of individuals whom the colonel had 
arrested for cattle theft had been released, and the stealing 
of Indian cattle was now being carried on with reckless 
abandon, with military officers and civilian thieves sharing 
in the profits of this traffic.^
Another who expressed sympathy and support for Phillips 
was Major General Francis J. Herron. In the fall of 1864 
Herron received instructions from E. R. S. Canby, the major 
general commanding the Division of West Mississippi, to 
conduct an inspection tour of Arkansas and the Indian Terri­
tory. During the course of his mission Herron consulted with 
Phillips at Fort Smith where the latter had been assigned to 
court-martial duty. A subsequent report filed at Fort Gibson 
on November 18 indicated that Herron was fully convinced of the 
correctness of Phillips' accusations. The removal of the former 
commander of the Indian regiments he ascribed to the influence 
wielded by "McDonald & Co.," a firm which he believed was 
responsible for the theft of no less than 6-10,000 of an
Christie to Ross, August 19, 1864, Cherokee Nation 
Papers--Civil War Letters, 1861-1874, Division of Manuscripts, 
Bizzell Library, University of Oklahoma, Norman.
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estimated 25,000 head of Indian cattle driven from the Terri- 
8tory.
The end result of these complaints was not exactly 
what Phillips expected. Through appeals submitted by his 
friends Phillips hoped to receive a summons to Washington so 
that he could present evidence to Interior Department officials 
supporting his charges of malfeasance in the Indian Territory. 
But orders to proceed to Washington never arrived. While 
Secretary Usher was willing to write to Secretary of War 
Edwin M. Stanton complaining of the theft of Indian cattle 
and crops by army officials and men, he refused to ask the War 
Department to order Phillips to Washington. The Interior 
Department, he insisted, could not with propriety request the 
issuance of a special order of this sort.^
On the local level, however, complaints about conditions 
in the Fort Gibson area became so intense that Brigadier 
General Thayer was forced to act. With no advance warning, 
Phillips was summoned to Thayer's headquarters one December 
evening and in a strained, tight-lipped meeting with the 
district commander, the colonel was ordered to resume command
Herron to C. T. Christensen, November 18, 1864, OR, I, 
xli, part 4, pp. 605-06; William A. Phillips to Herron, January 
16, 1865, ibid., xlviii, part 1, pp. 542-43.
QPhillips to Herron, January 16, 1865, ibid.; Usher to 
Stanton, June 15 and 22, 1864, Letters Sent by the Indian Division 
of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, N.A., Microcopy 
606, Roll 4; Usher to William P. Dole, November 11, 1864,
Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A.,
Microcopy 234, Roll 835.
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at Fort Gibson. Phillips was also told that Order No. 7 had 
been revoked, and he was instructed to make "needful rules" 
to protect the rights of the Indians. Thayer and his aides 
offered no explanation for these sudden actions, and Phillips 
asked for none. After receiving his orders he quickly 
gathered a small escort and hurried by horseback to Fort 
Gibson, reaching the post on December 29, 1864.^^
Phillips' actions after his return to Fort Gibson 
demonstrated that he had not been chastened in the least by 
his recent experiences. Still determined to impede the 
activities of those individuals responsible for the plundering 
of the Indian Territory, Phillips issued General Orders No.
4 from his Fort Gibson headquarters on January 14, 1865. This 
order decreed that all parties having any lawful authority 
to purchase stock in the Indian Territory were now to 
report to the headquarters of the Union Indian Brigade at Fort 
Gibson. The business transactions of all these individuals 
were to receive the approval of both the tribal authorities 
and the post's provost-marshal. Lieutenant Houston Benge. Under 
the terms of this order, Benge was to keep an open, "perfect 
record" of all cattle butchered, transferred, driven or sold 
at the fort, and only actual citizens of the Indian Territory 
were to be allowed to drive stock to outside markets. Except 
in cases of dire necessity, cattle belonging to persons in 
arms against the United States were to be used only for the
lOwilliam A. Phillips to F. J. Herron, January 16, 1865, 
OR, I, xlviii.
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feeding of Federal troops, and this property was to be "as 
carefully and fully accounted for as other property." In 
the event that any rebel-owned cattle was distributed among 
the refugee Indians, records were to be made out in triplicate 
showing the amount of stock distributed. Phillips' Order No.
4 instructed the commanders of Federal detachments operating 
in or passing through the Territory to prevent the indiscriminate 
slaughtering of Indian stock by their troops, and warned all 
persons not to purchase stock driven illegally into surrounding 
states. Phillips also asked all officers, men and 
attaches of his command "to furnish all facilities within 
their power . . .  to the agents or representatives of the 
Indian Department . . .  in the exercise of their legitimate 
functions.
In attempting to prevent the theft of Indian cattle 
Phillips received assistance from an unexpected source--the 
legislature of Kansas. If, as Phillips believed, McDonald and 
Fuller were driving stolen cattle from the Indian Territory, 
they clearly were not the only ones involved in the traffic.
With the connivance of military post commanders in Kansas, 
armed bands of ruffians engaged in the theft of Indian cattle 
had turned the southern portion of that state into a no-man's 
land where honest people ventured only at extreme peril. 
Conditions in the southwestern portion of Kansas, where whites
l^General Orders No. 4, January 14, 1865, ibid., pp,
516-19.
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often enlisted the aid of the plains Indians in stealing 
cattle, were espedially bad, and from that area a group of 
Kansas legislators addressed a petition to Governor Samuel J. 
Crawford on January 16. The document solicited the governor's 
immediate aid in rectifying the conditions along Kansas' 
southern border. The drafting of this petition was followed 
late in the month by the passage of a resolution in the state 
senate condemning the driving of stolen stock out of the Indian 
Territory, and this action, in turn, was followed by the 
enactment of a measure designed to stop this traffic. In a 
measure signed into law by Crawford on February 11, 1865 the 
Kansas legislature decreed that any individual convicted of
driving stolen stock into Kansas was to be fined not less than
12$1,000 and imprisoned for not less than one year.
Although his order of January 14 urged military 
cooperation with the civilian agents of the Indian Bureau, 
Phillips greatly distrusted some of those in the bureau's 
employ. Among those especially suspect in his eyes was William 
G. Coffin, and in an attempt to thwart the superintendent's 
suspected illegal schemes, Phillips again took pen in hand on 
January 17, 1865. Once more his recipient was Secretary of
IZp. H. Abraham et al to Crawford, January 16, 1865, 
ibid., pp. 1133-34; Senate Journal of the Legislative Assembly 
Commenced at the City of Topeka, January 10, and Concluded 
March 3, l M 5  (Topeka; S. D. Macdonald an3~Co. , 1865), pp. 44- 
45; The Laws of the State of Kansas Passed at the Fifth Session 
of the Legislature, Commenced at the State Capital, on Tuesday, 
January 10, 1865 (Topeka; S. D. Macdonald and Co., 18^^57^ 
Chapter LXXIV, pp. 159-60.
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the Interior Usher.
Unfortunately, clarity of expression was not one of 
Phillips' great abilities. In a rather tortuously worded 
fashion what he seemed to say in this letter was that after 
the President had authorized the purchase of $200,000 worth 
of goods on credit. Coffin and his agents, working in 
conjunction with McDonald and Fuller, had fanned out through 
the Cherokee country. Their alleged purpose was to buy corn 
from loyal Cherokees which, in turn, was to be distributed 
among those refugees who were unable to reach their homes to 
raise crops. In numerous instances, however, false papers 
were drawn up stating that the licensed traders had purchased 
corn when in reality none had been bought at all. And in the 
end the firm in question had demanded payment from the 
government for much more corn than had actually been purchased 
and distributed among the loyal refugees. Phillips also 
charged that McDonald and Fuller had not paid for more than 
one-eighth of the cattle which they furnished the government.
The vast majority of the cattle used to fulfill its contracts 
the firm acquired by sending renegade blacks and whites out 
into the Territory to steal all the stock they could lay their 
hands on. But the contractors, he said, demanded payment from 
the government for all the stock furnished, no matter how it 
was acquired. In subsequent letters addressed to the secretary 
on February 3 and 4, Phillips repeated the same basic accusations, 
with the addition of a new one to the effect that an effort
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would be made by a "corrupt money corporation to get its
agents and creatures appointed as Indian Agents. . .
Perry Fuller himself, said Phillips, hoped to secure an
13appointment as the Creek Agent.
Usher responded promptly to these charges. On February 
10, the secretary sent a letter to Commissioner Dole stating 
that the complaints of Colonel Phillips should be the subject 
of a "rigid inquiry," especially the allegation that employees 
of the Indian Bureau were aiding in the theft of Indian cattle. 
Usher asked that Superintendent Coffin and his agents be 
called upon for statements in answer to these charges. Next, 
on February 20, the secretary addressed a letter directly to 
McDonald and Fuller, who were in Washington hoping to expedite 
the payment of the money which they claimed was owed them by 
the Federal government. From the contractors Usher asked for 
a statement showing-the total quantity of the goods they had 
shipped to the Indian country.
McDonald and Fuller began building their defense even 
before Usher sent out his letters of February 10 and 20. In 
two separate dispatches sent to the secretary on February 6, 
the contractors stated that they were aware of the charges made
^^Phillips to Usher, January 17, and February 2 and 
4, 1865, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous.
^^Usher to Dole, February 10, 1865, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 
836; Usher to McDonald and Fuller, February 20, 1865, Letters 
Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of Interior, N.A., Microcopy 
606, Roll 5.
245
by Phillips against their firm, but they insisted that their 
business affairs were completely proper. Phillips' statements 
dealing with the purchase of corn for distribution among the 
other refugees were "simply untrue" as their firm and its 
agents had played no direct role in this activity. Both the 
purchase and the distribution of this corn was carried out by 
committees appointed for that purpose by .the. acting Cherokee 
principal chief and the Cherokee National Council. The persons 
from whom corn was purchased received certificates of sale and 
were paid in cash when they presented these certificates for 
redemption to the licensed contractors.^^
They maintained that Phillips' statements dealing with 
Indian cattle were equally false. As early as the spring of 
1864 Colonel Phillips began establishing rules governing the 
acquisition and sale of Indian-owned stock, and their agent, 
Henry McKee, had followed these rules to the letter. On the 
other hand, the individual who most flagerantly violated these 
regulations was Phillips himself. The colonel, they charged, 
had given papers authorizing various parties to take cattle 
out of the Indian Territory with the stipulation that a certain 
portion of these animals would be driven to Phillips' Kansas 
farm. And McDonald and Fuller charged that on at least one 
occasion Alexander Foreman, a special detective employed by
l^McDonald and Fuller to Usher, February 6, 1865, 
Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, Microcopy 
234, Roll 836.
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Phillips, had entered Kansas and seized a large number of 
cattle allegedly stolen from the Indian Territory. Foreman 
then sold these animals to private citizens in Kansas and had 
never filed with the authorities at Fort Gibson any record of 
his transactions.^^
In attempting to account for Phillips' attack, McDonald 
and Fuller concluded that the colonel's accusations sprang from 
"a malicious, spiteful and revengeful spirit. . . . "  Phillips, 
they said, had hoped to receive the Republican gubernatorial 
nomination in Kansas in 1864 and attributed his failure to 
secure that honor to the fact that McDonald and Fuller had 
supported a rival candidate. Now he was trying to extract 
revenge by hurling unfounded accusations at their firm. All 
in all, they considered his performance "pitiable" and asserted 
that his account of affairs in the Territory, whether true or 
false, demonstrated his unfitness for the position he held. If 
the account were true, and conditions at Fort Gibson had 
reached the scandalous level that Phillips said they had, this 
would be a disgraceful commentary on his leadership abilities. 
And if false, his willingness to make untrue statements for 
spiteful reasons likewise proved Phillips "unworthy of the high 
trust reposed in him,"^^
After the receipt of Usher's letter of February 20, the 




February 21 and 23. In these, the two provided general 
Information on the quantity of goods sent to the Indian 
Territory by their firm and disclaimed any desire to secure 
appointments within the Indian Bureau.
Superintendent Coffin backed McDonald and Fuller's 
claims of complete honesty and uprightness. The superin­
tendent, who apparently came to Washington along with the 
contractors to aid them in settling their accounts with the 
government, submitted a brief statement to Commissioner Dole 
on February 10. He maintained that in spite of the hardships 
the contractors labored under in transporting goods to Fort
Gibson through guerrilla infested territory, their firm had
19fulfilled its contracts to his entire satisfaction.
Somewhat later Coffin also provided more elaborate 
details on recent events in the Indian Territory. In two 
additional letters written to Commissioner Dole the following 
month, the superintendent asserted that after receiving 
permission in the fall of 1864 to purchase refugee goods on 
credit he had approached a number of Kansas mercantile houses 
which at various times had engaged in the Indian supply 
business. These included the firms Stettaner and Brothers, 
Camey and Stevens, and McDonald and Fuller. In the process
l&McDonald and Fuller to Usher, February 21 and 23,
1865, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous.
^^Coffin to Dole, February 10, 1865, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 836
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of bargaining with these firms Coffin insisted that he had 
exerted pressure on McDonald and Fuller, pointing out to them 
that since they had received the last supply contract, their 
integrity would be conq)romised if the Indians were left to 
starve. After repeated appeals of this sort, McDonald and 
Fuller and Carney and Stevens jointly offered to provide on 
credit the supplies needed at Fort Gibson. When Camey and 
Stevens later declined to participate, McDonald and Fuller 
"with great reluctance" agreed to carry on the supply effort 
alone. In supplying the refugees during the winter of 1864- 
1865, Coffin claimed that the profits of the contractors 
amounted to less than twenty percent, which to the superin­
tendent was not at all unreasonable considering the company’s 
risks. In accounting for Phillips' criticism of McDonald and 
Fuller, Coffin claimed that it was a well-known fact that the 
colonel was a partner in trading ventures carried on in the 
Fort Gibson-Fort Smith area by the Ross family. Thus this 
attack amounted to nothing more than "a desperate and dastardly 
effort" on the part of Phillips and the Ross family to drive 
their competitors out of the Indian country. Coffin concluded 
his explanations by asking in his letter of March 24 whether 
he would be allowed to pay the contractors the sum to which they 
were entitled, or was payment to be withheld because of the 
"vindictive passions of outside and irresponsible parties? . . ."^O
^^Coffin to Dole, March 13 and 24, 1865, ibid.
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As the testimony gradually reached the desks of Usher 
and Dole, Congress began its annual consideration of Indian 
appropriations. On February 23, 1865 the House of Represen­
tatives passed H.R. 682 appropriating funds for the fiscal 
year 1865-1866. The measure reached the upper chamber the
following day and was immediately referred to the Committee 
21on Finance.
Two things of importance occurred after the referral of 
the appropriations bill. First on February 25 Senator Samuel 
C. Pomeroy introduced and secured the passage of a resolution 
requesting the secretary of the interior to furnish the Senate 
with copies of all orders, permits, licenses and correspondence 
in any way relating to the activities of licensed traders in 
the Indian Territory. Second on February 27 Secretary Usher 
sent similarly worded letters to House Ways and Means Committee 
Chairman Thaddeus Stevens and John Sherman of the Senate 
Finance Committee. These men were informed that in addition 
to the usual sums appropriated to fulfill the government's 
treaty obligations to the tribes of the Southern Superin­
tendency another $447,000 would be needed "to supply to 
certain tribes . , . the quantity of goods and provisions they 
have been accustomed to receive . . . under their respective
^^Congressional Globe, 38 Cong., 2 Sess., February 23 
and 24, 1865, pp. 1045, 1048.
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treaties." In an oblique manner what the secretary was
saying was that while the Interior Department had received
presidential permission to purchase $200,000 worth of goods on
credit for the refugee Indians, actual expenditures had run
22to more than twice that amount.
Both these topics--trading activities and the need for 
additional funds--received attention on March 2 when the 
appropriations bill reached the Senate floor. Of the two, 
however, the money question received by far the greater 
amount of attention. Usher had addressed his appeal for added 
funds to Stevens and Sherman. But as had occurred in 1864 
Sherman’s Finance Committee deferred to the Senate Indian 
Affairs Committee in handling the complex financial arrangements 
of the Southern Superintendency. Thus on March 2, Indian 
Affairs Committee Chairman James R. Doolittle proposed an 
amendment identical to that found in the previous year’s 
legislation authorizing the secretary of the interior to use 
for the support of the loyal refugees the sums appropriated to 
meet the government's treaty obligations with the rebellious
OOtribes. The proposal was adopted without discussion.
The Wisconsin senator next proposed that the secretary 
of the treasury be authorized to issue to the secretary of the
22lbid., February 25, 1865, p. 1088; Usher to Stevens 
and Sherman, February 27, 1865, Letters Sent, Indian Division, 
Secretary of Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 5; William P. 
Dole to Usher, March 10, 1865, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received.
^^Congressional Globe, 38 Cong., 2 Sess., March 2,
1865, p. 1298.
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interior $250,000 in cash in lieu of the $250,000 in bonds due
the Choctaw tribe under the Net Proceeds Claim. This
amendment, which stipulated that these funds were to be used
for refugee support, also received approval without discussion,
but some of Doolittle's colleagues quickly challenged his next
two proposals. The first of these provided for an additional
appropriation of $500,000 to meet refugee expenses during the
first half of 1865 while the second called for a similar
special appropriation of $250,000 to aid in meeting the same
24type of expenses during the fiscal year 1865-1866.
Missouri's B. Grantz Brown objected to this proposed 
largess. At a time when the nation was stripping itself to the 
girth to finance the war, he could see no reason for spending 
almost one million dollars supporting people who, in his view, 
were as able as anyone else to care for themselves. Such an 
outlay was especially outrageous when, as Brown maintained, 
three-fourths of the proposed appropriations would go into
O Cfraudulent contracts.
These remarks elicited an immediate rebuttal from 
Doolittle. After Brown surrendered the floor, the Wisconsinite 
launched into a lengthy discourse on the privations suffered 
by the loyal Indians since the outbreak of hostilities in 1861. 




at stake was whether these long-suffering, loyal people were
26going to be adequately cared for or allowed to starve.
The length of Doolittle's remarks gave Brown ample time
in which to draft an amendment to the appropriations bill,
replacing the last two proposed by the Indian Affairs Committee
chairman. The Missourian's proposal authorized the secretary
of war to furnish the "so-called refugee Indians . . . such
temporary relief as may be absolutely necessary, including
provisions and clothing during the residue of the fiscal
year. . . . "  Doolittle immediately challenged the Brown
amendment declaring that of all the extravagant modes of
providing for the Indians the attempt to do so through the
commissary and quartermaster departments of the army was the
most expensive by far. In the end. Brown's proposal would
2 7cost the government three times as much as his own.
Senators Lane and Pomeroy backed Doolittle's assertion 
of army wastefulness. Pomeroy insisted that three million 
dollars in the hands of the War Department would not go as far 
as the $750,000 the Indian Affairs Committee wanted to place 
at the disposal of the Interior Department. Brown immediately 
regained the floor and claimed that if his amendment passed not 




as the War Department would see to it that the Indians were 
protected from attack and that their cattle were used for their 
own support.28
This assertion, absurd though it was, proved to be 
convincing to a Senate concerned over burgeoning war costs. 
Ignoring the fact that on more than one occasion the army had 
failed conspicuously in protecting the Indians against attack 
and in supervising the proper use of their cattle, the Senate 
adopted the Brown amendment by a vote of sixteen to fourteen. But 
Doolittle, still distrustful of the War Department, then proposed 
and secured the passage of a proviso requiring the secretary of 
war to submit to Congress at its next session a detailed
report of all funds expended under his supervision for refugee
. . .  29 relief.
After a fashion, the Senate next briefly considered the 
question of trading activities in the Indian Territory. Upon 
receiving a copy of the Senate resolution of February 25 
Secretary Usher forwarded to Hannibal Hamlin, president of the 
Senate, copies of the correspondence in his possession dealing 
with trade in the Southern Superintendency. This material 
included the accusatory letters of Colonel Phillips, the 
rebuttals of McDonald and Fuller, and Superintendent Coffin's 
letter of February 10 supporting the contractors.^®
28ibid.. p. 1301.
29lbid.. pp. 1301-02.
30usher to Hamlin, February 28, 1865, Letters Sent, 
Indian Division, Secretary of Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, 
Roll 5.
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It is impossible to say how many senators actually 
looked at these documents, but in all probability examination 
was confined to the members of the Indian Affairs Committee.
If this is the case, the senators on the committee were probably 
as puzzled by the welter of conflicting testimony as Usher 
and Dole must have been, and the action finally taken by the 
Senate amounted to something of a dodge. After the adoption 
of B. Gratz Brown's proposal authorizing the secretary of war 
to aid the Indian refugees, James Harlan of Iowa, a member of 
the Indian Affairs Committee, offered an amendment to H.R.
682. Harlan's proposition, adopted immediately and without 
debate, declared that persons convicted of stealing Indian 
livestock could be fined up to $5,000 or imprisoned for up to 
three years. The amendment also authorized Indian agents to 
sell surplus Indian livestock for the benefit of their wards 
under regulations issued by the secretary of the interior.
But no provision was made for any type of Senate action, such 
as a committee investigation, on the charges of past wrongs 
committed by licensed contractors. Clearly, in the case of 
McDonald and Fuller, Secretary Usher was given discretion to 
determine the justness of their claims.31
The House of Representatives acquiesced in the amendments, 
and Lincoln affixed his signature to the Indian Appropriations
31congressional Globe, 38 Cong., 2 Sess., March 2,
1865, p. 1302.
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Bill on March 3. Almost three weeks later on March 20,
Secretary Usher issued specific instructions to Commissioner 
Dole With regard to the theft of Indian cattle. Usher ordered 
the agents of the Southern Superintendency to collect and keep 
"well under control" the stock belonging to their Indian wards. 
They were also to file statements with the Interior Department 
showing the number of cattle owned by the Indians of their 
respective agencies. In those cases where there was surplus 
cattle which could be sold for the Indians' benefit the agent 
handling the sale was to give adequate public notice, in order 
to attract the greatest number of potential buyers. Sales were 
to be to the highest bidder, and the agent could refuse to 
sell if in his opinion a fair price was not offered by the 
would-be buyers. In cases where transactions were carried out, 
bills of sale were to be made out in triplicate, with one 
copy being forwarded to the commissioner of Indian affairs. 
Interior Department employees, including the agents, could not 
purchase Indian livestock without special permission from the 
commissioner. In those cases where Indian stock was needed 
by the military, the agents were to turn the animals over to 
quartermaster or commissary officers, and the army would be 
expected to pay the full market price which the animals then 
commanded at the place of purchase. On March 24, Dole forwarded 
a copy of these regulations to Coffin and instructed the 
superintendent to distribute duplicate copies to his agents 
who were expected to carry out the letter and the spirit of
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32the law "to their utmost ability."
As these instructions gradually filtered down to the
agents in the field, the McDonald and Fuller case drew to a
close. Although the official correspondence of Interior
Department officials is not entirely clear on this point, it
appears that of the amount expended in supporting the refugees
during the winter of 1864-1865 the McDonald and Fuller firm
33had claims against the government totaling about $371,000.
If the secretary granted the payment of this sum from the 
amounts made available under the recent appropriations act, 
his action would, in effect, exonerate the firm from any 
charges of wrongdoing.
Usher did not suffer from any lack of advice on the 
subject. McDonald and Fuller, still in Washington, were 
clamoring for their money, and as early as March 10, 
Commissioner Dole advised the payment of the full sum to the 
contractors "in consideration of the good faith they have held 
towards the Government, and their prompt action to enable it 
to extend aid . . .  to its suffering wards. . . . "  On the 
other hand, the Cherokee delegation of John and Daniel Ross 
and Evan Jones in behalf of all the loyal Indians protested
32gtatutes at Large, XIII, pp. 562-63; Usher to Dole, 
March 20, 1865, Letters Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of 
Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 5; Dole to Coffin, March 
24, 1865, Letters Sent By the Office of Indian Affairs, N.A., 
Microcopy 21, Roll 76.
^^William P. Dole to John P. Usher, March 10, 1865, 
R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received.
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against payment on the grounds that the claims submitted to
the Interior Department were largely fictitious or fraudulent.
Moreover, they maintained that the funds appropriated in the
act of March 3 were to be used in meeting future, not past,
34expenses.
After a prolonged period of indecision Usher reached a 
decision early in April. In a communique to Commissioner Dole 
on April 7 the secretary insisted that not one of the persons 
making accusations against McDonald and Fuller had the slightest 
personal knowledge of the matter, and most had not been within 
1,000 miles of the transactions they had denounced. To him the 
basic question at stake was whether the slanders of "meddle­
some and pestiferous persons" were to be regarded and justice 
denied the "faithful contractors." Usher pronounced himself 
entirely satisfied with the explanations submitted by and in 
support of McDonald and Fuller. The contract with the firm, 
he concluded, was the best that could have been made under the 
circumstances, and the twenty percent profits were not 
unreasonable considering the extraordinary risks taken. Thus, 
the contractors should be compensated in full for the performance 
of their contract, and he ordered the payment to be made.^S
34i)ole to Usher, March 10, 1865, ibid. ; McDonald and 
Fuller to William G. Coffin, March 24, 1865, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Super intendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 
836; John Ross et al to Usher, March 17, 1865, R.G. 48, N.A., 
Letters Received Miscellaneous.
35usher to Dole, April 7, 1865, Letters Received, O.I.A., 
Southern Super intendency, N.A. , Microcopy 234, Roll 836.
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The rendering of this decision was among the last of 
Usher's official actions as secretary of the interior. By 
late 1864 rumors were circulating in Washington that Lincoln 
had become dissatisfied with Usher's administration of the 
Interior Department and was looking for a successor. In 
response to these tidings numerous applicants for the position 
presented themselves to the President, including one of Lincoln's 
old Whig associates, Illinoisan Jesse K. Dubois. Uncle Jesse, 
as he was known to his friends, performed yeoman's service in 
garnering the Republican nomination for Lincoln in 1860, and 
the President was pressured by important party luminaries to 
repay this debt by offering Dubois the Interior Department 
appointment.
Lincoln, with deep regrets, spumed this proposal. 
Recognizing the inevitable. Usher submitted his resignation, 
effective May 15, on March 8, 1865. The following day Lincoln 
proposed to the Senate that Iowan James Harlan assume the 
interior portfolio, and in keeping with the traditional 
practice where cabinet nominees were members of the Senate, the
q ̂nomination received immediate and unanimous approval.
Harlan's appointment is generally ascribed to personal
^ Usher to Lincoln, March 8, 1865, Abraham Lincoln 
Papers, Library of Congress (microfilm copy). Series 1, Roll 
93; Reinhard H. Lu thin. The Real Abraham Lincoln; A Complete 
One Volume History of His Life and Tinies (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J .: Prentice-HalT7 I960), p. 556 (hereafter cited as Luthin, 
Lincoln); H. J. Carman and Reinhard H. Luthin, Lincoln and 
the Patronage (New York: Columbia University Press, 1^43), 
pp. 311-12 (hereafter cited as Carman and Luthin, Patronage).
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considerations, and undoubtedly these did play a role in
Lincoln's decision. Harlan and the President did not meet
until after Lincoln's election in 1860, but thereafter a firm
friendship rapidly developed. On gala social occasions the
Iowa senator was usually found in the President's party, and
at the second inaugural Harlan served as Mrs. Lincoln's
escort while her husband was sworn in for a second term. The
senator's daughter was often escorted by Lincoln's son Robert,
37and in 1868, Mary Harlan became Mrs. Robert Todd Lincoln.
Personal considerations alone, however, did not dictate 
this important decision. Equally as decisive were the political 
considerations. Any wartime president, especially one confronted 
with a civil war, must carefully cultivate public support.
Among those groups whose favor Lincoln especially valued and 
sought to cultivate was the Methodist Episcopal Church. One of 
Lincoln's closest unofficial advisors was Methodist Episcopal 
Bishop Matthew Simpson who was called to Washington on numerous 
occasions for consultations with the President. In a brief 
address of May 18, 1864 delivered at the White House to a group 
of delegates from the church's General Conference meeting in 
Philadelphia, Lincoln conceded that the Methodists sent more 
soldiers to the field, more nurses to the hospitals and more
^^Carman and Luthin, Patronage, p. 312; Johnson Brigham, 
James Harlan (Iowa City: The State Historical Society of Iowa, 
1913), p. 238.
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prayers to heaven than any other denomination.^® As the war 
drew to a close and the problem of reconstruction loomed 
ominously on the horizon it is not unreasonable to conclude 
that Lincoln hoped to continue to enjoy the cooperation and 
goodwill of this important group. The appointment of James 
Harlan, a prominent Methodist layman, to the cabinet would go 
far toward insuring Lincoln that support. In contrast. Uncle 
Jesse Dubois had nothing to recommend him but past services 
rendered. At a less critical time, that alone might have 
sufficed to secure the desired appointment, but in this 
instance it was not enough.
By the time that Harlan assumed his duties in the 
cabinet, Lincoln was dead, Andrew Johnson occupied the White 
House, and a turnover had occurred in the Southern Superin­
tendent's office. Late in April, William G. Coffin resigned 
the office he had held since 1861 and the new chief executive
immediately appointed Iowan Elijah Sells to the vacated
O Qposition. The fact that Sells and Harlan came from the 
same state was probably no mere coincidence. With Usher's
George R. Crooks, The Life and Times of Bishop 
Matthew Simpson of the Methodist Episcopal Church (NewYork: 
Harper and Brothers, 1890), pp. 370, 3 9 5 ; Luthin, Lincoln, p 
557.
®^George C. Whiting to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, April 28, 1865, Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern 
Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 836; Charles E. 
Mix to William G. Coffin, May 2, 1865, Letters Sent, O.I.A., 
N.A. , Microcopy 21, Roll 77.
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tenure nearing its end, Johnson undoubtedly turned to the 
secretary designate for advice in choosing Coffin's successor.
Sells wasted no time in assuming his duties. Late May 
found the new superintendent in Kansas where he held interviews 
with Major General Grenville M. Dodge and Brigadier General 
R. B. Mitchell. Dodge commanded the Department of the 
Missouri, while Mitchell had charge of the District of North 
Kansas. Both promised to aid Sells in stopping the theft of 
Indian cattle, and Mitchell backed up his statement by placing 
a force of Illinois troops, uncorrupted by any past association 
with cattle thieves, at the superintendent's disposal. On 
June 7 this force left Fort Scott accompanied by Seminole 
Agent George A. Reynolds on what Sells called "an expedition 
of discovery." Reynolds and his military escort were to scour 
the southern Kansas countryside arresting all persons who were 
found in possession of stock suspected of being stolen from 
the Indian Territory.^0
The superintendent returned to Washington in August 
for consultations with Harlan, and Dennis N. Cooley, recently 
appointed commissioner of Indian a f f a i r s . W h i l e  in the 
capital city, he, along with his two immediate superiors, 
listened to testimony provided by First Lieutenant George
Elijah Sells to William P. Dole, June 7, 1865, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 
234, Roll 836; Sells to George A. Reynolds, May 30, 1865, ibid.
^^For a discussion of Cooley's appointment to the 
commissioner's office see Chapter X.
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Williams of the Sixth Kentucky Cavalry. Williams, former 
provost-marshal for the District of Kansas, talked in great 
detail to Interior Department officials about his investi­
gations of the activities of Kansas cattle thieves. Impressed 
by these disclosures. Sells suggested that an order be 
procured from the War Department detailing the lieutenant to 
work with him and his agents in looking further into the 
illegal cattle trade. Secretary Harlan secured the desired 
order, and Lieutenant Williams accompanied the Federal 
commissioners who traveled to Fort Smith in September to 
negotiate with the Confederacy's former Indian allies.
Williams' investigation ended in a complete, though 
not necessarily deserved exoneration for McDonald and Fuller. 
Surrounded at Fort Smith by friends of the contractors, all 
of whom willingly submitted sworn affadavits attesting to the 
firm's honesty, the lieutenant stated in his report of 
October 10 that they were guilty of no transgressions what­
ever. Upon receipt of Williams' report, and after examining 
similar statements submitted by agents of the Southern Superin­
tendency, Cooley and Secretary Harlan in January, 1866 
quietly decided not to pursue the McDonald, Fuller and Coffin
^^Elijah Sells to D. N. Cooley, August 5, 1865, R.G.
48, N.A., Letters Received; Sells to Cooley, August 10, 1865, 
Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 836; Special Orders No. 433 (War Department), 
August 11, 1865, ibid.; George Williams to Cooley, October 10, 
1865, ibid.
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m at t e r  a n y  further.
The hindsight of over 100 years unfortunately yields 
little insight into the legality of the trading activities 
carried on by McDonald and Fuller under the auspices of 
Superintendent Coffin. The participants in the trade contro­
versy for the most part based their cases on invective rather 
than solid evidence, and in all probability the truth lies 
somewhere between the extreme statements made by both sides.
O n  the one hand, it is difficult to bel ieve that the M c D o n a l d  
a n d  Fuller f i r m  w a s  as blameless as its supporters maintained. 
In the midst of w a r t i m e  turmoil, extrav a g ance  a n d  p r o f i t e e r i n g  
it is simply i n c once iv abl e that the f i r m  turned its b a c k  on 
all  o p p ort u ni tie s to increase its pro f i t s  at the ex p e n s e  of 
the in dividuals w h o s e  needs it w a s  committed to supply. But 
con diti ons w e r e  p r o b a b l y  not as b a d  as Phillips sai d they 
were. For  all h i s  sincerity, the col onel seems to h a v e  b e e n  
a hig hly  i m p r e s s i o n a b l e  man i n f l u e n c e d  b y  the inn uend oes  of 
those who for o ne re a s on or a n o t h e r  h a d  some g r i evan ce against 
the licensed contractors.
D u r i n g  the height of the tra de controversy P re s i d e n t  
L in coln  r e c e i v e d  a letter f ro m  M i k k o  Hutkey, a loyal C r e e k  who 
h a d  followed O p o t h l e y a h o l o  into K a n s a s  in 1861. H u t k e y 's
^ ^ W i l l i a m s  to Cooley, O c t o b e r  10, 1865, L et t e r s  Received, O.I.A., So u th er n Superinte nde ncy,  N . A . , M i c r o c o p y  
234, Roll 836; C oo l e y  to Harlan, J a n u a r y  17, 1866, R.G. 48, N . A . , Letters Received; Har lan to Cooley, Ja n u a r y  29, 1866, Letters Sent, I n d i a n  Division, S e c r e t a r y  of the Interior, M i c r o c o p y  606, Rol l 6.
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account of affairs in the Indian Territory indicated that the
flour and beef provided the loyal Indians was distributed in
the sloppiest of ways, by guess rather than by weight, while
the clothes and shoes they received were made of the flimsiest
of materials. Poignantly he added:
The goods look as if they were the remnants 
of stocks from which the best articles had 
been sold to other people, as if anything 
was thought to be good enough for the 
Indians, who are good enough to be plundered 
of all they have but not good enough to be 
treated as people who have bodies, and Souls 
and human feelings and Sentiments.
Hutkey conceded that the President's time and thoughts were
engrossed "by the great affairs of your own Government that
rise up like mountains around you." Yet the Indians were a
part, however small, of those affairs, and he pleaded with
Lincoln to "stop the depredations and impositions heaped upon
us."44
The depth of the Federal government's concern for the 
people of the Indian Territory was revealed in the way Hutkey's 
entreaty was handled. When the loyal Creek's appeal reached 
his desk in mid-February, 1865 Lincoln without comment passed 
it on to Secretary Usher. Without comment the secretary passed 
the letter on to Commissioner Dole, and without comment the 
commissioner filed the document away in the archives of the 
Indian Bureau.
^^Hutkey to Lincoln, December 23, 1864, ibid.; John Ross 
to Lincoln, February 15, 1865, ibid.
CHAPTER X 
WAR'S END
Militarily, the closing months of the Civil War in 
the Indian Territory were rather uneventful. Commanders on 
both sides talked a great deal about proposed movements, but 
their frenetic discussions produced little activity. Late 
in June, 1864 Brigadier General Douglas H. Cooper proposed an 
attack on Fort Smith only to be thwarted by Samuel B. Maxey, 
the Confederate major general commanding the Indian Terri­
tory. Maxey believed that the Fédérais in and around Fort 
Smith were both more numerous and much better armed than any 
attacking force the Confederates could muster. Later, when 
the Confederate military commander in Arkansas, Major General 
John B. Magruder, proposed a similar campaign in November 
and asked for assistance from the Indian Territory, Maxey 
again dissented. Nevertheless, Magruder at first determined 
to push ahead with his plans, but later abandoned the Fort 
Smith campaign when he received a report--which proved to be
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false--that the post had received 4,000 reinforcements.
In reality, the most important events occuring in the 
Indian Territory at this time were diplomatic rather than 
military. On December 20, 1864 Union Cherokee leaders at 
Fort Gibson addressed a petition to President Lincoln urging 
that immediate steps be taken to offset the activities of 
rebel emissaries who were attempting to enlist the assistance 
of the wild tribes of the plains. The loyal Cherokees 
maintained that the long continuation of the war, together with 
the lies and machinations of the rebels, had shaken the 
confidence of the plains tribes in the United States 
government and had somehow convinced the people that the loyal 
Indians were their enemies. To alleviate this situation and 
to protect loyal whites and redmen against future outrages, 
the Cherokees proposed that a general convention be held 
attended by delegates from all the tribes of the Southwest. 
Hopefully, this assemblage would lead to the establishment of 
a "league of amity" in which all the Indians would pledge to 
maintain peace among themselves and reaffirm their allegiance
S. B. Maxey to D. H. Cooper, June 28, 1864, The War 
of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1902), Series 1, xxxiv, part 4, pp. 697-98 (hereafter 
cited as OR with series number in upper-case numerals and 
volume number in lower-case numerals); Edward P. Turner to 
Maxey, November 1, 1864, ibid., xli, part 4, p. 1024; John B. 
Magruder to John A. Wharton, November 8, 1864, ibid., p. 1034; 
Maxey to E. Kirby Smith, November 8, 1864, ibid., pp. 1035-37; 
Magruder to Maxey, Nove^er 16, 1864, ibid. , p. 1072.
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to the Federal government. Farsighted though it was, the
2proposal was ignored by the Lincoln administration.
The Cherokees were correct when they asserted that 
the Confederates were courting the tribes of the plains. In 
February, 1864 the rebel Indians meeting in their annual 
Grand Council discussed the idea of an alliance with the wild 
tribes, and while this early talk produced nothing tangible, 
the idea was not forgotten. On December 22, 1864 Colonel James 
E. Harrison of the Texas Fifteenth Volunteer Infantry Regiment 
sent a communication to Confederate Secretary of War James A. 
Seddon suggesting the possibility of forming an alliance with 
the Comanches. The Texas colonel pointed out that if this bond 
was affected, the Confederacy could use these people in 
attacking Federal wagon trains bound for New Mexico, possibly 
cutting off all communications with that distant territory.
The establishment of peaceful relations with the Comanches 
would also make it possible to transfer to some other theater 
of the war the Texas troops no longer needed to defend the 
state's northern frontier. Seddon immediately endorsed this 
proposition, and on December 23 the secretary sent instructions 
to General E. Kirby Smith, the Confederacy's chief military 
officer in the West. Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans- 
Mississippi Department, was told to take the steps needed to
2Lewis Downing et a^ to Lincoln, December 20, 1864, 
Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Indian 
Division, Record Group 48, National Archives, Letters Received.
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3complete the proposed alliance.
Steps looking toward the establishment of closer ties 
with the plains tribes had already been taken by the time 
Seddon's dispatch reached Smith at his Shreveport, Louisiana, 
headquarters. On January 21, 1865 L. P. Chouteau, a Confederate 
sympathizer trading in the western part of the Indian Terri­
tory, informed rebel Cherokee leaders that certain Comanche 
and Kiowa leaders encamped in the Antelope Hills wanted to 
join with the Confederacy in fighting the Fédérais. When this 
news reached Major General Maxey, the Indian Territory 
commander appointed the Confederate Creek Agent, Major I.
G. Vore, to meet the Comanche and Kiowa representatives, and 
learn their intentions and the reasons for their desire to 
join arms with the South. The original plans called for a 
parley along the banks of the False Washita River, but before 
Vore could reach the designated point, the nomadic plains 
tribesmen had come and gone. Southern supporters in the area, 
however, assured the major that the Indians from the plains 
were sincere in their desire to join arms with the Confederacy. 
Accordingly, Vore sent out messages urging these people to 
meet with representatives of the Confederate States and its 
Indian allies in mid-May at Council Grove on the North
^E. Kirby Smith to Albert Pike, April 8, 1865, OR, 
I, xlviii, part 2, pp. 1266-69.
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4Canadian River.
Secretary Seddon's instructions and the news of Vore's 
activities both reached General Kirby Smith at about the 
same time in mid-February, 1865. In carrying out the 
secretary's orders. Smith acquiesced in the plans already set 
in motion by Major Vore and appointed Brigadier General James 
W. Throckmorton and Colonel W. D. Reagan to represent the 
Confederate States at the May council. From Vore, Kirby 
Smith had learned that the plains tribes wanted extended to 
them the same type of pledge that Albert Pike had extended 
to the Osages in Article XXVII of their treaty of August,
1861. He thus authorized Throckmorton and Reagan to assure 
the delegates from the wild tribes that in its dealings with 
them the Confederacy would faithfully execute the terms of 
this article. In addition, both men were instructed to meet 
with Brigadier General D. H. Cooper, who had recently succeeded 
Maxey as commander of the District of the Indian Territory, at 
Cooper's headquarters at Fort Washita. Here the Confederate
^Smith to Pike, April 8, 1865, ibid.; L. P. Chouteau to 
J. M. Bell, January 21, 1865, Cherokee Nation Papers--Letters 
to J. M. Bell, 1839-1907, Division of Manuscripts, Bizzell 
Library, University of Oklahoma, Norman; Stand Watie to 
Tuckabatchee Muceo, March 19, 1865, Cherokee Nation Papers-- 
Civil War Letters, 1861-1874, Division of Manuscripts, 
University of Oklahoma; undated, unsigned notation in the 
Peter P. Pitchlynn Collection, 1865, Folder 18, Thomas 
Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma.
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representatives would plan their strategy for the upcoming 
council
As the time for the appointed meeting approached, 
conditions in the Indian Territory bordered on the chaotic. 
Recognizing the inevitable, and desiring to avoid the useless 
spilling of blood. General Robert E. Lee surrendered his 
forces to General Ulysses S. Grant at the Virginia village 
of Appomattox Courthouse on April 9, and his capitulation was 
followed on April 26 by that of General Joseph E. Johnston at 
Durham Station, North Carolina. Rumors of these actions, 
along with accounts of general lawless in the southern portion 
of the Indian Territory and friction between the rebel Creeks 
and Chickasaws, gradually reached General Cooper's headquarters 
at Fort Washita. News also circulated that Major General 
James G. Blunt with 15,000 cavalrymen would lead a raid out of 
Fort Smith through the Indian Territory into Texas. Perplexed 
over the rash of rumors and ill-tidings. Cooper advised all 
the commissioners and delegates to the Council Grove meeting 
to proceed just as if no bad news had been received. He also 
pleaded with quartermaster and commissary officers in the area
5e . Kirby Smith to Pendleton Murrah, March 21, 1865,
OR, I, xlviii, part 1, pp. 1439-40; Smith to Albert Pike, 
April 8, 1865, ibid., part 2, pp. 1266-69; C. S. West to W.
D. Reagan, April 15, 1865, ibid., pp. 1279-80. Article XXVII 
of the Osage treaty of 1861 provided that a white man who 
married an Osage woman would be considered an Osage even 
after the death of his wife. Ibid., OR, IV, i, p. 641.
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to "keep everything rocking along just as usual. . . .
At the preliminary meeting held with Cooper, 
Throckmorton, Reagan and representatives of the tribes of 
the Indian Territory agreed upon a proceedural plan. During 
the early stages of the Council Grove assembly the Confederate 
emissaries would remain discreetly in the background while 
the redmen in attendance swapped greetings and expressions 
of goodwill. Once these preliminary but important exchanges 
were concluded, Throckmorton and Reagan would be introduced, 
and hopefully their addresses to the council would lead to 
the signing of a tripartite treaty uniting the Confederate 
States and its Indian allies with the plains tribes in 
opposition to the United States. Possibly plans could then 
be formulated for the launching of an attack against Federal 
forces in Kansas.^
Information reached Fort Washita shortly after the 
departure of the Council Grove delegates that Federal 
commissioners had opened talks with E. Kirby Smith. Cooper 
decided that until the outcome of this parley was known any 
plans for launching an expedition into Kansas should be
^D. H. Cooper to Stand Watie, April 6, 1865, Cherokee 
Nation Papers--Civil War Letters, 1861-1864, Division of 
Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma; Robert Pierce to J. M. 
Scott, May 9, 1865, ibid.; Cooper to Scott, May 10, 1865, OR 
I, xlviii, part 2, p. 1297; James G. Randall and David DoniXd, 
The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston; D. C. Heath and 
Cong)any, 1961) , pp. 526, 528.
^D. H. Cooper to S. S. Anderson, May 15, 1865, OR,
I, xlviii, part 2, p. 1306.
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deferred, and he so informed Throckmorton. While advancing 
toward Council Grove, the Texas general received letters 
from Cooper dated May 16 and 22 telling him to confine the 
talks with the plains Indians merely to the establishment of 
friendly relations. More ambitious projects would have to 
await the completion of Kirby Smith's conference with the 
Union emissaries. In addition to corresponding with 
Throckmorton, Cooper on May 22 sent a letter to Stand Watie 
suggesting that the Confederacy's Indian allies hold a grand 
council after the Council Grove session to hear reports on 
the talks conducted with the plains Indians. In the light 
of what he termed the "thousands of rumors afloat," this 
grand council could also "take into consideration the present 
condition of affairs and determine the policy to be pursued 
in the Indian Territory.
The meeting with the plains Indians proceeded just 
about as planned, with one exception.^ As the delegates 
from the various tribes began gathering at a spot called 
Cherokee Town near the designated meeting place, some concern 
was expressed over the safety of meeting at Council Grove.
The question was finally settled on May 20 when those present
QCooper to Throckmorton, May 16 and 22, 1865, ibid., 
pp. 1307, 1317; Cooper to Watie, May 22, 1865, ibid.. p.
1318.
^The following account is based on information found 
in undated, unsigned notations in the Peter P. Pitchlynn MSS, 
1865, folders 18 and 19, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa.
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decided to move the assembly to the south to some point on the
Washita River where the chances of Federal interference were
less.
The once-removed council finally opened at Camp 
Napoleon, a place near present-day Verden, Oklahoma, on May
25, 1865. Among those present were representatives from the 
Five Civilized Tribes as well as the Reserve Caddoes, Reserve 
Osages, Kiowas, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Lipans and several bands 
of the Comanches. By this time presumably, the tribesmen had 
already exchanged greetings. Thus little time was lost in
getting to the main business at hand, the establishment of
closer ties between the tribes represented. On the
opening day General Throckmorton delivered a very general, 
perfunctory address in behalf of the Confederacy, and on May
26, Colonel William P. Adair, a rebel Cherokee, submitted to 
the council the terms of a proposed compact.
This agreement provided for the establishment of an 
Indian Confederacy, similar to the one of 1861, linking the 
plains tribes with those of the Indian Territory. The 
Confederacy's motto was to be "An Indian shall not spill an 
Indian's blood," and in keeping with this expressed spirit of 
harmony, the party's signing the document pledged to settle 
all their future disputes peacefully and to work together for 
"the peace, the happiness, and the protection of all alike.
lOlbid.
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and the preservation of [the Indian] race." After these terms 
were read and interpreted, several plains delegates spoke 
in support of the proposed Confederacy, and the document was 
then signed by the assembled delegates.
The following day. May 27, Throckmorton and Reagan
concluded on behalf of the Confederate States and the state
of Texas a treaty of peace with the plains tribes. Some
closing remarks were then made by Captain Jonathan Spears,
another rebel Cherokee, after which the council hastily
adjourned sine die. Obviously with countless rumors and
counter-rumors circulating through the area, those present
were anxious to return to their homes or stations of duty as
quickly as possible. But at some time before the final
adjournment--the sketchy records do not indicate when--the
tribes allied with the Confederacy since 1861 agreed to hold
another of their periodic grand councils at Armstrong Academy
in the Choctaw Nation to hear reports on the Camp Napoleon
12meeting and plot their future course of action.
The Camp Napoleon meeting was accompanied and followed 
by a dizzying array of events. While the tribesmen of the 
Indian Territory and the plains were parleying on the banks of 
the Washita, to the south E. Kirby Smith was parrying with the 
two top Union commanders in the West, Major General John 




E. R. S. Canby, who headed the Division of West
Mississippi. After prolonged and involved wrangling, Kirby
Smith accepted the terms offered by Canby, and on May 26
in New Orleans representatives of the two generals signed a
surrender convention which provided that the troops of the
Confederacy's Trans-Mississippi Department would immediately
cease all acts of war and resistance against the United 
13States. Shortly thereafter, without having any particular 
authority to do so. Major General Francis J. Herron assumed 
responsibility for the negotiation of preliminary treaties of 
peace between the United States and the Confederacy's Indian 
Allies. Herron, commander of the Northern Division of 
Louisiana, met on June 8, 1865 with E. Kirby Smith's chief of 
staff. Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner. Buckner, not 
realizing that the events he was discussing had already 
transpired, informed Herron that General Throckmorton and 
Colonel Reagan, along with delegates from the tribes of the 
Indian Territory, were about to undertake negotiations with 
the plains Indians. Herron, equally ignorant of the fact 
that these talks had already occurred, immediately decided to 
appoint two commissioners of his own to travel to the Indian 
Territory to meet with the Confederate commissioners and the 
Indian leaders of the area. Fearing the loss of valuable
13john Pope to Ulysses S. Grant, May 1 and 27, 1865, 
OR, I, xlviii, part 2, pp. 283, 626; Pope to J. T. Sprague, 
May 19, 1865, ibid. , p. 507; Surrender Agreement of May 26, 
1865, found in ibid., pp. 600-01.
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time and an opportunity to negotiate with the Indians with
the assistance of Confederate commissioners, Herron did not
14bother to clear his actions with his superiors.
Herron designated Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Matthews 
of the 99th Illinois Volunteer Infantry to act as his chief 
representative, while Captain W. H. Vance of the 47th Indiana 
Volunteer Infantry served as Matthews' assistant. In a 
letter of June 9, 1865 the major general from his Shreveport 
headquarters instructed Matthews to proceed with as little 
delay as possible to Council Grove where he was to work with 
commissioners Throckmorton and Reagan in accomplishing the 
chief object of his mission, the negotiation of a temporary 
treaty or alliance between the Indians and the United States. 
Matthews was to impress upon the Indians the fact that the 
armies of the South had surrendered, thus bringing their 
country back under the control of the Federal government. He 
was to tell them that Washington's desire was to be on terms 
of friendship with all the Indians, an object which could be 
accomplished by their returning quietly to their homes without 
interferring with either the whites or the redmen who had 
supported the United States. Finally, in addition to entering 
into some sort of temporary pact, Matthews was to suggest 
another general council to be held at some point in the Terri­
tory around August 1 attended by commissioners from Washington
J. Herron to Nathaniel P. Banks, June 8, 1865, 
ibid., p. 818; Simon B. Buckner to D. H. Cooper, June 8, 
1865, ibid., pp. 818-19.
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who would draw up "a full and complete treaty." In sum,
Herron not only assumed responsibility for the negotiation 
of a temporary peace treaty; he also more or less designated 
the place and the manner whereby permanent relations would be 
re-established with the tribes of the Indian Territory. Upon 
receiving these instructions, Matthews and Vance gathered a 
fifty man escort and left for the Indian Territory traveling 
by way of northeastern Texas.
Herron's commissioners made their way northward not 
knowing that the council they were to attend had long since 
adjourned. The delegates of the tribes of the Indian Terri­
tory assembled at Armstrong Academy equally oblivious of the 
fact that the war was over. The actions taken by the assembled 
delegates, however, revealed that they realized that the 
Confederacy was in its death throes. In a set of resolutions 
adopted on June 15, 1865 the Grand Council of the United 
Nations of the Indian Territory established a special committee 
made up of the principal chiefs and governors of the nations 
represented at the council. This committee was instructed to 
extend "the hand of fellowship" to all nations of Indians, 
including those allied with the United States. All, stated 
the resolutions, were to be invited to become a party to the 
Indian Confederation and to cooperate with it in its efforts
Herron to Matthews, June 9, 1865, ibid., pp. 830-31; 
Matthews to Herron, June 30, 1865, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters 
Received.
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"to contract anew" friendly relations with the United States. 
Clearly, the assembled delegates hoped that the Indians of 
the area could present a united front to Federal authorities 
in the negotiations that were certain to come.
In addition to contacting all nearby tribes, under the 
June 15 resolutions the governors and principal chiefs of the 
tribes of the Territory were to appoint from one to five 
commissioners each. These men, chosen with the consent of 
their tribal councils, were to contact Union military author­
ities in the area in affecting a cessation of hostilities in 
the area. After obtaining the proper passes, they were to 
proceed to Washington where they would negotiate "such treaties 
as the exigencies of affairs may seem to demand." No treaty 
was to be binding, however, until ratified by the national 
council of each Indian nation. On June 16, representatives 
of the rebel Cherokees, Creeks, Seminoles, Choctaws and 
Chickasaws, as well as the Black Dog band of the Osages, 
signed the resolutions, after which the Armstrong Academy
1 C
council adjourned.
When Matthews and his party reached the vicinity of 
Doaksville in the Choctaw Nation, informants told them of 
the events recently transpired. The Council Grove meeting-- 
adjourned to Camp Napoleon--had long since been concluded.
A copy of the resolutions can be found with Matthews' 
letter of June 30 to Herron, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received; 
undated, unsigned notation, Peter P. Pitchlynn MSS, 1865, 
folder 19, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa.
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but delegates from the tribes aligned with the South were at 
the moment huddling nearby. Upon learning these facts,
Matthews hurriedly dispatched to Armstrong Academy a courier 
carrying a message requesting that the Grand Council remain 
in session until the Federal commissioners arrived. But by 
the time that Matthews' envoy reached the designated point, 
the council had passed its resolutions and adjourned.
Disappointed, yet encouraged by the friendly reception 
they had encountered, Matthews and Vance decided to make the 
best of the situation in carrying out their instructions. A 
letter was sent to Choctaw Governor Peter P. Pitchlynn informing 
him of the purpose of the Federal commissioners' mission and 
requesting a meeting at Doaksville with the governor at his 
earliest convenience. Pitchlynn quickly complied with this 
request, and after a short but pleasant meeting at Doaksville 
on June 18, the terms of a temporary treaty of peace were worked 
out. In these brief articles, the Choctaws promised to return 
to their homes and refrain from committing any hostile acts 
against the United States and its allies, white or Indian.
The United States pledged to protect the Choctaws "in their 
persons and property" against encroachments committed either 
by whites or Union Indians, and the two parties agreed that 
this compact would remain in effect until permanent treaties 
were negotiated and ratified by the proper authorities. The
^^Matthews to Herron, June 30, 1865, R.G. 48, N.A.,
Letters Received.
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agreement designated September 1, 1865 and Armstrong Academy
as the time and place for the convening of a grand council
where Federal and Indian commissioners would attempt to
re-establish permanent relations. The provisions of this
pact met with the hardy approval of a number of Choctaw
national councilman present, and the same day that these
terms were agreed to, Pitchlynn issued a proclamation calling
upon his brothers of the Indian Territory to choose delegates
18to the forthcoming conference.
The Choctaw pact signed, Matthews and Vance on June 
19 sent out letters to other rebel tribal leaders and then 
repaired to the plantation home of Colonel R. M. Jones, twelve 
miles west of Doaksville. John Jumper, Samuel Checote and 
Stand Watie, the respective chiefs of the rebel Seminoles, 
Creeks and Cherokees, and Chickasaw Governor Winchester 
Colbert were informed of the events at Doaksville, and were 
invited to enter into agreements like the one signed by 
Pitchlynn. Watie responded promptly to this call, reaching 
Doaksville on June 21. Two days later the rebel Cherokee 
leader signed an agreement identical to that signed earlier 
by Pitchlynn. When the Seminole, Creek and Seminole chiefs, 
for reasons unexplained, failed to appear Watie on his own 
initiative assumed the authority to enter into a similar pact 
in their behalf with Matthews and Vance. After these dealings
IBpR, I, xlviii, part 2, pp. 1105-06; Matthews to 
Herron, June 30 , 1865, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received.
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with the South's solitary Indian general, the Federal 
commissioners left for Shreveport, and on June 30 Matthews 
submitted a complete report on his actions to Major General 
Herron.
Before news of these affairs reached the nation's 
capital, a significant change occurred within the Indian 
Bureau. While Matthews and Vance negotiated in the Indian 
Territory, Secretary of the Interior James Harlan and President 
Andrew Johnson began discussing the course of action to be 
taken in dealing with the nomadic tribes of the West. Sporadic 
outbreaks of violence, sparked by the greed and intemperance 
of gold-hungry whites, had kept the Great Plains area in a 
state of turmoil throughout the Civil War years. With victory 
over the South achieved Harlan and Johnson together decided 
that the time had arrived to come to terms with the wandering 
plains tribesmen. Accordingly on June 22, 1865 the secretary 
of the interior instructed Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
William P. Dole to proceed "with all convenient dispatch" to 
visit the Indians of the Dakota, Iowa, Montana and Colorado 
territories. During the course of his expedition the commis­
sioner was to impress upon the tribes of the area the idea 
that the only alternative to permanent peace with the United 
States was annihilating war. He was, in addition, to enter
l^Matthews to Herron, June 30, 1865, ibid. ; Matthews and 
Vance to Stand Watie, June 19, 1865, Cherokee Nation Papers-- 
Civil War Letters 1861-1874, Division of Itenuscripts, University 
of Oklahoma. A copy of the Cherokee treaty can be found in 
OR, I, xlviii, part 2, pp. 1100-01.
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into treaty arrangements in which the plains Indians agreed 
to abandon their nomadic existence in favor of, as Harlan 
expressed it, "the more peaceful and industrial arts of 
civilized life." Not at all enraptured by the prospect of 
abandoning the comforts of Washington for the semi-civilized
barreness of the Far West, Dole tendered his resignation as
20commissioner of Indian affairs on July 5.
Harlan quickly found a successor for Dole in the person 
of Dennis N. Cooley of Dubuque, Iowa. During the election 
can^aign of 1864 Cooley gained a certain notoriety among the 
higher echelons of the Republican Party for the services he 
rendered as secretary of Union Executive Congressional 
Committee. Made up of three Republican members from each of 
the two houses of Congress, the committee raised part of the 
funds needed to finance Lincoln's second presidential campaign 
by collecting contributions from local United States post­
masters. Immediately after the election. Senator Harlan, a 
member of the fund-raising committee, wrote Cooley a warm 
personal letter of thanks for his "herculean efforts," at the 
same time assuring him that if fortune made it possible for 
him to do so Harlan would gladly aid his fellow Iowan in 
"the attainment of the gratification of [his] wishes. . . . "
9 0 Harlan to Dole, June 22, 1865, Letters Sent by the 
Indian Division of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, 
N.A. , Microcopy 606, Roll 5; Dole to Harlan, July 6, 1865,
R.G. 48, N.A. , Letters Received; Dole to Andrew Johnson, July 
6, 1865, Andrew Johnson Papers, Library of Congress (microfilm 
copy). Series I, Roll 16.
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Before the end of the war, Cooley acquired an appointment 
as Federal tax commissioner in the conquered regions of South 
Carolina. Apparently feeling that this rather obscure position 
was not adequate recompense for the services rendered, Harlan 
on June 14, 1865 wrote Secretary of the Navy Giddeon Wells 
soliciting a position for Cooley in the Navy Department. No 
opening materialized, but after Dole's resignation Harlan 
persuaded President Johnson to acquiesce in appointing Cooley 
to the vacated position, and before the end of July the former 
tax commissioner had assumed his new duties as commissioner of 
Indian affairs.
Gradually during the month of July, 1865, from reports 
submitted by officers in the field, Washington officials 
learned of the recent events in the Indian Territory. When 
Ulysses S. Grant learned of the terms of the Matthews-Vance 
treaties, he immediately endorsed the idea of holding a 
grand council attended by Federal and Indian delegates, but 
he suggested to the War Department that the site be changed 
from Armstrong Academy to Fort Gibson, a site more accessible 
to Washington's commissioners. The Johnson cabinet discussed
Harlan to Cooley, November 11, 1864 and Harlan to 
Wells, June 14, 1865, Records of the United States Congress, 
Appointment Papers, National Archives, 38 Cong.--Sen. 38B-A4; 
Harlan to Andrew Johnson, July 7, 1865, Andrew Johnson MSS, 
L.C., Series I, Roll 14; H. J. Carman and R. H. Luthin,
Lincoln and the Patronage (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1943), p. 292; Johnson Brigham, James Harlan (Iowa City: The 
State Historical Society of Iowa, 1913), p. 207 (hereafter 
referred to as Brigham, Harlan).
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Indian affairs at a meeting held on July 25, and it was agreed
that the secretary of the interior would appoint the Federal
22representatives.
The slate of commissioners was quickly filled. In 
addition to Cooley and Southern Superintendent Elijah Sells, 
Harlan singled out Ely Parker, Thomas Wister and Brigadier 
General William S. Harney to represent and defend the Federal 
government's interests at the forthcoming conference. Parker, 
a Seneca Indian who would himself later become commissioner 
of Indian affairs, was appointed on the recommendation of 
Ulysses S. Grant after serving as a member of Grant's staff 
throughout the war. Wister, a prominent member of the Society 
of Friends, was recommended to Harlan by Thomas Evans of 
Philadelphia, a Quaker leader of national renown, while 
Harney was singled out for service by the secretary of the 
interior at the request of Henry S. Wilson of Massachusetts, 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Major 
General Francis J. Herron and James M. Edmunds, commissioner of
23the general land office, were also asked to serve but declined.
Z^Francis J. Herron to James Harlan, June 30, 1865, R.G. 
48, N.A., Letters Received; J. J. Reynolds to Harlan, June 28, 
1865, ibid.. Letters Received Miscellaneous; Edwin M. Stanton 
to James R. Doolittle, July 24 and 25, 1865, OR, I, xlviii, part 
2, pp. 1117-18, 1122.
23James Harlan to Elijah Sells, August 4, 1865, Letters 
Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of Interior, N.A., Microcopy 
606, Roll 5; Harlan to Thomas Evans, August 12, 1865, ibid.; 
Harlan to William H. Goode, August 12, 1865, ibid.; Congressional 
Globe. 38 Cong., 2 Sess., December 8, 1864, p. 8; Annua1 Report 
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1865, H. Ex. 
Doc. No. 1, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 1866 (Serial 1248), p. 480 (here­after referred to as Commissioner s Report, 1865).
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Shortly after the naming of the Federal commission, 
the site of the upcoming conference was changed once again.
As late as August 7 Secretary Harlan's correspondence indicated 
that the grand council would convene at Fort Gibson as had 
been agreed upon in the cabinet meeting of July 25. Beginning 
on August 12, however, the letters written by the secretary 
indicated that the confrontation with the tribes of the Indian 
Territory would take place instead at Fort S m i t h . ^4 Exactly 
when and by whom this decision was made is not clear, but in 
all probability Harlan and Cooley, with the concurrence of 
military officials and the President, made the choice, with 
convenience and accessibility quite possibly being the 
determining factors. Fort Smith, Arkansas, was not exactly 
a cosmopolitan center, but it could better accomodate the 
throngs planning to attend the grand council than could a 
crude frontier post such as Fort Gibson. Unlike the fort 
located in the Cherokee country. Fort Smith was linked by 
telegraph to the nation's capital, making it possible for 
Cooley and his associates to keep in constant touch with 
Secretary Harlan. These telegraphic ties would greatly assist 
the Federal representatives in handling any contingencies that 
might arise during the negotiations. Still, all things 
considered, the decision to transfer the grand council to
^James Harlan to Edwin M. Stanton, August 7, 1865, 
Letters Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of Interior, N.A., 
Microcopy 606, Roll 5; Harlan to Thomas Evans, August 12, 
1865, ibid.
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Fort Smith was of minor significance. What was important was 
not where the conference met or even who served on the team 
of Federal negotiators. The factor of crucial significance 
was the terms and concessions the United States would demand 
from those tribes who had negotiated treaties of alliance with 
the South.
In setting those terms, President Johnson deferred to
Harlan, and long before the end of the war the Iowan had
reached some definite conclusions concerning the Indians'
future. Unlike more rabid and irresponsible Westerners, Harlan
deplored all talk of annihilating the redman. A policy of
total destruction he believed to be both financially prohibitive
25and morally indefensible. Indian concentration coupled with 
isolation from the vices of white society was vastly preferable.
The future secretary of the interior first stated his 
views on the Indian question in Congress early in 1863. In 
mid-December, 1862 Harlan's Senate colleague James H. Lane 
introduced a measure, subsequently enacted into law, providing 
for the extinction of Indian land titles in Kansas and the 
removal of all Indians from the state. Harlan voiced general 
support for the measure on the Senate floor, but his remarks 
indicated that while he believed that the wild, nomadic tribes 
should be removed to some distant area outside the boundaries 
of Kansas, those Indians who had taken lands in severalty and
Z^Brigham, Harlan, p. 203
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adopted agricultural pursuits might be allowed to remain where
26they were. He later changed his mind, concluding that the 
Indian Territory should become a resettlement area for the bulk of 
the Indians of the West, both the nomadic and the more sedentary.
In reality the terms outlined by the secretary for the 
Fort Smith commissioners were based on legislation introduced by 
Harlan early in 1865. On February 4, 1865 Senator Lane 
secured the passage of a resolution instructing the Committee 
on Indian Affairs to look into the expediency of establishing 
a territorial government for the Indian Territory. Harlan, a 
member of the Indian Affairs Committee, submitted a measure 
on February 20 providing for the organization of a territorial 
government for the area in question. The bill was referred 
immediately to the Committee on Indian Affairs whose members 
apparently had worked with Harlan in its drafting. Back in 
committee, and later on the floor of the Senate, a number of 
changes were made and in its final form the measure authorized 
the establishment of a territorial government composed of a 
governor, a general council, a supreme court and one district 
court for each resident tribe of the Territory. The Pres­
ident of the United States, with the consent of the Senate, 
would appoint the governor. The individual members of the 
general council would be elected by their fellow tribesmen, 
with each tribe's representation being based on its total
^^Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., December 15,
1862, p. 84; ibid., January 26, 1863, pp. 506-07.
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population. The council could enact general legislation
affecting the tribes of the Territory, and it could send a
non-voting delegate to Congress to represent the Territory's
interests in Washington. Finally, Senate Number 459--as the
bill was officially designated--abolished slavery in the 
27Territory.
The members of the Senate debated the merits and wisdom 
of this measure on two different occasions, first on February 
23 and then on March 2. During the course of the discussions 
the bill's most consistent supporters based their arguments 
for passage on the alleged benefits which the tribes concerned 
might derive from a territorial government. Wisconsin's Senator 
James R. Doolittle contended that passage of the bill was 
required if order was to be brought out of the anarchy and 
chaos which the Civil War had inflicted on the Indian Terri­
tory. Harlan stated that this legislation was designed to 
make it possible for the tribes of the area to protect 
themselves from the aggression of the white man before they 
wasted away like "the snows before a morning's sun." He 
provided no details, however, explaining how this measure would 
afford the desired protection. In response to an inquiry 
addressed by Alexander Ramsey of Minnesota on February 23, 
Senator Doolittle stated that while there was nothing in the
27Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 
38 Cong., 2 Sess., 1865, p. 133; Congressional""]lobe, 38 Cong., 
2 Sess., February 20 and 22, 1865, pp. 915, 981.
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measure specifically calling for such action, he hoped that 
tribes from outside the Indian Territory could be persuaded 
to resettle in the area. But he conceded that the tribes 
living in states such as Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota 
would probably not be asked to go to the Indian Territory as 
their habits and customs differed so much from the tribes 
already there.
Among those least swayed by the statements of the 
bill's supporters was Senator LaFayette S. Foster of Connecticut. 
The clause providing for tribal consent for the proposed 
territorial government he labeled a "transparent humbug." Of 
course, he said, the Indians would give their consent to the 
proposed territorial government; through the passage of the 
proposed measure Congress would have in effect set a pre-con­
dition for the re-establishment of peaceful relations which the 
tribes would have no power to resist. With prophetic insight 
he added:
As it will be managed, it seems to me that this 
whole matter of consent is an outrage; it will 
be obtained to a certainty. . . . Those who say 
no will be disloyal, will be unfaithful, and 
any chief who attempts to stand in the way of 
this legislation will be a rebel'.
Had the Connecticut senator been blessed with the gift of
clairvoyance, he could not have better predicted the Federal
29government s eventual course of action.
^^Congressional Globe, 38 Cong., 2 Sess., February 23 
and March 2, 1865, pp. 1023-24, 1305.
Z^Ibid., March 2, 1865, pp. 1309-10.
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Despite the cogency of Foster's statements, the Senate 
by a vote of seventeen to nine approved the Harlan Bill on the 
evening of March 2. The measure was then submitted to the 
House of Representatives but was ignored as the lower chamber 
raced to wrap up other last minute business before Congress' 
adjournment. While Senate supporters of the bill were probably 
disappointed by this turn of events, the House's failure to 
act was not a great setback. As one historian has noted, what 
was needed was an expression of opinion on the part of the 
Senate, the body that would be called upon to ratify future 
Indian treaties. Through the passage of this bill the Senate 
had approved the idea of consolidating the Indian Territory
O Qunder a formal territorial government.
Outside Congress, John Ross stood in the front ranks 
of those who opposed the Harlan-sponsored territorial bill. 
Through an officer in the internal revenue service, Ross 
obtained an interview with Harlan while Senate Number 459 
was pending before the upper house and undoubtedly told the 
Iowa senator of his opposition to the legislation. Along with 
his fellow Cherokee delegates, Ross, in behalf of all the 
tribes of the Indian Territory, submitted a formal protest to 
to Congress charging that the passage of the Harlan Bill
30lbid., March 2, 1865, pp. 1310, 1420; Annie Abel,
The Slaveholding Indians, Vol. Ill: The American Indian Under 
Reconstruction (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co. , 1925%] 
p . 143.
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31would violate their treaty rights.
Secretary Harlan was thus well aware of the Cherokee 
chieftan's past opposition to a territorial form of government. 
Also cognizant of what one contemporary referred to as Ross' 
"talismatic" influence throughout the Indian Territory, the 
secretary made careful preparations before sending the 
Federal commissioners off to Fort Smith.̂ ^ On August 15, 1865 
Harlan forwarded to Commissioner Cooley copies of two letters 
written by and a speech delivered by John Ross in the fall of 
1861. In the two letters Ross allegedly urged Opothleyaholo 
and his followers to join forces with the South, and in the 
speech Ross was quoted as saying that the Pike treaty was the 
best agreement ever entered into by the Cherokee Nation. Harlan 
instructed Cooley to take copies of these documents with him 
to Fort Smith, and while he did not specifically say what they 
were to be used for, the implication was clear. If John Ross 
in any way tried to block the fulfillment of the Federal 
government's objectives for the Indian Territory, these materials
O Ocould be used to discredit the Cherokee chief.
Joseph J. Lewis to James Harlan, March 2, 1865, John 
Ross Papers, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa; H. Mis. Doc. No. 56, 
38 Cong., 2 Sess., 1865 (Serial 1232).
32j. w. Stapler to John P. Usher, February 21, 1865, 
R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous.
S^Harlan to Cooley, August 15, 1865, Letters Sent, 
Indian Division, Secretary of Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, 
Roll 5.
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The following day, through Commissioner Cooley, Harlan 
addressed a lengthy, loosely organized letter of instruction 
to the Federal commissioners. Two themes stood out in this 
missive: the establishment of a formal territorial government 
for the Indian Territory and the resettlement within the 
Territory of tribes not then residing there. Under the 
directions issued by the secretary, the Federal commissioners 
were to induce the tribes of the Territory to accept the 
establishment of a centralized, territorial government composed 
of a presidentially appointed governor and a general council.
For reference purposes Harlan sent along a copy of Senate 
Number 459 which the commissioners were to use as a guide in 
their negotiations on the territorial question.
So far as the resettlement issue was concerned the 
Federal representatives were to determine the population of 
each tribe currently residing in the Territory and demand from 
each the cession of unneeded, surplus lands. In impelling the 
tribes of the Territory to grant the desired concessions, the 
commissioners should indicate that all such actions would give 
evidence of good will toward the United States. If this line 
of persuasion was not sufficient these people might be warned 
that the statute of July 5, 1862 authorized the President to 
abrogate all treaties with those tribes who had aligned 
themselves with the South, a not too subtle warning that refusal 
to cooperate might have unpleasant consequences. In the ceded 
areas to be acquired, both nomadic and non-nomadic tribes
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from other areas were to be placed, but special care was to 
be taken to prevent the resettlement of those who were hostile 
to the indigenous tribes of the Territory. The wandering 
tribes were to be lodged in areas as remote as possible from 
the white thoroughfares crossing the region, as their transition 
"to the more quiet and confining pursuits of civilization" 
must be a gradual one. By contrast, if possible, the more 
civilized Indians from outside the Indian Territory were to be 
persuaded to merge their funds and live as one people with the 
tribes whose lands they occupied. Finally, any agreements 
signed must contain stipulations prohibiting white persons 
from settling in the Territory, with the exception of the 
officers, agents and employees of the United States government 
as well as those whites adopted by the resident tribes.
Harlan's set of instructions also dealt with problems 
growing out of the war, such as tribal factionalism. In a 
statement which revealed his own lack of knowledge of pre-war 
conditions, the secretary pointed out that the recent conflict 
might have brought about the formation of contending parties 
within the tribes. The commissioners should inform these 
people that the President was anxious for all past differences 
to be buried in oblivion, but if a reconciliation could not be 
worked out within a given tribe or tribes a division of tribal 
lands, funds and annuities between contending factions might 
be agreed to. Consent should not be given to any such division, 
however, until all efforts to restore harmony had proved
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utterly unavailing. Slavery should also be abolished and
steps taken to incorporate the former slaves of the Territory
into the tribes on a completely equal footing. The Indians
were also to be informed that the sums expended on refugee
relief would not be refunded, and those tribes with funds
invested in Southern state bonds should consent to the sale
of this paper and the reinvestment of the proceeds in United
States bonds.
As to the number of treaties to be negotiated the
secretary granted the commissioners substantial latitude. If
they found it necessary to make a general treaty with all the
tribes at the council, they were authorized to do so. If, on
the other hand, circumstances dictated that they treat
separately with one or more tribes, they might do that also.
But Harlan did insist on one thing:
In every treaty which you may negotiate, the 
Indian parties thereto should expressly agree 
that any amendment thereof, which the Senate 
of the United States may make, shall be taken 
and held to be a part of the same, and as 
binding in every respect as if it had, after 
being made, been formally submitted to and 
ratified by such parties.34
Shortly after the receipt of this rambling document, 
the Federal commissioners, with the exception of General 
Ramey, left Washington. Harney at the time of his appointment 
was at home in St. Louis, and he traveled to Fort Smith 
independently of the others. Within a few days Cooley and his
^^Harlan to Cooley, August 16, 1865, ibid,
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companions reached Leavenworth, Kansas, from which point a
telegram was sent to Harlan on August 24. The commissioners
asked the secretary of the interior whether they should make
the opening statements at the upcoming council, or were they
merely to state that they were there to hear what the Indian
delegates had to say. That same day by return wire Harlan
informed his emissaries that they were to be governed by the
circumstances they encountered. He suggested, however, that
they begin by making an opening statement to the effect that
the President was willing to grant the Indians of the Territory
peace, but he wanted land for the settlement of other Indians
and a civil government for the entire Territory.
With the secretary's communication in hand the
commissioners moved on to Fort Scott, then to Fort Gibson and
finally Fort Smith, reaching the latter point on September 5.
In traveling from Leavenworth to the council site, Cooley and
his associates rode in wagons and ambulances provided by army
officials in the West and were accompanied by a 100 man cavalry 
"idescort.
35Fort Smith New Era, September 2, 1865, p. 2: W. S. Harney to James Harlan, August 14, 1865, R.G. 48, N.Â., Letters Received Miscellaneous: D. N. Cooley to Harlan, August 24, 1865. ibid., Letters Received; Harlan to Cooley, August 24, 1865, 
Letters Sent, Indian Division, Secretary of Interior, N.A., 
Microcopy 606, Roll 5.
36cyrus Busey to D. N. Cooley, August 25, 1865, and 
undated, unsigned notation in Documents Relating to the 
Negotiation of an Unratified Treaty of September 13, 1865, with 
the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Osage, Seminole,
Seneca, Shawnee, and Quapaw Indians, Unratified Treaty File, 
N.A., Microcopy T-494, Roll 8.
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The Federal government's representatives were not the 
only ones making the sojourn from Kansas to Fort Smith. News 
of the government's coming confrontation with the tribes of 
the Indian Territory, a confrontation aimed at reducing the 
Indian population of Kansas, had spread rapidly, creating 
excitement in all areas of the state, especially in fledgling 
railroad centers such as Leavenworth and Lawrence. Chief 
among the rumor mongers were Kansas newspapers, some of which 
claimed that 50,000 Indians were expected at the council.
One Kansan, William Weer, leader of the abortive raid of 1862 
wrote his congressman saying: "Treaties will be made--railroad 
grants fixed up and things done generally." Spurred on by the 
lure of new lands and easy profits, prospective entrepreneurs 
along with assorted charlatans and camp followers preceded, 
followed and quite possibly even accompanied the Federal 
representatives bound for Fort Smith. By the time the conference 
opened, the local press reported that the town was a teeming 
conglomeration of red, white and black humanity.
The first session of the Fort Smith council began at 
10:30 on the morning of Friday, September 8. Sitting in the
37weer to Sidney Clark, July 26, 1865, Letters Received 
By the Office of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency,
N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 836; Fort Smith New Era, September 9, 
1865, p. 2. Whenever possible, the following account of the 
Fort Smith meeting will be based on notes compiled by Charles 
E. Mix, Chief Clerk of the Indian Bureau who acted as the 
council's secretary. This unorganized, oftimes illegible 
material is found with the copies of the Fort Smith treaty in 
the Unratified Treaty Files of the National Archives and will 
be cited as Daily Proceedings, Documents, U.T.F., N.A., 
Microcopy T-494, Roll 8.
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presiding officer's chair, in a council room provided by army 
officials at the military post. Commissioner Cooley confronted 
representatives from the loyal Cherokees, Creeks, Seminoles, 
Choctaws and Chickasaws as well as delegates from the Osages 
Cowskin Senecas, Senecas and Shawnees, Wyandotts and Quapaws. 
Also present were agents G. C. Snow of the Osages, George A. 
Reynolds of the Seminoles, Isaac Coleman of the Choctaws and 
Chickasaws, Justin Harlan of the Cherokees, J. W. Dunn of the 
Creeks, Milo Gookins of the Wichitas and J. B. Abbott of the 
Shawnees. To the south, representatives from the rebel factions 
of the tribes of the Indian Territory had assembled briefly 
on September 6 at Armstrong Academy, only to adjourn immediately; 
but none had as yet reached Fort Smith.^8
Following a prayer in the Cherokee tongue by that 
tribe's acting principal chief Lewis Downing, Commissioner 
Cooley delivered his opening remarks. As if any reminder were 
needed, Cooley pointed out that portions of several tribes had 
aligned with the government's enemies and had waged war on the 
United States and its loyal Indian allies. "All such," he 
said, "have rightfully forfeited all annuities and interests in 
the lands in the Indian Territory." The President, he added, 
was "deeply pained" by the actions of those who had "violated 
their plighted faith and treaty obligations. . . . "  But after
^^Daily Proceedings, September 8, 1865, Documents, 
U.T.F., N.A., Microcopy T-494, Roll 8; Ira G. Clark, "Attempts 
to Form an Indian Confederation in 0klahoma--1860-1890," 
(Unpublished M.A. thesis. University of Oklahoma, 1937), p. 56
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subduing in battle those who had caused the rebellion he was
now willing "to hear his erring children in extenuation of
their great crime." Upon learning of the Indians' desire to
renew their allegiance to the United States the President had
authorized his commissioners to make new treaties with the
tribes who wanted peace among themselves and with the Federal
government. And further:
He directs us to say to those who remain true, 
and who have aided him in punishing the rebels, 
he is well pleased with you, and your rights 
and interests will be protected by the United 
States.39
His discourse concluded, Cooley threw the floor open 
to replies from the Indian delegates. The spokesmen of those 
present asserted that since they had learned of the exact 
purpose of this council only since their arrival at Fort 
Smith they needed time for the preparation of answers to the 
commissioner's remarks. The decision was then made to adjourn 
until 4:30 that afternoon, by which time Cooley asked that the 
delegates be prepared to show their credentials. He also 
requested that each delegation, before the beginning of the 
afternoon session, choose a number, not exceeding five, 
authorized to speak for their tribe and sign treaties.^®
The afternoon's activities began with a brief address 
by Smith Christie of the loyal Cherokees. Christie expressed
3^Daily Proceeding, September 8, 1865, Documents, 
U.T.F., N.A., Microcopy T-494, Roll 8.
40ibid.
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pleasure at having the opportunity to meet with the Federal 
commissioners and gratitude for the kind words expressed 
earlier toward the Indians who had remained loyal to the United 
States. He insisted, however, that he and his fellow Cherokee 
delegates had no authority to make a treaty or enter into any 
arrangement of any kind with the United States or any other 
tribe of Indians. They were told by their principal chief, John 
Ross, that a grand council would convene at Fort Smith, but 
since they received no information concerning the object of 
this meeting they had arrived without specific instructions 
from their people. But they would gladly report to their 
National Council whatever subjects the Federal commissioners 
laid before them.^^
The spokesmen of the other tribes of the Indian Terri­
tory expressed similar sentiments. Mikko Hutkey of the Creeks 
declared that his people believed that the council was called 
for the sole purpose of re-establishing ties with their 
brothers who had joined the South. Hutkey*s remarks were 
seconded by Pascota of the Seminoles who declared that he and 
his fellow delegates had come for the same purpose and were not 
prepared to do business as their "friends of the South" were 
not present. Robert B. Patton insisted that the only aim of 
the 212 loyal Choctaws whom he represented was to get possession 
of their former homes, while Robert Lewis of the loyal Chickasaws
41Ibid.
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stated simply that his people would be willing "to do whatever 
the rest do." After the conclusion of these rather cursory, 
non-committal responses, Cooley adjourned the council for the 
day promising to make on Saturday a complete statement of the 
wishes and intentions of the government.
By the time the council reconvened at 10:45 the next 
morning, Cooley had distilled Harlan’s rambling set of 
instructions into seven basic demands. The commissioner began 
his discourse by reeling off the names of the tribes that had 
aligned with the South and the dates of the treaties signed 
with Albert Pike. These actions, he said, along with the 
suppression of the rebellion left these tribes without any 
treaties or guarantee of protection by the United States. 
Furthermore, under the terms of the law of July 5, 1862 those 
who had joined the South could lose all their rights to 
annuities and lands if the President chose to exercise the 
authority delegated to him. But the President was not anxious 
to enforce these penalties; he desired instead to renew the 
relations which existed at the outbreak of the war, and his 
commissioners were now prepared to propose definite terms upon 
which normal ties could be re-established. Each tribe must 
enter into a treaty for permanent peace and amity amongst 
themselves and "with each nation and tribe" and the United 
States; the tribes of the Indian Territory must pledge to aid
42lbid.
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the United States when called upon in compelling the plains 
Indians to maintain peace with each other, the tribes of the 
Territory and the Federal government; slavery must be abolished 
immediately and steps taken for the adequate care of the former 
slaves, preferably by their incorporation into the tribes on 
a basis of complete quality; the treaties must stipulate 
specifically that slavery or involuntary servitude would never 
again exist in any tribe except in punishment of crime; lands 
must be set aside for the resettlement of friendly tribes from 
Kansas and elsewhere on terms to be set by the parties concerned 
or by the United States; the tribes of the Territory must be 
formed into a consolidated government similar to the one 
outlined in the recently passed Harlan Bill; finally no white 
persons except officers, agents and employees of the United 
States, and employees of internal improvements authorized by 
the Federal government, could reside in the Territory unless 
they were incorporated into some tribe according to that tribe's 
normal usages.
His terms enunciated, Cooley again assured the tribesmen 
present that those who had always been loyal to the United 
States would receive liberal treatment even though their 
governments might have joined the enemy. After Mikko Hutkey 
stated that he and his brothers would have replies ready by 
Monday, the council adjourned at 1:15 in the afternoon.^3
43Ibid.
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The Southern delegates, contrary to expectations, had
not arrived by Monday. Thus the third and fourth days of the
council, Monday and Tuesday, September 11 and 12, were devoted
to the tribal replies to Cooley's seven demands. The hig&
point of these two days was the exchange between the Cherokee
delegation and the commissioner of Indian affairs, the council's
first bloodletting. On Monday, H. D. Reese of the Cherokee
delegation read a lengthy paper defending the tribe's course
in 1861. The thing that bothered them most was Cooley's
assertion that the tribes that had aligned themselves with the
South had forfeited all lands, annuities and protection. To
any charges of treason, said Reese, his people pleaded not
guilty, and he attempted to shift the onus of their action on
to the United States.
. . . if, through the dire necessities of the 
times, we were compelled to commit an overt 
act, in which our only object was to gain time 
and to save the lives of ourselves and 
families, the sin does not lie at our door.
Every treaty, he continued, signed by the Cherokees since the
Treaty of Hopewell in 1785 contained guarantees of United
States' protection. With this protection withdrawn in 1861
the Cherokees were forced to join the South to avoid annihilation.
But they took this step with the firm intention of flying to
"their Father's home" at the first opportunity.^^
Cooley, in behalf of the Federal commissioners, read
^^Commissioner's Report, 1865, pp. 506-07.
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a tart statement of reply on Tuesday. The commissioner of
Indian affairs denied that he had said that the forfeitures
provided for in the act of July 5, 1862 were an accomplished
fact. The Federal government's representatives had only stated
what were the legitimate, legal consequences of treason,
consequences which the President did not desire to enforce.
Then quoting at length from the documents provided by Secretary
Harlan, he asserted that John Ross' statements and actions in
1861 seemed to indicate that a Confederate alliance was something
much desired by the principal chief, and voluntarily entered
into by the Cherokee people. That hundreds, perhaps thousands
of the Cherokees never assented in their hearts to the Pike
treaty, the Federal commissioners believed, and their deeds of
valor in defense of "the old flag" merited praise and honor.
But while John Ross is the principal chief of 
the Cherokee nation, and the treaty made by him 
and the nation with those in rebellion . . .  is 
not repudiated and a new treaty made with the 
United States . . . you, as a nation, are 
legally, morally, and of right ought to be, as 
you are, subject to the will and pleasure of 
the President. . . .45
The remaining records of the Fort Smith Council do not 
indicate if Cooley's statement had to be translated into the 
Cherokee tongue. If so, probably nothing was lost in the 
translation. The meaning was clear. While other Cherokees 
might legitimately claim to have acted under duress in 1861,
^^Daily Proceedings, September 12, 1865, Documents, 
U.T.F., N.A., Microcopy T-494, Roll 8.
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Ross, the living symbol of the solidarity of the conservative, 
full-blood Cherokees and their opposition to Federal goals, 
was an unrepentant rebel. And if the Cherokees hoped to escape 
the dire consequences of their past actions, Ross' leadership, 
along with the Pike treaty, must be repudiated.
Wednesday, September 13, the fifth day of the conference, 
witnessed the introduction of a proposed treaty of peace and 
amity which the Federal commissioners had begun drafting the 
preceding weekend. Under its provisions the Five Civilized 
Tribes along with the Osages, Senecas, Senecas and Shawnees, 
and Quapaws were to acknowledge the United States' exclusive 
jurisdiction over them, promise not to enter into any alliance 
with any other sovereign power and repudiate any past actions 
in which they renounced their allegiance to the Federal 
government. In return the United States promised to re-estab­
lish peace and friendship with all tribes within "the so-called 
Indian country," provide them ample protection and "arrange 
and settle all questions relating and growing out of former 
treaties" either at this council or some future one.^G This 
last proviso, implying the need for a future council, reflected 
the Federal commissioners' growing awareness of the apparent 
impossibility of settling all pending questions at Fort Smith.
Cooley and his associates affixed their signatures to 
this document on Tuesday the fourteenth. With two exceptions.
^^Daily Proceedings, September 13, 1865, ibid.
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the delegations from the tribes of the Territory followed 
suit. The loyal Choctaws, for reasons not explained, did not 
sign at this time but did so before the final adjournment on 
September 21. The Cherokees likewise abstained. In behalf of 
his charges. Agent Justin Harlan submitted a statement to the 
effect that illness prevented the attendance of part of the 
delegation at this session, and those Cherokees present in the 
council room did not choose to sign without their brothers.
The Cherokee delegation appeared on Friday, September 
15 with a concise, emphatic note of protest. Quite possibly 
this statement was the handiwork of John Ross; certainly its 
spirit was in harmony with his. Early in August the aging, 
enfeebled principal chief made his way westward through 
Arkansas to his w a r t o m  country. For several weeks he stayed 
with old friends before wearily making his way to Fort Smith, 
arriving several days after the council opened. He seems not 
to have been an official delegate, but he was the backbone of 
loyal Cherokee resistance to Federal d e m a n d s . 48
The Cherokee statement was presented to the council by 
H. D. Reese. He prefaced his reading of this declaration by 
stating that his people were prepared to sign the treaty of 
peace and amity, but they were not willing to concede any
47oaily Proceedings, September 14, 1865, ibid.
48john Ross to Sister Sarah, August 3, 1865, John Ross 
MSS, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa; Grace S. Woodward, The 
Cherokees (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 291
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forfeiture of any treaty rights, for they were not guilty 
of treason. Reese then read the statement in which the loyal 
Cherokees acknowledged the execution of the Pike treaty of 
October 7, 1861 but declared that the agreement was procured 
through the coercion of the rebel army. Commissioner Cooley 
next mumbled something about not wanting any name signed in 
protest, but after a brief consultation the Federal repre­
sentatives agreed to permit the Cherokees to add their signa­
tures to the document. This task done, an adjournment was 
called until two that afternoon when some of the Southern
49delegates from Armstrong Academy were expected to appear.
One of the first of the Armstrong Academy coterie to
reach Fort Smith was Governor Winchester Colbert of the
Chickasaws who arrived on September 13. The governor told 
Cooley and his associates that a large group representing those 
Indians who had fought with the South was on its way, and on 
the fifteenth several hundred delegates and hangers-on from 
Armstrong Academy reached the council site.^^
For the Cherokees, the arrival of these people marked
the second time that wartime adversaries had encountered one
another since the May surrender. In mid-July, at the suggestion 
of the Southern Cherokees, delegates from the two factions met 
each other near Fort Gibson in an effort to re-establish some
49commissioner's Report, 1865, p. 519.
SOjohn B. Garrett to James Harlan, September 13, 1865, 
R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous; Fort Smith Weekly 
News, September 16, 1865, p. 2.
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semblance of tribal u n i t y . T h e  meeting ended in failure, 
however, apparently because the Union Cherokees would not 
promise an immediate repeal of laws passed in 1863 by the 
National Council confiscating the property of those tribesmen 
fighting for the Confederacy. Thus the Southern Cherokee 
delegates reached Fort Smith convinced that their people's 
welfare could be protected only by dividing the Cherokee domain 
between the hostile parties.
As had occurred so often in the past, Indian dissensions 
worked to the advantage of the white man. Cooley was deter­
mined to break Cherokee resistance to his demands by deposing 
Ross, for as he admitted in a wire to Secretary Harlan, the 
Cherokee chieftan was "in our way. The rebel Cherokees, 
their memories of their embittered past undimmed, willingly 
cooperated in this endeavor, making possible the establishment 
of a strange alliance between the commissioner of Indian 
affairs and those individuals who had fought with the South 
throughout the war. The rebel Cherokees worked with Cooley 
in trying to discredit Ross, and the commissioner aided the 
rebels in regaining a foothold in their country.
The Federal commissioners' open denunciation of Ross 
came at the afternoon session of the council on Friday,
^^Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Vol. 251, np, nd, p. 36, 
Indian Records Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma 
City.
^^Cooley to Harlan, September 16, [?] 1865, R.G. 48, 
N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous.
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September 15. In a formal statement read to the assembled 
delegates by Cooley, the United States' representatives 
bitterly attacked Ross for alleged sins of both the past and 
present. He had, by means of "his superior education and 
ability . . . induced many of his people to abjure their 
allegiance to the United States and to join the states in 
rebellion. . . . "  Now by virture of his position as "pretended 
first chief of the Cherokees" he was exercising "an influence 
in his nation and at this council adverse to the wishes and 
interests of all loyal and true Indians. . . . "  Therefore, 
the Federal commissioners, convinced that Ross was not the 
choice of "any considerable portion" of his tribe and did not 
in fact legally hold the position of principal chief, announced 
their refusal "in any way or manner" to recognize the long­
time Cherokee leader as chief of his nation. John Ross was 
present in the council room for the reading of this document, 
and after what the official secretary of the proceedings called 
"a short calloquy" involving Ross, Cooley and rebel Cherokee 
leader E. C. Boudinot, the council a d j o u r n e d . ^3
The eighth day of the proceedings, Saturday, September 
16 revealed that the views of Cooley and his Southern Cherokee 
allies were not completely harmonious. In the early stages of 
the council, the loyal Indians had expressed serious misgivings
53The original handwritten copy of this statement can 
be found in Documents. U.T.F., N.A., Microcopy T-494, Roll 8; 
Also see Commissioner s Report, 1865, p. 519.
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about the Negro question. They indicated their readiness to 
make adequate provisions for their former slaves and free 
persons of color living in their tribes at the outbreak of the 
war. But they did not want the Indian Territory to become a 
dumping ground for former slaves from surrounding Southern 
states. Similarly, the Southern Cherokees in their statement 
presented by E. C. Boudinot stated their desire to deal fairly 
with their former slaves but protested against their incor­
poration into the tribe on a basis of complete equality. In 
addition serious objections were expressed to the establishment 
of a consolidated territorial government. In the light of 
the different tastes, customs and levels of development that 
prevailed in the Territory, such a step might produce "inex­
plicable confusion." They announced their willingness, however, 
to study the plan recently proposed in the United States 
Senate. Finally, the Southern Cherokees confessed that they 
could see no way in which future peace could be maintained in 
the land other than through an equitable division of the 
Cherokee domain between the tribe's rival f a c t i o n s . 54
The delivery of these remarks was followed by another 
exchange between the rival Cherokees. In this instance 
Boudinot was arrayed against John Ross and his nephew William 
P. Ross. The official records of the proceedings give no
54paily Proceedings, September 9 and 16, 1865, Documents, 
U.T.F., N.A., Microcopy T-494, Roll 8.
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clue as to what was said but the words undoubtedly were 
barbed. Cooley intervened and brought the discussion to a 
close when he announced that the Ross faction would be 
permitted to submit a statement to the council on Monday
morning.55
In the final four sessions of the Fort Smith Council, 
Monday through Thursday, September 18 through 21, there was 
much activity, but nothing of any real substance was accom­
plished. The loyal Cherokees on Monday presented an elaborate 
defense of John Ross, asserting that he was chief both in law 
and in fact, having been elected for a four-year term by his 
compatriots in August, 1863. But their rhetoric was for 
naught. Having received a telegram from Washington stating 
that both Harlan and President Johnson approved their stand 
with regard to Ross, the Federal commissioners refused to 
recede from the position taken the preceding Friday. This 
exchange of views was accompanied by the appointment of two, 
five-man committees representing the rival Cherokee factions. 
Their goal was to settle the tribe's domestic affairs, but on 
the question of property confiscation their talks again 
faltered and collapsed. Meanwhile, outside the council room 
Ely Parker met with the rebel Choctaws and Chickasaws, who 
represented the overwhelming majorities in both their tribes, 
in an effort to draft a treaty settling all questions growing out 
of the war. The complex issues to be resolved, however, defied
55oaily Proceedings, September 16, 1865, ibid.
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an immediate solution, and these talks, too, foundered.
When this effort to negotiate a final treaty with the 
most united of the tribes failed, the seemingly endless council 
was brought to an end on the afternoon of September 21. 
Commissioner Cooley made some final perfunctory, congratu­
latory remarks, after which he adjourned the council to meet 
again at the call of the secretary of the interior.^7
The Fort Smith proceedings concluded, the delegates 
of the Indian Territory tribes scattered to their homes to 
grapple with their domestic problems and prepare for their 
future talks with the United States. Cooley, on the other 
hand, headed eastward in high spirits carrying the treaty of 
peace and amity signed by all factions of the tribes of the
c QTerritory. He had not achieved all that he had hoped for 
at Fort Smith, but that mattered little. Knowing that the 
tribesmen he had faced at the conference table were both 
powerless and divided, the commissioner realized that the 
United States would soon get everything that it wanted from 
the inhabitants of the Indian Territory.
56d. N. Cooley et £l to James Harlan, September 16, 
1865, and Harlan to C o ^ e y  et al> September 17, 1865, R.G. 
48, N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous; Commissioner* s 
Report. 1865, pp. 525-37.
57lbid., p. 537.
SBo. N. Cooley to James Harlan, September 21, 1865, 
R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received Miscellaneous.
CHAPTE?. XI 
THE TREATIES OF 1866
Other than familiarizing the tribes present with the 
demands and expectations of the United States, the Fort Smith 
Council accomplished nothing important. The treaty of peace 
and amity, in which the Indian delegates reaffirmed their 
tribes' allegiance and subservience to the United States, was 
so unimportant that the Johnson administration never 
submitted it to the Senate for ratification.^ Much more was 
expected by the United States than vows of friendship and 
goodwill, yet clearly the questions and issues at stake were 
of such magnitude that they could not be finalized at a 
hastily convened frontier council. Thus, before the final 
adjournment at Fort Smith on September 21, an unwritten 
agreement was reached that the tribes of the Indian Terri­
tory would send delegates to Washington to negotiate treaties 
settling all questions growing out of the war as well as those
^This conclusion is based on the fact that in all the 
papers of the Fort Smith Council found with this treaty in 
the Unratified Treaty File in the National Archives, there is 




pending at the outbreak of the conflict.^
This decision, in turn, created another problem-- 
that of deciding who would represent the tribes at the 
Washington negotiations. Would the delegations be made up 
solely of those Indians who had fought with the United States, 
or would they be composed of representatives of both the loyal 
and rebel Indians? Or would each faction within each tribe 
send a separate delegation?
The United States did nothing to clarify this particular 
issue. Indeed, the treatment meted out to the Cherokees at 
Fort Smith by Cooley and his associates had the effect of 
blurring the distinction between loyal and disloyal tribesmen. 
Left to their own devices, therefore, the Civilized Tribes of 
the Indian Territory wrestled with this question, with mixed 
results.
With the exception of a mere handful of people, the 
Choctaws and Chickasaws to a man supported the Confederate 
war effort. After the conclusion of hostilities in 1865, the 
rebel majorities in both these tribes dominated the re-estab­
lishment of treaty relations with the United States, with no 
real opposition from the loyal tribesmen. At the Fort Smith 
Council the loyal Choctaw and Chickasaw delegates never claimed 
to represent the dominant factions of their tribes. They
^Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
for the Year 1866, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., 1867 
(Serial 1284), p. 8 (hereafter cited as Commissioner's Report, 
1866).
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admitted that they were present only to protect the property 
interests of their people, and in the later negotiations in 
Washington they asked only that these interests not be
3forgotten.
The other tribes spoke with less unanimity in Washington. 
Despite their past differences the rival Creek factions managed 
to reoccupy their country with a minimum amount of dissension. 
Families and friends long separated by the war embraced one 
another and vasted little energy in recriminations, and at the 
beginning of 1866 Agent J. W. Dunn reported that all was quiet 
and orderly in the Creek Nation. This orderliness, however, 
did not extend into the political arena. The loyal Creeks 
sent a delegation to Washington composed of Chief Sands, Coweta 
Micco, and Cotchoche, while the Southern faction, fearing that 
their rivals might make inordinate concessions to the Federal 
government, sent D. N. McIntosh and James M. C. Smith to the 
capital city. But in issuing instructions to these two men, 
rebel Creek Chief Samuel Checote urged them to lay past 
differences aside and cooperate if possible with the Union dele­
gates in promoting the best interests of all the Creek people.^
Robert B. Patton et al to The Treaty Commissioners of 
the United States, January 8, 1866 and Susan Cooper et al to 
James Harlan, April 10, 1866, Letters Received by the oTfice of 
Indian Affairs, Choctaw Agency, National Archives, Microcopy 
234, Roll 176.
4 j .  w. Dunn to Elijah Sells, January 5 , 1866, and 
Samuel Checote to D. N. McIntosh and James M. C. Smith,
January 18, 1866,-Letters Received, O..I.A., Creek Agency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 231; Angie Debo, The Road to Disappearance 
(Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 194TJ, pp. 170-71.
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Far less harmonious were the affairs of the Cherokees. 
Four years of internecine war had done nothing to heal the 
cleavages within the tribe, and the one feeble attempt in 
July, 1865 to establish some sort of tribal unity failed over 
the issue of confiscation. On October 24, 1863 the National 
Council enacted a measure barring rebel Cherokees from 
collecting debts owed to them either by the tribal government 
or the loyal members of the tribe. The law in addition 
provided that loyal Cherokees having financial claims against 
rebel tribesmen could satisfy their claims by selling the 
property of those from whom debts were owed. On July 13, 1865 
the National Council passed a further enactment providing a 
full pardon, with some listed exceptions, to those rebel 
Cherokees who would take an oath of allegiance to support and 
defend the tribe's constitution, but nothing was said about 
repealing the Confiscation Act of 1863.^
At the July meeting, the loyal Cherokee representatives 
refused to make any specific promises about the confiscation 
issue beyond agreeing to bring the question to the attention 
of the National Council. To the rebel Cherokees who wanted a 
definite pledge that the noxious measure of 1863 would be 
repealed, this was not enough. Thus the two rival factions.
Laws of the Cherokee Nation, Vol. 251, np, nd, p. 19; 
Indian Records Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma 
City (hereafter cited as Cherokee Laws, Vol 251); see also 
the Proclamation of July 14, 1865 issued by Acting Principal 
Chief Lewis Downing, Letters Received, O.I.A., Cherokee Agency, 
N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 100.
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as bitterly divided as ever, were represented by separate 
delegations at Fort Smith and later at Washington. On 
November 3, 1865 the National Council designated Smith Christie, 
White Catcher, Daniel H. Ross, Houston Benge, John B. Jones, 
James McDaniel and Thomas Pegg as the individuals who would 
represent the tribe in the coming negotiations in Washington.
In a companion measure passed four days later, the Council 
requested and authorized John Ross to cooperate with the 
delegation. The Southern Cherokee delegation was appointed 
by Stand Watie, the principal chief of the rebel faction, and 
was made up of Watie and his son Saladin, William Penn Adair,
J, A. Scales, E. C. Boudinot and John Rollin Ridge.^
Among the Seminoles, the situation was similar, but 
the feelings of antipathy were not as extreme. Following the 
conclusion of the Fort Smith Council, the rebel and loyal 
Seminole leaders met together on several occasions, but they 
settled nothing. The rebels, on their part, claimed that 
their signing of the treaty of peace and amity had absolved 
them of all wrongdoing and restored them to all their former 
rights. In contrast, the Union Seminoles maintained that 
their disloyal bretheren must assume a subservient position by.
^Cherokee Laws, Vol. 251, pp. 43-44; Annual Report of 
the Commissioner o£ Indian Affairs for the Year 1865, H. Ex. 
Doc. No. 1, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 1Ô66 (Serial 1248), p. 523; 
Lois E. Forde, "Elias Cornelius Boudinot" (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1951), p. 121; Gaston L. 
Litton, "The Principal Chiefs of the Cherokee Nation," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XV (193 7), p. 264.
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among other things, recognizing the loyal leader John Chupco 
as chief. Unwilling to accept these terms, the rebels sent 
one of their Fort Smith representatives, John Brown, to 
Washington to defend their interests while the Union faction 
was represented by Chupco, Cho-cote-harjo and Fos-har-jo.^
Typically, the United States did not wait to finalize 
its relations with the Civilized Tribes before negotiating 
treaties with other tribes affecting the future of the Indian 
Territory. In response to the demands of land-hungry 
Westerners several pacts were concluded in the fall of 1865 
looking toward the removal and resettlement of a number of 
the nomadic tribes within the confines of the Indian Territory.
The first to come to terms were the Osages. While 
Cooley and his fellow commissioners labored at Fort Smith, 
Brevet Major General John B. Sanborn held a series of talks 
with Osage leaders at the tribe's council ground in Kansas 
near present-day Wichita. Southern Superintendent Elijah 
Sells appeared on the scene on September 28, after the breakup 
of the Fort Smith Council, and on September 29 the tribe came 
to terms with the Federal negotiators. Under the provisions 
of the September treaty, the Osages sold outright or ceded in 
trust to the United States a total of almost four million acres
George A. Reynolds to Sir [Elijah Sells?], December 
5, 1865, Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, 
N.A. , Microcopy 234, Roll 836; John Chupco e_t £l to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 30, 1866, and statement 
signed by John Jumper ejt £l, December 19, 1865, ibid. , Seminole 
Agency, Microcopy 234, Roll 803.
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of land in Kansas. Within six months after the signing of 
this agreement the tribe was to abandon the relinquished lands 
and concentrate itself on its diminished reservation. If at 
some future time the tribe agreed to leave the state entirely, 
this diminished reserve, too, would be sold, with one-half the 
proceeds being used to purchase a new tribal home within the
QIndian Territory.
The following month additional pacts were negotiated, 
beginning with a treaty with the Cheyenne and Arapaho signed 
on October 14 at a parley held near the mouth of the Little 
Arkansas River. Under the terms of this agreement the two 
tribes relinquished their lands in the Colorado Territory and 
agreed to settle on a new reservation located between the 
Arkansas and Cimarron rivers, lands lying within the western 
portion of the Cherokee domain. The United States' commis­
sioners who negotiated this agreement--John B. Sanborn,
William S. Harney, Thomas Murphy, Kit Carson, William W. Bent, 
Jesse H. Leavenworth and James Steele--affixed their signatures 
four days later to a similar pact with the Comanche and Kiowas. 
In this instance these tribes agreed to confine their wanderings 
to an extensive reservation lying between the Red and Cimarron 
rivers and running westward from the ninety-eighth meridian to
Elijah Sells to D. N. Cooley, October 2, 1865, R.G.
48, N.A., Letters Received; Comerssioner's Report, 1866, p.
4; Charles J. Kappler (ed.),"Indian Affairs. ^ w s  and Treaties, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), II, pp. 673-76 
(hereafter cited as Kappler, Laws and Treaties, II).
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Qthe eastern boundary of the New Mexico Territory.
The execution of these treaties proved to be no simple 
task, but their negotiation was a relatively easy, uncompli­
cated matter compared to the Federal government's effort to 
come to terms with the Civilized Tribes of the Indian Terri­
tory. As the new year 1866 began, delegates from these tribes 
began arriving in Washington, and for several months the 
corridors of the Interior Department building echoed the 
comings and goings of these people as they anxiously tried to 
re-establish normal treaty ties with the United States.
In addition to the seven points delineated by Cooley 
at Fort Smith, there were other issues at stake which needed 
to be settled at the Washington negotiations. For example, 
relations between the loyal and disloyal Cherokees and 
Seminoles, if possible, must be made more harmonious. At 
the same time those individuals in all tribes who had remained 
loyal to the United States must be compensated in some manner 
for property destroyed by hostile forces during the war. And 
finally, there was the railroad question.
This particular issue had been mentioned at Fort 
Smith, but only obliquely. In listing his demands. Commissioner 
Cooley stipulated in his seventh point that:
No white person except officers, agents and 
employees of the government, or of any internal 
improvement authorized by the government will
^Commissioner* s Report, 1866, pp. 2-3; Kappler, Laws 
and Treaties, II, pp. 679-85.
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be permitted to reside in the territory. . .
In the tumultuous, confusing and lengthy proceedings which
followed, the railroad question was ignored and was not 
discussed within the confines of the council room. Indeed, 
in the light of what appeared to be vastly more pressing 
issues, the assembled Indian delegates possibly did not grasp 
the implications of Cooley's seventh point. Nonetheless, his 
passing, inferential reference to the topic indicated that 
the Federal government was thinking in terms stitching the 
trackless expanses of the Indian Territory with iron rails.
Certainly the idea was not new. In 1853-54 Lieutenant 
A. W. Whipple, at the behest of Secretary of War Jefferson 
Davis, explored the possibilities of constructing a trans­
continental railroad line along the thirty-fifth parallel from 
Fort Smith to the Pacific, a route that bisected the Indian 
Territory. Slightly later Kansas settlers and politicians 
began talking in terms of promoting the wealth of their 
state-to-be through the construction of a north-south railroad 
linking the farmlands of the Kansas-Missouri area with the 
seaport markets of the Gulf Coast. A line of this type, too, 
almost inevitably would cross the Indian Territory, and 
Article XVlll of the Choctaw-Chickasaw treaty of 1855 provided 
for the construction of railroad and telegraph lines through 
the Choctaw and Chickasaw domains either by the United States
^^Commissioner*s Report, 1865, p. 483 (italics added).
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or private corporations.^^
Nothing was done before the outbreak of the Civil 
War to bring an Indian Territory railroad into fruition, but 
the scheme was not forgotten. In point of fact, the 
hostilities quite possibly increased interest in the construction 
of a more extensive railroad network in the Southwest by demon­
strating the need for a more efficient and rapid method of 
transporting troops and supplies. During the course of the 
war, James H. Lane engineered the passage of a measure in 
March, 1863 granting Federal lands to his adopted state to 
aid in the construction of two lines. One of these was to 
run westward from Topeka toward Sante Fe, New Mexico, while the 
other was to be a north-south line originating in Leavenworth 
and extending southward toward Galveston Bay. In an act 
passed by the Kansas legislature on February 9, 1864 these 
Federal grants were formally accepted and the construction 
rights conferred. The Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Company 
was awarded the east-west grant, and the Leavenworth, Lawrence 
and Fort Gibson Company, a firm in which Senator Lane had a 
financial stake, received authorization to begin the process
^^James D. Morrison, "Social History of the Choctaw" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 
1951), p. 103; V. V. Masterson, The Katy Railroad and the 
Last Frontier (Norman; University of Oklahoma Pre^ss, 1952), 
p. 3; W. Eugene Rollon, The Southwest Old and New (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 199; Kappler, Laws and Treaties, 
II, p. 535.
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12of linking Kansas to the markets lying to the south.
This measure was something of an anomoly. Congress 
had long since abandoned the practice of granting lands to the 
states to aid in railroad construction, preferring instead to 
make the grants directly to the companies involved. Yet 
Kansans were not satified by the measure. On numerous 
occasions their legislature appealed to Congress for 
additional and more generous assistance in expanding the 
state's railroad network, and the first session of the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress witnessed the introduction of four 
measures looking toward the extension of the Kansas railroad 
system across the Indian Territory. Also introduced was a 
bill to authorize the construction of a southern trans­
continental line from Missouri and Arkansas to the Pacific 
Coast via the Territory. Obviously with this much railroad- 
sponsored activity taking place in Congress, the railroad
question would be an important part of the Washington
13negotiations of 1866.
1 9Statutes at Large, XII, pp. 772-74; Walter A. Johnson, 
"Brief History of tKe Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Lines," 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXIV (1946), p. 342; Wendall H. 
Stephenson,""The Political Career of General James H. Lane," 
Publications of the Kansas State Historical Society. Ill (1930), 
pT 150 (hereaTter cited as Stephenson, "Lane." P.K.S.H.S.. Ill).
l^Stephenson, "Lane," P.K.S.H.S.. Ill, p. 150; H. Mis. 
Doc. No. 51, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., 1864 (Serial 1200); S. Mis.
Docs. Nos. 29, 30, 63, 38 Cong., 1 Sess., 1864 (Serial 1177);
S. Mis. Doc. No. 25, 38 Cong., 2 Sess., 1865 (Serial 1210).
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The Seminoles were the first of the tribes of the 
Indian Territory to come to terms with Federal negotiators 
D. N. Cooley, Elijah Sells and Ely P a r k e r . A  weak, badly 
divided people living on poor, unproductive lands which they 
were anxious to abandon, the Seminoles were incapable of 
effectively resisting Federal demands. When the Northern 
Seminole delegation reached Washington in January, in child­
like simplicity and faith they addressed a letter to Cooley 
expressing their desire to enter into the new treaty relations 
and their confidence that their Great Father would deal with 
them justly. Exactly when Southern Seminole delegate John 
Brown reached the capital city is as unclear as the role he 
played in the talks. But in all probability his part was 
minimal. Because of the compliance of the regular delegation 
there was no need for the Federal commissioners to shuttle 
back and forth playing them off against Brown.
The Seminole treaty signed on March 21 by the loyal 
Seminole and Federal negotiators was a concise, uncluttered 
document of eleven articles. With the exception of the sharp 
real estate bargain driven by the United States, its provisions
D. N. Cooley to James Harlan, February 22, 1866, 
Letters Received, O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., 
Microcopy 234, Roll 837.
^^John Chupco et al to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, January 30, 186F7 Letters Received, O.I.A., Seminole 
Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 803; George A. Reynolds to 
"Sir" [Elijah Sells], December 5, 1865, Letters Received, 
O.I.A., Southern Superintendency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 
837.
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generally foreshadowed and paralleled those negotiated in 
1866 with the other Civilized Tribes. Beginning with the 
usual profession of peace and perpetual friendship between 
the contracting parties, the agreement granted amnesty to all 
individuals for any past offenses committed against either 
the Seminole or United States governments. In Article II 
slavery was formally abolished, and former slaves of the tribe 
and their descendants "and such other of the same race as 
shall be permitted by [the Seminole] nation to settle there" 
were granted all the rights of native citizens.
The most controversial portion by far of the treaty 
was Article III in which the tribe surrendered its former 
domain for one of vastly diminished size. The Seminoles 
agreed to cede to the United States the entire two million 
acre reservation acquired under their treaty of 1856. In 
return, they were to resettle to the east on a 200,000 acre 
tract lying between the Canadian River and its north fork in 
what had been the western portion of the Creek domain. The 
questionable feature of this transaction was the prices 
involved. The old Seminole reservation was to be sold to the 
United States for fifteen cents per acre. The Seminoles were 
to pay, however, fifty cents per acre for their new tract, 
land which the United States was in the process of buying from 
the Creeks for only thirty cents per acre. The purchase price 
of $100,000 for the new reservation was to be deducted from 
the $325,000 the tribe received for the sale of the old. An
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additional $50,000 would be taken out to compensate the loyal 
Seminoles for losses sustained during the war. For several 
years to come, this article of the treaty would cause much 
controversy, and for all their efforts United States officials 
were never able to satisfactorily explain why their government 
should turn a rather tidy profit in a land transaction 
negotiated with a defenseless people.
Provision was made for the expansion of the Southwest's 
transportation system in that portion of the pact in which the 
Seminoles granted a right of way through its lands to any 
railroad conçany duly authorized by Congress to construct a 
track from the eastern boundary of the tribe's domain to any 
point on either its southern or western boundary. In addition 
the Seminoles agreed to sell to the United States, or to the 
appropriately authorized company, land on each side of the 
track. The belt of lands sold on each side was not to exceed 
three miles in width, and the land was not to be reconveyed 
in any manner to any person not a member of the Seminole tribe.
In Article VII, the Seminoles consented to the estab­
lishment of a general council made.up of delegates elected 
from each tribe residing within the Indian Territory. The 
council would have the authority to legislate "upon all 
rightful subjects and matters pertaining to the intercourse 
and relations of the Indian tribes . . . resident in said 
Territory. . . ." Any of the council's enactments might be 
suspended either by the President or the secretary of the
326
interior, and no measures were to be passed inconsistent with 
the laws or Constitution of the United States or existing 
treaty stipulations between the tribes concerned and the United 
States. Council members were to receive four dollars per 
diem from the United States during council sessions, and the 
superintendent of the Southern Superintendency would preside 
over all such assemblies.
In the closing articles of the agreement the tribe 
accepted the stipulations of the treaty as a full settlement 
for all damages and losses incurred during the war and approved 
the wartime diversion of their tribal funds for refugee support. 
The United States, in turn, reassumed all past treaty obli­
gations except those inconsistent with the pact of March 21.^^
The signing of this proposed treaty prompted Southern 
Seminole delegate John Brown to take decisive steps. On March 
23 he entered into an agreement with one E. B. Grayson whereby 
the latter promised to work to prevent the ratification of the 
treaty. As compensation Grayson was to receive fifteen percent 
of whatever amount of money the Southern Seminoles might get 
under a new treaty. That same day Brown addressed a letter 
of protest to President Andrew Johnson complaining of the 
provisions of the proposed treaty signed two days earlier.
Among other things he insisted that the price received by the 
Seminoles for their ceded lands was too low while the amount
^^Kappler, Laws and Treaties, II, pp. 694-99.
327
paid for the new reservation to be acquired--a reservation in 
his opinion too small to meet the tribe's needs--was too high. 
The placing of former Seminole slaves on a basis of equality 
within the tribe and the use of the tribe's own funds to 
indemnify the loyal Seminoles for their wartime losses were 
points which also met with his disapproval.^^
Over a month passed before Superintendent Elijah Sells 
and Seminole Agent George A. Reynolds submitted a joint 
rebuttal to Brown's protest. In a statement dated April 26, 
the two replied point-by-point to each complaint leveled by 
the Southern Seminole representative. The tribe was receiving 
a small amount--fifteen cents per acre--for its ceded lands 
because they were among the worst in the Indian Territory. On 
the other hand, they saw nothing at all wrong with the fact 
that fifty cents per acre was to be paid for the new domain 
to be occupied by the tribe as these were the very best lands 
ceded by the Creeks in the treaty which they were presently 
negotiating. As to the Negro question. Sells and Reynolds 
insisted that the vast majority of the tribe's members favored 
equal rights for their former slaves. Furthermore the blacks 
were the most enterprising people in the Seminole Nation, and
1 John Brown to Andrew Johnson, March 23, 1866, Records 
of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, Indian 
Division, Record Group 48, National Archives, Letters Received. 
An undated copy of Brown's agreement with Grayson can be found 
in the Miscellaneous Indian Documents Collection--Seminole, 
Division of Manuscripts, Bizzell Library, University of 
Oklahoma, Norman.
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if placed in a position of equality, they could be of great 
assistance to the Indian in his "march toward civilization." 
Finally, the Southern Superintendent and the Seminole agent 
defended that portion of the treaty which authorized the use 
of tribal funds to reimburse the loyal Seminoles for the 
wartime destruction of their property. Not seeing, or perhaps 
ignoring, the irony of paying a man for his losses with his 
own money, they justified this feature of the treaty on the 
grounds that the Southern Seminoles had grabbed almost $30,000 
in tribal annuities at the outbreak of the war and, with the
assistance of other rebels, had destroyed much of the property
18of their brother Seminoles.
It is virtually impossible to shed any light on the
events which followed the drafting of this rebuttal. It is
certain that there were other exchanges between Brown and
Indian Bureau officials, but they must have been oral. The
records of the commissioner of Indian affairs and the secretary
of the interior contain no further letters from Brown after
his protest of March 23, nor did either Cooley or Harlan send
any missives to the Southern Seminole delegate. All that is
known is that the United States Senate ratified the Seminole
treaty on July 19, and sometime before that. Brown added his
19signature to those already on the document.
l^Elijah Sells and George A. Reynolds to D. N. Cooley, 
April 26, 1866, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received.
^^Commissioner's Report, 1866, p. 9.
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Almost one year later. Brown's Washington colleague 
E. B. Grayson charged that the sinister influences secured 
this reversal. In a letter written in May, 1867 Grayson, 
without being overly specific, claimed that certain speculators 
interested in the ratification of the original treaty pressured 
Brown into signing the document just as Grayson and his
associates were about to consumate a new and more favorable
^  20 pact.
Perhaps this assertion is true. Bribery and intimi­
dation had often played a role in Indian negotiations in the 
past, and it is not inconceivable that they were used in this 
instance. On the other hand, Grayson, angered by his failure 
to collect any recompense, might have exaggerated the results 
of his labors. In reality, perhaps the Federal negotiators 
simply held firmly to the original treaty stipulations and 
Brown, recognizing the inevitable, just gave up the struggle.
In contrast to the Seminole agreement, the Choctaw-
Chickasaw treaty was, by Commissioner Cooley's own admission,
21the most complete of the series. In many respects it was 
also the most generous. In the earlier Choctaw-Chickasaw 
negotiations at Fort Smith the United States commissioners
20e . B. Grayson to E. B. Johnson, May 10, 1867, 
Miscellaneous Indian Documents--Seminole, Division of Manu­
scripts, University of Oklahoma.
ZlCommissioner's Report, 1866, p. 9.
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attempted to extract rather harsh terms from the tribe's
representatives. As "a matter of humanity," the Federal
negotiators had not demanded the surrender of all tribal
rights and privileges. Instead they asked for the cession,
without compensation, of the Leased District, plus one-third
of the territory possessed by the two tribes east of the
ninety-eighth meridian. For this cession, the United States'
representatives offered an unspecified sum which tribal
leaders believed was "very inadequate." Also demanded was
the emancipation of all slaves and the making of suitable
provision for the welfare of these people, plus the forfeiture
of all funds accruing to the two tribes over the past five 
22years.
The Choctaw and Chickasaw delegates reached Washington 
in January, 1866 prepared, if necessary, to yield to most of 
these exacting terms. They were not willing to cede one-third 
of their lands east of the ninety-eighth meridian, nor were 
they anxious to accept a new demand made after their arrival 
in the capital city--the placing of their former slaves on a 
footing of complete equality with native and adopted tribal 
citizens. In the end, they made neither of these two conces­
sions. By early April, most of the points of disagreement had
Address by P. P. Pitchlynn, Principal Chief of the 
Choctaw Nation, and Winchester CoIFert, Governor of tHe 
Chickasaw Nation, to the Choctaws and Chickasaws. . . . 
(Washington; JosepE"L. Pearson, 1866), pp. 1-2. A copy of this 
document can be found in the Choctaw Nation Papers, Choctaw- 
Federal Relations, Section A, Indian Records Division,
Oklahoma Historical Society.
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been ironed out, and on the twenty-eighth of the month, a
9 0proposed treaty was signed.”
As in the case of the Seminoles, the Choc taw-Chickasaw 
treaty contained pledges of perpetual friendship between the 
contracting parties and amnesty was granted for all wartime 
offenses. The details for the establishment of an intertribal 
council were spelled out, and the two tribes agreed to allow 
any railroad company or companies properly authorized by 
Congress to construct both a north-south and an east-west 
line across their territories. As in the Seminole treaty, the 
United States reaffirmed all previous treaty stipulations 
except those inconsistent with the current agreement, but 
unlike the Seminoles, nowhere in their treaty did the Choctaws 
and Chickasaws specifically approve the diversion of tribal 
funds for the support of the refugee Indians. Elaborate 
provisions were contained providing, if the two tribes so 
desired, for the survey and division of tribal lands in 
severalty, with the United States paying the costs of the 
survey. While the tribes surrendered none of their lands east 
of the ninety-eighth meridian, they did agree to allow 
civilized Indians living north of the Indian Territory to 
settle in this area. But no more than 10,000 were to be 
resettled, one-fourth in the Chickasaw domain and three- 
fourths with the Choctaws.
23lbid.; John H. B. Latrobe to D. N. Cooley, April 4, 
1866, Letters Received, O.I.A., Choctaw Agency, N.A., Micro­
copy 234, Roll 176; Commissioner* s Report, 1866, p. 9.
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During the course of the negotiations the Leased 
District and Negro questions became intertwined, and they 
remained joined in the treaty of April 28. It was agreed 
that the two tribes would cede the Leased District to the 
United States for the sum of $300,000. If within two years 
their legislatures enacted measures placing the former slaves 
on a footing of complete equality, this money would be paid 
directly to the tribes, the Choctaws receiving three-fourths 
of the sum and the Chickasaws the balance. If, on the other 
hand, appropriate legislation was not enacted the United 
States would use the $300,000 to resettle the former Choctaw 
and Chickasaw slaves outside the Indian Territory. In the 
meantime, the freedmen of the two tribes were to enjoy the 
equal protection of the laws of the Choctaw and Chickasaw 
tribes and 'a fair renumeration . . . for their labor. . . ."
In Article XXXIX, provision was made for the recompense 
of the few members of the two tribes who remained loyal to 
the Union. The President of the United States was to appoint 
a commission, not exceeding three in number, to consider the 
claims of loyal Choctaws and Chickasaws for wartime losses. 
When the secretary of the interior approved the commission's 
report, payment would be made out of Choctaw and Chickasaw 
funds in the hands of the United States government.
All things considered, the terms of this treaty were
^^Kappler, Laws and Treaties, II, pp. 702-14.
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very salutary. Ironically, the near unanimity with which both 
tribes supported the Confederacy seems to have aided them in 
at least two ways in re-establishing these favorable treaty 
ties with the United States. First, tribal solidarity made 
it impossible for Federal negotiators to twist concessions 
from them by threatening to deal with rival delegations. In 
the case of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, rival delegations did 
not exist. Second, solidarity aided tribal leaders in planning 
the course of action to be followed in Washington. Knowing 
perfectly the wishes and desires of their people, and confident 
of their people's united support, the Choctaw and Chickasaw 
delegates reached Washington better prepared than any other 
delegates from the Indian Territory to negotiate with the 
United States.
How much of the credit for these favorable terms should 
be given to the delegates themselves is still a matter of 
debate. A recent student of the Choctaws, for example, seems 
to feel that Principal Chief Peter Pitchlynn and Governor 
Winchester Colbert in their joint report to their people 
exaggerated the importance of the delegates' actions in an
effort to make their shady financial transactions in Washington
pcwith attorney John H. B. Latrobe more palatable. Certainly 
criticism of the way in which the Choctaw delegates enriched
See David Baird, "Peter Pitchlynn: Choctaw Delegate," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 1968), 
pp. 197-204.
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themselves at the expense of their own people--by secretly 
receiving one-half of the $100,000 fee charged by Latrobe for 
his legal council and assistance--is well taken. Yet to 
leave Washington with a treaty better than that negotiated by any 
other tribe, the men who represented the Choctaws and Chickasaws 
must have been adroit individuals of above average ability.
The talks conducted with the Creeks were far more 
complicated than those with the Seminoles, Choctaws and 
Chickasaws. The Northern Creek delegates reached Washington 
early in January. Their Southern counterparts did not arrive 
until mid-February, and by that time the talks being conducted 
by Chief Sands and his associates were far advanced. On March 
3, the Northern Creek delegation signed a proposed treaty, and 
two days later Southern delegates D. N. McIntosh and James M.
C. Smith asked for copies. McIntosh and Smith quickly found 
much of the agreement unacceptable, and through Creek Agent 
J. W. Dunn they arranged to meet the loyal Creek delegates at 
their quarters at the Union Hotel.
The atmosphere that prevailed at this meeting was 
frigid at best. The Union delegates refused to consider the 
idea of permitting McIntosh and Smith to serve along with them 
as official Creek delegates. They insisted that they alone 
were authorized to treat with the United States. Furthermore
2&D. N. McIntosh and James M. C. Smith to D. N. Cooley, 
March 5, 1866, J. W. Dunn to Cooley, March 15, 1866, and Dunn 
to Elijah Sells, May 10, 1866, Letters Received, O.I.A., Creek 
Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 231; Commissioner* s Report,
1866, p. 10.
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they steadfastly maintained that the terms of their proposed 
treaty were the best that could be hoped for, and they bluntly 
informed the Southern delegates that interference on their part
would be regarded as both unkind and without authority. On
2 7this sour note, the encounter ended.
Next, McIntosh and Smith filed a lengthy report with 
the Federal negotiators in which they discussed in detail 
their objections to the treaty signed by their Northern 
bretheren. They believed, among other things that the loyal 
Creeks had agreed to cede an excessive amount of territory 
for an inadequate sum. Like John Brown they bemoaned the fact 
that tribal funds, allegedly the common property of all, were 
to be used to reimburse the loyal Creeks for wartime losses. 
The provisions granting equality to the tribe's former slaves 
were also unacceptable, and they complained about the absence 
of any stipulation preventing the confiscation of rebel Creek 
property by their Northern counterparts. For good measure, 
they faulted the officials of the Indian Bureau for their 
failure to treat them as official delegates, equal in every 
respect to Chief Sands and his a s s o c i a t e s . ^8
These events of early and mid-March were followed by a 
lengthy series of talks and maneuvers during which Federal
27j. w. Dunn to D. N. Cooley, March 15, 1866, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Creek Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 231.
28d . N. McIntosh and James M. C. Smith to D. N. Cooley 
et al. May 9, 1866, ibid.
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officials tried to reconcile the differences of the two Creek 
factions. On May 9 a second proposed treaty was signed, 
copies of which were forwarded to McIntosh and Smith in the 
hopes that it would meet with their approval. But it did not.
It appears that in this agreement the amount to be paid the 
loyal Indians out of tribal funds was reduced, but there was 
no provision for aid to destitute Southern Creeks. McIntosh 
and Smith believed that if their wartime adversaries received 
assistance out of tribal funds, their own indigent people 
should receive out of the cession money at least $200,000.
Equally as objectionable was that part of the treaty providing
29for the equality of the former slaves.
Undaunted, Secretary of the Interior James Harlan 
instructed his negotiators to continue their reconciliation 
efforts. Continued they were, and a compromise treaty entirely 
satisfactory to neither Creek faction, but generally
o nacceptable to both, was signed on June 14.
As in the earlier agreements with the other tribes, 
amnesty was granted in Article I for all past offences 
committed by any Creeks against their own government or that 
of the United States. In Article III, the Creeks formally 
agreed to cede to the United States the western half of their
2^0. N. McIntosh to James M. C. Smith to D. N. Cooley, 
May 9, 1866, ibid.; Cooley to James Harlan, May 18, 1866, and 
Charles E. Mix to Harlan, May 25, 1866, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters 
Received; Commissioner's Report, 1866, p. 10.
N. Cooley to W. T. Otto, June 14, 1866, R.G. 48, 
N.A., Letters Received; Commissioner* s Report, 1866, p. 10.
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domain, about 3,250,000 acres for thirty cents per acre. Of 
the $975,000 arising from this cession. It was agreed that 
$200,000 would be distributed per capita "to enable the Creeks 
to occupy, restore, and improve their farms. . . . "  Nothing 
was said about limiting these funds to the loyal Creeks, thus 
in the end the rebel members of the tribe, like the loyal, 
were permitted to use tribal funds to overcome war-inflicted 
poverty.
On the other hand. Article III did stipulate that 
$100,000 of the cession money would be used specifically to 
reimburse loyal Creek soldiers and refugees for their losses, 
but here again the forces of compromise were evident. Earlier 
drafts of the Creek treaty had set aside $300,000 as recompense 
for the loyal members of the tribe.
On one point--the Negro question--the Union Creeks 
would not compromise, and ultimately they prevailed. In the 
prolonged three-sided negotiations between the two Creek 
delegations and the United States commissioners, the repre­
sentatives of the loyal faction stated that Opothleyaholo 
had promised equality to all slaves who stood faithfully by 
his side, and they insisted that they must remain true to this 
"sacred pledge." As signed on June 14, the final Creek treaty 
not only formally abolished slavery within the tribe; it 
stipulated in addition that the Creek freedmen would "enjoy 
all the rights of native citizens, including an equal interest 
in the soil and national funds. . . . "  Finally the treaty
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granted north-south and east-west railroad right of ways and 
contained the now usual provisions dealing with the intertribal 
council. As the Seminoles before them, the tribe accepted the
O 1United States' wartime use of their funds for refugee relief.
The most prolonged and involved of the negotiations of 
1866 were those conducted with the Cherokees. In January,
1866 the tribe's two delegations, as bitterly divided as ever, 
reached Washington. In the ensuing months, their disagreements 
took the rival delegates on more than one occasion to the 
office of President Andrew Johnson. Characteristically,
Johnson seems to have said little at these encounters, and the 
representatives of both factions often came away from these 
meetings believing that the President's views were in harmony 
with their own. Washington politicians, at that very moment 
struggling with the task of Southern reconstruction, often had 
this same experience. In May the dissensions within the Cherokee 
tribe were given widespread display when John Ross and one of 
the leaders of the opposing delegation, John Rollin Ridge, 
exchanged embittered denunciations in the pages of Horace 
Greeley's New York Tribune.
3lKappler, Laws and Treaties, II, pp. 714-19; 
Commissioner]s Report. 1866, p. 10; D. N. Cooley to James 
Harlan, May 18, 1866, R.G. 48, N.A., Letters Received.
^^John Ross to Sister Sarah, January 19 and February 
22, 1866, John Ross Papers, Thomas Gilcrease Institute of 
American History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma; J. W. Washboume 
to J. A. Scales, June 1, 1866, Cherokee Nation Papers--Civil 
War Letters 1861-1874, Division of Manuscripts, University of 
Oklahoma.
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The Cherokee discussions were so lengthy and complex 
as to defy concise summation. Among the questions of greatest 
controversy was the cession of Cherokee lands for the 
resettlement of other tribes. The Northern Cherokees did not 
want to dispose of any territory lying east of the ninety- 
seventh meridian while their Southern counterparts would cede 
lands lying as far east as 95° 30'. The rebel delegates also 
favored the making of liberal land grants to railroad companies 
interested in extending their tracks through the Cherokee 
domain. E. C. Roudinot, in particular, was an enthusiastic 
railroad advocate, and as early as October, 1865 he had 
traveled to Washington with a letter of introduction from S.
N. Coleman, a Missouri promoter interested in the construction 
of a line from St. Louis to Galveston, Texas, via the Indian 
Territory. The Northern delegates, in contrast, recognized 
the inevitability of railroad construction in the Territory, 
but wanted only to grant right of ways about 200 feet in 
width to the companies concerned.
Most inçortantly, there was the question of Cherokee 
factionalism. Could the two feuding parties possibly live 
together as a united people? Surveying the scene, Cherokee
N. Cooley to Andrew Johnson, June 15, 1866, quoted 
in Joseph B. Thobum (ed.), "The Cherokee Question," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, II (1924), pp. 146-67 (hereafter cited as Thobum, 
Cherokee Question," CO, II); S. N. Coleman to James Harlan, 
October 20, 1865, R.G. 48, N.A. , Letters Received Miscellaneous
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Agent Justin Harlan concluded that they could not. In a 
letter to Southern Superintendent Elijah Sells on March 28, 
Harlan set forth the opinion that nothing had occurred during 
his three years as Cherokee agent to convince him that the 
rival factions could live together in peace and harmony. If 
reunited at this time he believed that bloody scenes 
reminiscent of the period immediately following the Cherokee 
removal would be repeated. The Southern Cherokees concurred 
in this opinion. Substantially outnumbered, they believed 
that their persons and property could be adequately protected 
only if their people were given a certain measure of autonomy. 
Specifically, they believed that a portion of the tribal domain 
must be set aside for the exclusive use of the Southern 
Cherokees, and they must have the authority to enact their own 
laws. Insisting always on tribal unity, in fact if not in 
spirit, the Northern Cherokees flatly rejected this p r o p o s a l . 34 
In an attençt to conclude the seemingly interminable 
talks. Secretary of the Interior Harlan early in June went so 
far as to propose that the Southern Cherokees resettle, for the 
time being at least, on a portion of the Choctaw domain. This 
idea came to naught, however, when the former rebel Cherokees 
insisted on being given the right to enact their own laws, a 
proposal unacceptable to the Choctaws. When this effort to
34justin Harlan to Elijah Sells, March 28, 1866, Letters 
Received, O.I.A., Cherokee Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 100; 
Richard Fields to Smith Christie, April 4, 1866, R ..C. 48, N.A. , 
Letters Received Miscellaneous; D. N. Cooley to Andrew Johnson, 
June 15, 1866, quoted in Thobum, "Cherokee Question," CO, II, pp. 146-67
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settle the Cherokee question failed, the disgruntled Federal 
negotiators entered into a treaty on June 13 with the Southern 
delegation, in effect recognizing the Cherokees who most 
consistently supported the Confederacy as the leaders of the 
tribe.
Quite possibly this move was a gambit designed to bring 
the proud, unconçromising Ross party to terms. If so, it 
worked. Faced again with the spectre of tribal disunity and 
displacement from their traditional positions of leadership, 
the Northern Cherokees, acting as the sole representatives of 
their tribe, placed their signatures on a treaty of peace on 
July 19. Understandably, this chain of events infuriated the 
Southern Cherokees who acquiesced in this treaty only reluc­
tantly and under p r o t e s t .
As it appears that they were used as pawns, the pique 
of the Southern Cherokees is understandable. But the terms 
meted out to them under the treaty were not all that bad. As 
in the other treaties of 1866, complete amnesty for all past 
actions was granted, and the Cherokee confiscation acts were
James Harlan to the Choctaw Delegation, June 4, 1866, 
and Harlan to Andrew Johnson, June 14, 1866, Letters Sent by 
the Indian Division of the Office of the Secretary of the 
Interior, N.A., Microcopy 606, Roll 6.
3^An undated document signed by the Southern Cherokee 
delegates giving their objections to the treaty signed by the 
Union delegates can be found in Letters Received, O.I.A., 
Cherokee Agency, N.A., Microcopy 234, Roll 100.
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specifically repealed. Further, all Cherokees and Cherokee 
freedmen who so desired might settle in reserved areas lying 
southwest of the Arkansas River and northwest of the Grand 
River. Here they could elect their own local officials and 
delegates to the Cherokee National Council and proposed inter­
tribal council. They could also enact any police regulations 
that were not contrary to the Cherokee constitution or the laws 
of the United States.
Again there were elaborate details dealing with the 
intertribal council. North-south and east-west railroad right 
of ways, not exceeding a width of 200 feet, except at specified 
points such as stations, were granted, and Cherokee freedmen 
received all the rights of native Cherokees. In Article XV, 
it was agreed that "civilized” Indians from outside the Terri­
tory might be settled on unoccupied Cherokee lands east of the 
ninety-sixth meridian, and Article XVI stipulated that 
"friendly" (i.e. non-hostile nomadic) Indians were to be 
settled west of that line. The Neutral Lands in Kansas were 
ceded in trust to the United States to be sold by the secretary 
of the interior either in their entirely to some "responsible 
party" or in small, individual allotments.
S^Kappler, Laws and Treaties, II, pp. 724-31. The 
Cherokee treaty contained no statement whereby the tribe 
accepted the use of its funds for refugee relief, for in the 
case of the Cherokees no such acknowledgment was necessary.
As the tribe did not receive any annuities under its treaties 
with the United States, no Cherokee funds had been spent 
during the war to maintain the Union refugees.
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Within days after the signing of the Cherokee treaty 
oi: July 19, Congress completed action on the various railroad 
measures affecting the Indian Territory introduced since 
December, 1865. Of the five such bills introduced, three 
were enacted into law. In 1865 James H. Lane was elected 
president of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Fort Gibson Rail­
road, and on January 31, 1866 the senator-president introduced 
a bill to grant additional lands, over and above those received 
under the act of March 2, 1863 to his railroad. But the
O Qmeasure died in committee.
Another bill which met its demise in committee was a
measure introduced by Missouri's B. Gratz Brown to aid in the
construction of the Kansas and Neosho Valley Railroad connecting
the Great Lakes with Galveston Bay.^9 But the supporters of
this particular project refused to give up. On April 25
Samuel Pomeroy introduced a similar bill, and after lengthy
debate in June and July, it made its way through both houses
40of Congress and vas signed by President Johnson on July 25.
^^Congressional Globe, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., January 31, 
1866, p. 520: March 9, 1866, p. 1273; May 10, 1866, p. 2547; 
Stephenson, "Lane," P.K.S.H.S., III, p. 150.
^^Congressional Globe, March 21, 1866, p. 1537 and April 
p. 1799. "
40ibid., April 25, 1866, p. 2163; ibid., May 17, 1866, 
p. 2635; ibid., May 31, 1866, pp. 2913-14; ibid., June 7,
1866, p. 3009; ibid., June 13, 1866, p. 3124; ibid., June 20, 
1866, pp. 3 2 7 9 - M T "ibid. , June 22, 1866, pp. 3lW^36; ibid. , 
July 24, 1866, pp. 4064-65.
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Also passed were a second Pomeroysponsored bill to assist 
in the construction of a Southern Branch of the Union Pacific 
Railroad from Fort Riley, Kansas, to Fort Smith, Arkansas, 
and legislation introduced by B. Gratz Brown granting lands 
for the construction of a transcontinental line via the 
southern route from Missouri and Arkansas to the Pacific 
Coast. These were signed into law by the President on July 
26 and 27, respectively.^^
This plenthora of legislation is somewhat misleading. 
Combined with the law of March 2, 1863 it would appear at 
first glance that no less than four railroads had been 
authorized by Congress to traverse the Indian Territory, one 
from east to west and three--the Kansas and Neosho Valley, 
the Union Pacific, Southern Branch, and the Leavenworth, 
Lawrence and Fort Gibson--from the north to south. But that 
was not the case. Section eleven of the act of July 25,
1866 granting lands to the Kansas and Neosho Valley Railroad 
provided that only one of the north-south lines would actually 
enter the Indian Territory. This right would be conferred on
41lbid., March 23, 1866, p. 1588; ibid., April 3, 1866, 
p. 1729; ibid.. May 18, 1866, p. 2664; ibid., May 21, 1866, 
p. 2706; ibid., June 30, 1866, pp. 3504-05; ibid., July 24,
1866, p. W 7 E .
42lbid., December 11, 1865, p. 17; ibid., February 13, 
1866, p. 806; ibid., February 28, 1866, p. 1069; ibid., March 
1, 1866, pp. 1100-03; ibid., March 2, 1866, p. 1132; ibid., 
July 27, 1866, p. 4230.
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the company which first extended its track to the Southern 
boundary of K a n s a s . I n  future years this feature of the law 
was the subject of much controversy, but the United States, 
much to the disappointment of railroad entrepreneurs, held to 
the letter of the law. In a decision rendered in 1870, 
Secretary of the Interior Jacob D. Cox insisted that the true 
intent of Congress was to permit the entry of only one north- 
south line into the Indian Territory, a decision concurred in 
by President Ulysses S. G r a n t . ^4 But all of that was a 
question for the future.
It is impossible to know what passed through the minds 
of the delegates of the Five Civilized Tribes as they made 
their way home from Washington. Those with a sharp eye for 
profits possibly looked forward to the coming of the railroad 
to the Indian Territory and the creation of new business 
opportunities. Perhaps the Choctaw delegates thought smugly 
of the favorable terms extracted from the United States and 
the $50,000 they were about to extract from their own people. 
For most, however, the long trip westward was doubtless a time 
of quiet meditation. Watching the countryside slip by from 
the windows of their railroad coaches, they must have tried 
to make some sense out of the confusing events of the past
43gtatutes at Large, XIV, pp. 238-39.
^^Railroads Through the Indian Territory, Miscellaneous Indian Documents Collection, Volume 1, bocument No. 20, 
Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma.
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five years. They had never really understood this war 
between North and South. They only knew that this conflict 
had reopened old fissures within their tribes and had brought 
much intense suffering. Yet, even though many had stood by 
the Union in its time of deepest travail, in the end all were 
treated as traitors, and faced with the prospect of Federal 
forfeiture of their traditional rights and privileges, all 
were forced to yield to the demands of the United States. 
After wrestling briefly and wearily with this bewildering 
array of events, as best they could, the Indian delegates 
probably put them out of mind and thought of their families 
and the prospect of restoring some semblance of order out of 
the chaos imposed on their people by the Civil War.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Manuscript and Archlvial Collections
Norman, Oklahoma - Division of Manuscripts, Bizzell Library, 
University of Oklahoma
Cherokee Nation Papers - Civil War Letters 1861-1874
Cherokee Nation Paperc - Letters to J, M. Bell 
1837-1907
Miscellaneous Indian Documents Collection 
Peter P. Pitchlynn Papers 
John Ross Papers
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma - Indian Records Division, Oklahoma 
Historical Society
Cherokee Nation Papers - Section A - Federal Relations
Section X - Civil War 
Choctaw Nation Papers - Section A - Federal Relations 
Creek Nation Papers - Section A - Federal Relations
Section X - Biography
Grant Foreman Papers
Seminole Nation Papers - Section A - Miscellaneous
347
348
Tulsa, Oklahoma - Thomas Gllcrease Institute of American 
History and Art
John Ross Papers
Peter P. Pitchlynn Papers
Washington, D. C.




Legislative Records - Appointment Papers, 38 
Congress, 2 Session
Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs: 
Cherokee Agency - 1861-1866 
Choctaw Agency - 1861-1866 
Chickasaw Agency - 1861-1866 
Creek Agency - 1861-1866 
Seminole Agency - 1861-1866 
Southern Superintendency - 1861-1866
Letters Sent by the Indian Division of the Office 
of the Secretary of the Interior - 1861-1866
Letters Sent by the Office of Indian Affairs - 
1861-1866
Records of the Office of the Secretary of the 
Interior, Indian Division





American State Papers. Documents, Legislative and 
Executive, of the Congress of the United States, 
From the First Session of the Fourteenth to the 
Second Session of the Nineteenth Congress,
Inclusive: Commencing December 4,~r8l5 and Ending 
March 2, 1827. Class II. Volume II. Indian 
Affairs. Walter Lowrie and Walter S. Franklin, 
editors. Washington, D. C .: Gales and Seaton,
1834.
Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies. Washington, D. C. : 
Government Printing Office, 1891-1895.
Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties. 2 vols. Charles
J. Kappler, editor. Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1903.
Journa1 of the House of Representatives. 3 7 Congress,
2 Session, 1861.
Journal of the Senate of the United States of America. 
37 Congress, 2 Session, 1862; 38 Congress, 2 
Session, 1865.
Journals of the Continental Congress. Vol. II. 
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
1904.
Statutes at Large. Vol. XII-XIV.
The Congressional Globe. 1861-1866.
The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128
vols. Washington, D. C. : Government Printing 
Office, 1881-1902.
2. Congressional Serial Set
a) Senate
350
36 Congress, 1 Session, Mis. Doc. No. 61
37 Congress, 1 Session, Report No. 1
37 Congress, 2 Session, Ex. Doc. No. 1; Mis.
Doc. No. 5 7
38 Congress, 1 Session, Ex. Doc. No. 44; Mis. 
Docs. Nos. 29, 30, 63
38 Congress, 2 Session, Mis. Doc. No. 25
b) House of Representatives
37 Congress, 2 Session, Mis. Doc. No. 75 
3 7 Congress, 3 Session, Ex. Doc. No. 1
38 Congress, 1 Session, Ex. Doc. No. 1; Mis. Doc.
No. 51
38 Congress, 2 Session, Ex. Doc. No. 1; Mis. Doc.
No. 56
39 Congress, 1 Session, Ex. Doc. No. 1
39 Congress, 2 Session, Ex. Doc. No. 1
B. State
Kansas. Senate Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the 
State of Kansas, At Its Fourth Session, Commenced At 
The City of Topeka, January 10, And Concluded March 2, 
1865. Topeka: S. D. MacDonalH and Co. , 1865.
The Laws of the State of Kansas; Passed At The
Fifth Session of the Legislature, Commenced At the 
State Capital, On Tuesday, January 10, 1 8 ^ . Topeka:
S. D. MacDonald and Co., 1865.
C. Tribal
Laws of the Cherokee Nation. Vol. 251, np, nd. Indian
Records Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma 
City.
Newspapers 
Fort Smith New Era, September 2, 1865.
351
Fort Smith Weekly News, September 16, 1865.
Unpublished Materials
Baird, David. "Peter Pitchlynn: Choctaw Delegate."
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 
1968.
Brown, Walter Lee. "Albert Pike 1809-1891." Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas, 1955.
Clark, Ira G. "Attempts to Form an Indian Confederation 
in 0klahoma--1860-1890." Unpublished M.A. thesis. 
University of Oklahoma, 1937.
Forde, Lois E. "Elias Cornelius Boudinot." Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1951.
Morrison, James D. "Social History of the Choctaw."
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Oklahoma, 1951.
Parsons, David. "The Removal of the Osages from Kansas." 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Oklahoma, 1940.
Reed, Gerard A. "The Ross-Watie Conflict: Factionalism in 
the Cherokee Nation, 1839-1865." Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 1967.
Books and Articles
Abel, Annie H. The Slaveholding Indians. 3 vols. Cleveland:
The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1915-25.
Allhands, James L. "History of Construction of Frisco Lines 
in Oklahoma," Chronicles of Oklahoma, III, (1925), 
pp. 229-39.
Anderson, Mabel Washboume. "General Stand Watie," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, X, (1932), pp. 540-55.
Banks, Dean. "Civil-War Refugees From Indian Territory in 
the North, 1861-1864," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XLI, 
(1963), pp. 286-98.
35 2
Easier, Roy P. (ed.). The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln.
8 vols. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University 
Press, 1953.
Bearss, Edwin C. and Gibson, Arrell M. Fort Smith; Little 
Gibraltar on the Arkansas. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 196$.
Blunt, James G. "General Blunt's Account of His Civil War 
Experiences," The Kansas Historical Quarterly, I,
(1932), pp. 213775.
Brigham, Johnson. James Harlan. Iowa City, Iowa: The State 
Historical Society of Iowa, 1913.
Brown, Everett Sommerville. The Constitutional History of
the Louisiana Purchase léoT-1812. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1920.
Castel, Albert. A Frontier State at War; Kansas, 1861-1865. 
Ithaca, N. Y.; Cornell University Press, 1958.
Crooks, G. R. Life of Bishop Matthew Simpson of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1090.
Carman, H. J. and Luthin, R. H. Lincoln and the Patronage.
New York; Columbia University Press, 1943.
Debo, Angie. And Still the Waters Run. New York; Gordian 
Press, 1966.
_______ . The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1961.
_______ . The Road to Disappearance. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1941.
Foreman, Grant. Indian Remova1 The Emigration of the Five 
Civilized Tribes of Indians. Norman; University of 
Oklahoma Press, l9F3.
Gates, Paul W. Fifty Million Acres; Conflicts over Kansas
Land Policy, 1854-1090. Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 
Ï95?.
Gibson, Arrell M. Oklahoma--A History of Five Centuries.
Norman; Harlow Press, T965.
_______ . The Kickapoos ; Lords of the Middle Border. Norman;
University of Oklahoma Press, 1963.
353
Hagan, William T. American Indians. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1961.
Hendrick, Burton K. Lincoln* s War Cabinet. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1946.
Hill, Luther B. A History of the State of Oklahoma, 2 vols.
Chicago and New York: The Lewis Publishing Co., 1908.
Hollon, W. Eugene. The Southwest Old and New. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1961.
Homer, Charles W. Winfield Scott the Soldier and the Man.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937.
Johnson, Ludwell H. Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton 
in the Civil War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1958.
Johnson, Walter A. "Brief History of the Missouri-Kansas- 
Texas Railroad Lines," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXIV, 
(1946), pp. 340-358.
Litton, Gaston L. "The Principal Chiefs of the Cherokee
Nation," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XV, (1937), pp. 253- 
270.
Luthin, Reinhard H. Lincoln and His Cabinet A Complete One 
Volume History of His Life and Times. Englewood,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall. 1960.
McReynolds, Edwin C. The Seminoles. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 195 7.
Macartney, Clarence E. Lincoln and His Cabinet. New York: 
Charles Scriber's Sons, 1931.
Masterson, V. V. The Katy Railroad and the Last Frontier. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952.
Monaghan, Jay. Civil War on the Western Border 1854-1865. 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955.
Morris, John W. and McReynolds, Edwin C. Historical Atlas of 
Oklahoma. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1^65.
Nevins, Allan and Richardson, James D. (eds.). The Messages 
and Papers of Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy 
Including Diplomatic Correspondence 1861-1865. 2 vols.
New York: Chelsea House-Robert Hector, 1966.
354
Randall, James G. and Donald, David. The Civil War and 
Reconstruction. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company,
Richardson, James D. (ed.). A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 1764-l40#. 11 vols.
Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art,
1909.
Richardson, Rupert N. Texas The Lone Star State. Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1^58.
Stephenson, Wendell H. "The Political Career of General 
James H. Lane," Publications of the Kansas State 
Historical Society, III, (193Ôy, pp. 1-196.
Thoburn, Joseph H. (ed.). "The Cherokee Question," Chronicles 
of Oklahoma, II (1924), pp. 141-242.
Vaughn, Alden T. New England Frontier Puritans and Indians 
1620-16 75. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965.
Washburn, Wilcomb. "The Moral and Legal Justifications for 
Dispossessing the Indians." Seventeenth Century 
America. Edited by James Morton Smith. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1959.
Woodward, Grace Steele. The Cherokees. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1963.
Young, Mary E. "Indian Removal and Land Allotment: The
Civilized Tribes and Jacksonian Justice." American 
Historical Review, LXIV, (1958), pp. 31-45.
________. "The Creek Frauds: A Study in Conscience and
Corruption." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
XLII, (1955), pp. 411-37.
Miscellaneous
Johnson and Graham's Lessee v s . McIntosh. 8 Wheaton (U.S.) 
pp. 570-605. Rochester, New York: The Lawyers Co­
operative Publishing Co., 1960.
355
Message of the President, and Report of Albert Pike,
Commissioner of the Confederate States to the Indian 
Nations West of Arkansas. of the Results of his 
Mission. Richmond: Enquirer Book and Job Press, 1861 
(microfilm copy, Division of Manuscripts, Bizzell 
Library, University of Oklahoma, Norman).
Worchester v s . State of Georgia. 6 Peters (U.S.) pp. 542-61.
Rochester, New York: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing 
Co., 1960.
